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!
Abstract!
 
Contemporary egalitarianism has largely developed in abstraction from the basic 
fact that time passes, people age, and so any given society comprises several 
overlapping generations. As a result, few normative tools are available to assess 
claims made about the fairness of time-sensitive distributions. The field of 
intergenerational justice has emerged to fill this gap, but its theorists have primarily 
focused on the question of what we owe to future generations. My thesis 
contributes to egalitarian thought and intergenerational justice by providing an 
egalitarian account of justice between co-existing generations. It answers the 
question of which inequalities between age groups, on the one hand, and birth 
cohorts, on the other hand, matter; and it offers a framework to establish what 
counts as a suitably egalitarian treatment of young people.  
 
The thesis is in two parts: the first establishes the theoretical framework, and the 
second makes explicit its implications for two policy discussions. In Part I, I 
highlight the generational implications of the dominant diachronic view of equality 
through time – complete lives egalitarianism (CLE). While it provides key insights 
into birth-cohort justice, CLE cannot account for why some cases of age-group 
inequalities are unjust. I then propose two complements to CLE to overcome its 
limitations: a prudential diachronic approach grounded on Daniels’s theory of age-
group justice, and a synchronic alternative inspired by McKerlie’s work. From the 
first three chapters, I derive three principles of equality between overlapping 
generations: (1) approximate cohort equality, (2) prudential lifespan planning 
(lifespan sufficiency and efficiency), and (3) relational synchronic equality. I then 
draw on these principles to establish what ‘treating the young as equals’ means. In 
Part II, I put forward an intergenerational egalitarian case for basic income. I then 
consider whether we should be concerned about the absence of young people in 
parliaments, and propose the introduction of youth quotas.  
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INTRODUCTION!
 
 
Like ‘The Terminator’, justice between 
generations is an idea that will not go away. 
(Moody 2007, 125) 
 
 
This thesis offers an intergenerational egalitarian response to the question ‘what 
does it mean to treat young people as equals?’. The introduction that follows is 
divided into four parts. First, I highlight the triple political context that frames and 
motivates my research project: the urgency of youth unemployment, poverty and 
exclusion; the prevalence of anti-youth discourses and policies; and the ambiguity 
and disconnectedness of existing intergenerational discourses. Against this 
backdrop, I state my research questions and specify some of the research gaps in 
the literature addressed by this thesis. I then introduce my methodology - 
Philosophy of Public Policy - before presenting an overview of the thesis’ 
structure. 
 
Social,!Discursive!and!Political!Context!
 
According to The Prince’s Trust, “If we lined up Britain's unemployed young 
people, the job queue would stretch from London to Middlesbrough” (Martina 
Milburn in The Prince's Trust 2013). The Joseph Rowntree Foundation reports that 
unemployment rates in the UK are 21% for young people between 16 and 24 years 
old and 6% for 25-64 year-olds (MacInnes et al. 2013, 38). Unemployment rates 
for young adults are always likely to be higher than for older age groups, but the 
gap is widening as unemployment rates for the young rise. In 1992, the 
unemployment rate of the young was twice as high as for the rest of the population, 
now it is four times higher (MacInnes et al. 2013, 38). Long-term unemployment is 
also increasing: the number of young people who have been without a job for more 
than 24 months has increased by more than 330% in the past decade (The Prince's 
Trust 2013). The consequences of youth unemployment can be disastrous for the 
individuals involved. For instance, long-term unemployment is often connected to 
depression: 25% of young people who have been unemployed for longer than 6 
months have been prescribed anti-depressants (The Prince's Trust 2014, 8). A study 
conducted by the Prince’s Trust estimated that more than 20% of long-term 
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unemployed youth felt like “they have nothing to live for” (The Prince's Trust 
2014, 14).   
 
At the European level (EU28), the rate of unemployment amongst those 16-24 is 
23%, approximately twice the overall rate (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2011, 1). There are important 
differences from one European country to another. The European countries that are 
doing best in terms of youth unemployment are currently Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands - with youth unemployment rates lower than 10% - while the worst 
countries for youth unemployment are Spain and Greece - with youth 
unemployment rates of more than 55% (EU Committee of the House of Lords 
2014, 20). According to one of the largest studies conducted on Youth 
Unemployment by the Eurofound, there are approximately 14 million young 
people who are not in employment, education or training across the EU: 7.5 million 
between 15 and 24 years old and a further 6.5 million between 25 and 29 years old. 
The Eurofound estimates that the economic costs associated with the resulting state 
welfare and lost production could be as high as 153 billion euros a year (Eurofound 
2012).  
 
Even when they do have jobs, young people are disproportionately likely to be in 
precarious positions. As Guy Standing argues, although many other groups make 
up what he calls ‘the precariat’, “the most common image is of young people 
emerging from school and college to enter a precarious existence lasting years, 
often made all the more frustrating because their parents’ generation had seemingly 
held stable jobs” (Standing 2011, 18). Precarious jobs are defined as insecure 
positions that do not allow for the construction of an occupational identity 
(Standing 2011, 16). They are more likely to be temporary and involve fewer 
hours. There is also the relatively new phenomenon of an army of interns, only half 
of which are paid the minimum wage in the UK (Lawton 2010, 6). At the European 
level, a recent study by the European Youth Forum estimates that half of all interns 
receive compensation for their work, although a further half of this group said they 
were not paid sufficiently to cover their day to day expenses (Dyrnes 2011, 15).  
 
Despite this context of job scarcity and the structural precariousness they have to 
face, the young are often regarded with little sympathy. Media and politicians alike 
tend to emphasize personal desert and render young people responsible for their 
own situation. The generation born in the 1980s – Generation Y - has been 
described as the ‘entitlement generation’, ‘generation me’ (or GenMe), and even 
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the ‘dumbest generation’ (Twenge 2006, Bauerlein 2008). Discourses on youth 
often revolve around their alleged laziness, bad attitude, and strong sense of 
entitlement (Jones 2011, Buckingham 2012). A recent study commissioned by 
Women in Journalism has shown that the best chance young boys have to be 
portrayed positively by the media is if they are dead (Bawdon 2009, 12). Young 
people are asked to “stop whingeing, stop complaining, and just get on with it” 
(Howker and Malik 2010, 2) and to take on their responsibilities, or “we should cut 
all your benefits and starve you into going back to work” (Lord Digby Jones in 
Howker and Malik 2010, 67).  
 
As the writers of Jilted Generation argue, there seems to be a resurgence of a 
Victorian ideology that sees laziness where there is poverty and disadvantage, and 
lack of personal responsibility where there are structural and systemic issues 
(Howker and Malik 2010, 69). These feelings towards younger cohorts are quite 
widespread. In the US, 70% of Americans believe today’s young people are less 
virtuous and industrious than their elders (Taylor et al. 2009, 8). The 
Intergenerational Foundation recently published a report on the perception of 
young people in European countries: “When asked to rate overall how positively or 
negatively people felt towards those in their 20s, respondents from the UK gave its 
younger people the lowest score of any country, coming 29th out of 29 countries” 
(Leach 2011, 3). It does not come as much of a surprise that some 85% of young 
boys under 20 years old in the UK feel that they are unfairly portrayed by the 
media (Bawdon 2009). 
 
If young people are portrayed and perceived as lazy, self-serving and unwilling, 
when as a group they are none of those things, then there is at least some reason to 
worry that youth policies may be inadequate. If policies are driven by group 
representations and prejudices of the kind, they may miss the urgency of youth 
poverty and unemployment, and not take young peoples’ interests seriously enough 
(Buckingham 2012, Howker and Malik 2010). In France, for instance, until 2010, 
the guaranteed minimum income scheme introduced in 1988 excluded young 
citizens under the age of 25 years old. The newly reformed scheme, however, is so 
restrictive that at the end of 2011, only 10,000 young people were receiving 
income benefits, while over a million people aged between 18 and 25 lived under 
the poverty line (Landré 2011). The primary reasons given by the French 
government for the age-based differential treatment were that the young should be 
taught the right values, and that they should not be given something for nothing 
(Bidadanure 2012). Similarly, in the UK, some have argued that the young 
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unemployed are often the first age group to be threatened with loss of their benefits 
or pushed into workfare programmes (Malik 2011, 2012a). Given the current 
situation of young people across European countries, the need to reflect seriously 
upon what societies owe their young citizens cannot be overestimated.  
 
Taking on this challenge, some groups have condemned what they claim are clear 
instances of injustice. In the UK, there is a growing interest in issues of 
intergenerational justice. Think tanks (Demos, Intergenerational Foundation), 
journalists (Shiv Malik, Ed Howker), activists (Clare Coatman) and politicians 
(David Willetts) have voiced, all in different ways, their concerns for 
intergenerational fairness. They complain that some generations – in general 
younger and future generations - are getting fewer resources, benefits or 
entitlements than others, and that such inequalities are morally objectionable. For 
instance, some argue that it is not fair that (a) the generation of young people today 
will end up having paid “a higher share of their incomes to their governments for a 
lower entitlement to services and benefits from their governments” (Coyle 2011, 
103). Others claim that (b) it is unfair that the government’s spending per elderly 
person is several times higher than the amount spent per child and that “of the NHS 
[annual] budget of about £100bn, half goes on the over-65s” (Willetts 2010). Some 
also complain that (c) the young are entitled to a lower minimum wage than older 
adults, while others stress the fact that (d) the unemployment rate of the 16-25 
years old age group is twice as high than for the rest of the population. Many also 
find it unjust that (e) the young today have to pay so much in tuition fees to study 
towards higher education while the generation before them – the baby-boomers – 
did not have to pay for the same services when they were young themselves. 
 
Commentators often assume that intergenerational inequalities such as (a-e) are 
self-evidently wrong. As Rainer Forst argues: “when persons are treated unequally 
that always seems to feed the corrective desire for justice, the desire to put an end 
to such inequality” (Forst 2011, 190). But inequalities between generations may 
not all matter equally. For instance, it seems that the claim (b) - that it is prima 
facie unfair that the elderly consume a much larger share of healthcare resources 
than other age groups - is mistaken, and I think that most egalitarians would agree. 
As we age, we need more healthcare resources to function as equals in terms of 
capabilities, welfare or wellbeing. Assuming we think of the right distribution of 
healthcare resources in some other way than mere equality of resources (for 
example, in terms of responding to healthcare needs), then the elderly are likely to 
consume a very large share of those resources. Many egalitarians would agree that 
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there is something wrong with claim (b), but there are few theoretical tools to 
explain what makes some inequalities between generations unfair and others 
legitimate.  
 
Sociologists, politicians and journalists do not always spell out the normative 
assumptions that underpin their condemnation of intergenerational inequalities. 
The available understandings of intergenerational fairness are thus often confused. 
At best, intergenerational fairness is becoming a buzzword loosely signifying 
“forward-looking” or “promoting the interests of younger and future generations”; 
at worst, it has come to equate with “leaving a bank balance as close to the black as 
possible” and eventually with economic austerity (Little 2012). The cost of not 
burdening future generations with increasing levels of debts is thus often 
understood as the slashing of the very services that disproportionately benefit the 
bottom of the income distribution. From this angle, the requirements of 
intergenerational justice thus seem to sometimes contradict the requirements of 
social equality and solidarity. 
 
Such an understanding of intergenerational justice, as a reduction of the per capita 
debt passed on to the next generation, results in the following paradox: even the 
drastic decreasing of the benefits aimed at young people such as the higher 
education budget, youth jobseeker allowances, or youth housing benefits is 
defended in the name of younger and future generations, because the debt passed 
on to them must be lowered. Thus although the debt-ridden interpretation of the 
requirements of intergenerational justice is only one conception of 
intergenerational justice amongst others, as Shiv Malik argues, it has rendered 
egalitarians suspicious and eventually driven them away from intergenerational 
justice:  
Intergenerational justice – the main trunk of generational enquiry – is still 
viewed with suspicion by those on the traditional left. For a start, it 
apparently holds all the wrong antagonistic qualities when compared to 
class warfare – why fight the vested interests of your parents when you 
should be fighting those of the upper classes? Or to put it another way, 
how does fighting the baby boomers stop the fat cats from making off with 
society’s plunder?  
(Malik 2012, 7) 
 
This suspicion of intergenerational justice on the left can be traced back to the 
recent history of intergenerational discourses. In the 1980s, ‘generational equity 
groups’, whose leader was AGE (Americans for Generational Equity) and which 
Harry Moody (2007) refers to as “the nightmare of gerontology”, radically changed 
the terms of the policy debate around the unaffordability of ageing: “AGE pushed 
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forward the idea that population aging was unaffordable and that the old were 
gaining benefits at the expense of the young” (Moody 2007, 131). Its members 
argued that the ageing of the population was threatening the equity in benefit ratios 
between the young and the old, and as a response, advocated the privatization of 
social insurance schemes. From their perspective, if each generation was 
responsible for itself and saved accordingly, then problems of inequity between 
successful generations would be tackled. For Moody, such debate “has not 
disappeared but has assumed new forms in different countries. Like “The 
Terminator”, justice between generations is an idea that will not go away” (Moody 
2007, 125).  
 
Research!Aims!
 
My goal in this thesis is to provide an egalitarian account of intergenerational 
justice that takes seriously the challenges faced by the young as a vulnerable social 
group. I articulate a theory of justice between generations that does not follow the 
generational equity debate down the reactionary path it took in the 1980s, and aims 
to ease the suspicions of the Left. My account is egalitarian in two ways: (1) it is a 
theory of intergenerational equality; and (2) it works to further egalitarianism in its 
traditional focus on the least advantaged, through promoting a conception that 
does not promote an otherwise unjust society.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis aims to answer the question: ‘what does it means to treat the 
young as equals?’. I provide both a theoretical answer – asking what makes young 
adulthood special for distributive justice - and a practical answer – asking which 
radical policies could help bring about a temporally fair egalitarian society. I thus 
provide the conceptual clarifications and the normative tools needed to respond to 
the following questions: 
 
- Which inequalities between generations matter? 
- What does it mean for a young person to be equal to an elderly person? 
- When do institutions treat different age groups as equals? 
- What do we owe to young people - in theory and in practice?  
- What is special about time, age and the young for distributive justice?  
- What is a properly egalitarian way to answer these questions? 
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This thesis makes three core theoretical contributions to contemporary political 
philosophy. First, it is a contribution to egalitarian thought. Egalitarian theories 
will not be complete until they can accommodate issues of equality through time. 
And yet, as Petter Laslett put it thirty years ago, “the revival of political theory 
over the past three decades has taken place within the grossly simplifying 
assumptions of a largely timeless world” (Laslett 1979, 36). Things have changed 
since then. At the very end of the 1980s, the highly abstract ‘equality through time’ 
debate emerged. It sought to establish the time unit to which dominant egalitarian 
accounts for justice should apply: if John and Marry are unequal at T1 and unequal 
at T2 but equal overall, should we care? Is equality a diachronic value, in which 
case we should find the respective situation of John and Marry unproblematic, or is 
equality a synchronic value, in which case, we should find the inequality at T1 and 
T2 problematic. However, participants in this debate did not sufficiently connect 
their discussion of this abstract puzzle and the topic of intergenerational justice 
(Lippert-Rasmussen and Holtug 2006). The first important contribution of this 
thesis is that it deliberately reconnects this debate to generational issues and 
highlights its concrete implications for the field of justice between generations. 
 
Second, in recent years, many philosophers have been concerned with issues of 
intergenerational justice, but most of them have focused on issues arising from 
what we owe ‘future generations’. The intergenerational literature has largely 
focused on the problems of justice that arise when we ask what our duties of justice 
are to people who do not yet exist. Very little has been written in political 
philosophy on what co-existing generations owe each other and even less on issues 
of intergenerational equality. And yet, as Larry Temkin argues, understanding what 
intergenerational justice requires demands that we consider carefully what role 
moral principles of equality should play between groups of people born at different 
times:  
an adequate account of intergenerational justice will require as one of its 
central components a thoughtful and systematic treatment of the topic of 
intergenerational inequality. Nothing remotely resembling such a treatment 
has been afforded to date. Until it is, our understanding of the nature and 
extent of our obligations toward other generations will be incomplete and 
woefully inadequate. 
(Temkin 1992, 201) 
 
I take on this challenge and focus exclusively on co-existing generations, with an 
emphasis on what we owe to young people. By young people I will refer to the age 
group of 18 to 25 year-olds, but I will sometimes include slightly younger (16-18) 
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and slightly older young adults (up to 30 or 35 years old). I take care to specify the 
range when relevant. 
 
Third, this thesis provides a detailed analysis of the normative importance of the 
distinction between two meanings of the concept of generation: age groups and 
birth cohorts. Simply put, the puzzle I engage with is the following. On the one 
hand, we have no more control over our age than over our gender or ‘race’, so 
perhaps age – like gender and ‘race’ - should be seen as a criterion that is not 
morally relevant in justifying inequality. On the other hand, given that we all age - 
whereas we do not (in most cases) change ethnicity or gender - inequalities that are 
age-based seem to be less problematic. The basic fact that we all age gives intuitive 
strength to the dominant default approach to equality through time – complete lives 
egalitarianism – which states that we should aim to treat people equally over their 
complete lives.  
 
Complete lives egalitarianism, I show, brings interesting insights to explain why 
inequalities between birth cohorts matter, but is incapable on its own of making 
sense of why some inequalities between age groups matter. I argue that, even if we 
contend that complete lives equality, and hence birth cohort equality, is a goal of 
justice, there are at least two further goals which egalitarians should acknowledge. 
One is ensuring that inequalities between age groups are always ‘prudent’. The 
other is making sure that society is free from synchronic relationships of inequality. 
To highlight these two key principles of age-group justice, I introduce and discuss 
the key arguments of Norman Daniels and Dennis McKerlie, before going on to 
offer an account that advances the literature beyond these seminal contributions. 
This thesis can thus be seen as an in-depth discussion of the requirements of age-
group justice extensively discussing an aspect of intergenerational justice that is 
often overlooked (Gosseries and Meyer 2009, 6).  
 
To recap: this thesis makes three core theoretical contributions to the literature on 
intergenerational equality: (1) it draws out the concrete implications of the abstract 
‘equality through time debate’ for generational issues; (2) it develops a substantive 
egalitarian account of justice between overlapping generations, and instead of 
focusing on future unborn generations it focuses on young people; (3) it highlights 
the normative importance of the demographic distinction between age groups and 
birth cohorts and contributes to the under-researched field of age-group justice. 
Throughout the thesis, I also make an important methodological contribution by 
bringing the age group/cohort distinction to bear on other questions in political 
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philosophy. In Chapter 3, for instance, I make an important contribution on the 
nature of egalitarian commitment: I use the generational example to make a 
broader point about the distinction between distributive and relational conceptions 
of equality. I argue that the two conceptions cannot be reduced one to the other and 
that purely distributive accounts obscure a fundamental set of problematic 
inequalities. Similarly, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I bring the distinction to bear on 
further questions in political philosophy such as the distinction between pre-
distribution and re-distribution, the debate between basic income and basic capital, 
and the introduction of youth quotas in parliament. I show that taking on board the 
two dimensions of the generational lens enlightens each of these important debates.   
 
Methodology:!Philosophy!of!Public!Policy!
 
This research relates to the central question of distributive justice “who should get 
what and why?” - and thus belongs in the arena of political philosophy. However, 
my approach to normative theory is practical. The methodology used is at the 
intersection between political philosophy and public policy. This approach 
recognizes public policies as objects worthy of philosophical enquiry and considers 
the scope of political philosophy to extend beyond ideal theory. In this thesis, I 
systematically relate my normative considerations to the non-ideal circumstances 
in which we live and do not confine myself to asking what ideal societies owe to 
young people in the abstract. The aim of this section is to sketch what this 
methodology consists of, to discuss some its key benefits compared to purely ideal 
political philosophy, and to show why my thesis is an example of it. 
 
There are perhaps as many different definitions of philosophy and its purpose as 
there are philosophers. It may be thought of as a discipline without an object of its 
own. It consists of a form of critical reflection that can be applied to objects from 
mathematics and physics to arts, history and politics. Political philosophy - the 
branch of philosophy that takes politics as its object of study - can be practiced in 
many different ways. For instance, one may focus on the historical development of 
certain norms, concepts and conceptions or seek to illuminate and explain a 
philosopher’s political theory. Analytical political philosophy is a resolutely 
normative enterprise that seeks to develop a theory of how things ought to be in the 
political realm. Its style is systematic, rigorous and deductive. It uses reason to 
examine the different views that can be consistently held and their implications for 
various examples (Pettit 2012, 8). Political philosophers cherish the idea that things 
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could always be otherwise. They can point to a direction – an ideal society that we 
should wish to bring into existence - and they can argue that things should be one 
way or another. They can, for example, dispute that the ultimate goal of justice is 
equality of welfare, for instance, or equality of resources.  
 
But the risk with such a focus is that it may be too abstract and disconnected from 
reality to inform practice. Contemporary analytical philosophy has often been 
criticised for being too abstract and disconnected from empirical facts 
(Stemplowska and Swift 2012). Analytical theories of equality, for instance, are 
often critiqued for appealing to very abstract examples without enough concern for 
what people really experience or have struggled against in history (Anderson 
1999). This poses the question of what philosophers can do for politics. In many 
cases, knowing what a just society would look like does not directly help in 
knowing which policies should be implemented in a given society, at a given time 
(Sen 2009). If political philosophers seek to contribute to politics in a more 
immediate way, therefore, they must try to engage more directly with the political 
contexts in which they write, identify midpoints as well as ideals, and seek to draw 
more explicitly some of the implications their theories have for policies.  
 
Philosophy of Public Policy (PPP) takes on this challenge: it combines rigorous 
ideal debates with policy discussions. It seeks to avoid approaching politics in a 
disconnected manner and aims to make philosophy directly relevant to practice. 
Philosophers that engage in this practice seek to intervene “by way of argument 
into policy debates” (Wolff 2011, 8). PPP analyses the normative assumptions used 
to prescribe or implement policies. The specificity of PPP, as I aim to practice it in 
this thesis, is that it starts with political problems at the institutional level and uses 
ideal theory instrumentally to enlighten a specific pre-existing political debate. In 
this way, this thesis has started by highlighting the political contexts and problems 
that animate the philosophical discussions. Throughout, I will use concrete political 
and policy examples, and will end with two policy-oriented chapters where I 
explicitly draw the implications of the theoretical framework developed for 
policymaking. I will still use ideal theory and appeal to some abstract examples to 
clarify our intuitions. In this sense, this thesis still very much fits in contemporary 
ideal theory. But the aim is always to reconnect abstract discussions to the practical 
institutional problem this thesis seeks to inform.  
 
How does the philosopher of public policy proceed? She may try to identify what 
success should mean for policies. As Adam Swift and Stuart White (2008) argue, 
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one important task of the political philosopher is to clarify the goals we are trying 
to achieve with a given policy and to decide which goal we should be pursuing 
(Swift and White 2008, 50). Sometimes the goal will be obvious and 
uncontroversial, but sometimes it will need serious discussion. The starting point of 
this thesis is that the ultimate goal, in the context of equality through time, is not 
straightforward. It is not obvious how time and age should be approached or how 
we should deal with these issues at the practical level.  
 
The philosopher of public policy may use many philosophical techniques to 
enlighten a specific debate. This may include drawing important conceptual 
distinctions that are hidden behind a single phrase and bear important normative 
significance, or highlighting contradictions and clarifying ambiguities. In this 
thesis, I highlight relevant conceptual distinctions, such as between age groups and 
birth cohorts, between synchronic and diachronic, and between distributive and 
relational. I take particular care in drawing the implications that some abstract 
debates or ideal conceptions of justice have for the way we should think of 
inequalities between overlapping generations and the design of institutions that 
meet people’s needs as they age. I also develop some conceptual innovations to 
make sense of how we should design institutional provision (for instance, the 
concepts of ‘lifespan efficiency’ and ‘synchronic relational equality’).  
 
One problem with this applied approach to political philosophy, as Norman 
Daniels points out, is that it “risks frustrating both the professional philosopher and 
specialists in the area of application” (Daniels 1985, xi). For the philosopher, “the 
discussion starts a bit too close to the ground to really fly” while for the social 
scientist “this discussion is never down to earth enough” (Daniels 1985, xi). 
However, this need not be a limitation of Philosophy of Public Policy, but can be 
thought of as its strength. PPP inhabits an in-between space where policies become 
objects of normative enquiry and where ideal theory encounters practice. This 
thesis is located in this in-between space. Primarily, it aims to make an important 
set of theoretical contributions to egalitarian thought, as previously mentioned. 
However, it also aims to be of interest to the empiricist at least because it 
delineates some important lines of research through identifying which empirical 
data the normative claims depend on. The discussions PPP fosters, I hope to show 
with this thesis, are fruitful both for informing policymaking and for informing our 
conceptions of justice at the theoretical level. It is not only theory that enlightens 
practice; it is also practice that enlightens theory. 
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This thesis hopes to contribute to what Elizabeth Anderson (2008) and Stuart 
White (2014) call the “egalitarian toolkit” – that is the set of possible policy 
options egalitarians can appeal to so as to further a more egalitarian society.  I aim 
to contribute to enhancing the toolkit by focusing on issues of time, age and justice 
and looking at which youth policies could be introduced, more specifically. My 
discussions of ‘pre-distributive’ temporal policies, basic income, basic capital and 
youth quotas serve this purpose. But by doing so, I do not abandon the more 
utopian task of moving beyond the feasibility concerns and practicalities of the 
moment to think about how things ought to be. As Philippe Van Parijs argued in a 
recent paper: “Utopian thinking is not enough, but it is more indispensable than 
ever” (Van Parijs 2013, 180). It must be “intelligent, critical, sophisticated, 
unindulgent” and mobilize the tools of all social sciences (Van Parijs 2013, 180). 
In this thesis, I propose radical policies like universal basic income and thus aim to 
contribute to an important philosophical debate that draws heavily on the social 
facts of poverty, inequalities and exploitation without getting lost in policy 
practicalities and forgetting ideal and utopian thought. 
 
In no way should this thesis be taken as an attempt to undermine the moral 
significance of democracy in determining the right distribution of resources. This is 
a careful and rigorous contribution to the democratic debate, but it is simply one 
contribution amongst others. I agree with Cornel West when he claims: “I don’t 
think that there is any intrinsic tilt about being a philosopher that makes you a 
better citizen or a better person. I know many philosophers who are magnificent 
and some who are gangstas” (West and McCabe 2013). Even if I argue to 
‘convince’ and sometimes use the strong language of what justice ‘requires’ I do 
not hold strong meta-ethical views about truth and justice. I see my work as a 
philosopher as that of White and Swift (2008)’s ‘democratic underlabourer’ – 
contributing to political debates by providing the relevant distinctions and 
clarifications, as well as proposing a coherent theoretical conception and 
highlighting its policy implications.  
 
Structure!of!the!Thesis!
 
This thesis is structured in two parts. Part I (Chapters 1-4) establishes the 
theoretical framework of intergenerational equality. Part II (Chapters 5-6) 
discusses two public policies that can increase our chances of meeting the demands 
of intergenerational equality.  
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In Part I, I evaluate the challenges posed by the issue of time for egalitarianism, 
and I offer a principled theory of intergenerational equality. In Chapter 1, I present 
the equality through time debate: when we compare people born at different times, 
which time units are relevant? I introduce the dominant view – complete lives 
egalitarianism (CLE) - and highlight its implications for justice between birth 
cohorts and age groups. I show that, while it provides key insights into birth-cohort 
justice, it cannot account for why some cases of age-group inequalities may be 
unjust.  
 
I then propose two additions to CLE to overcome its limitations: a prudential 
diachronic approach adapted from Norman Daniels’s theory of age-group justice 
(Chapter 2), and a synchronic alternative inspired by Dennis McKerlie’s work 
(Chapter 3). In Chapter 2, I ask which distribution of resources between age groups 
maximizes lifespan utility. This prudential discussion is fundamentally diachronic 
because it is concerned with knowing which lifespan distribution makes our lives 
better as a whole. In Chapter 3, I ask whether there is any significant non-
diachronic element in our concern for equality. Should egalitarians object to 
synchronic inequalities when people are equal over their complete lives? I contend 
that, even if equality has diachronic value, there is some value in having a 
community where people are equal (in some respect) at any point. From the three 
first chapters, I derive three core principles of equality between overlapping 
generations. In Chapter 4, I draw on these principles to offer a three-fold response 
to what it means to treat the young as equals. 
 
In Part II, I discuss two public policies in light of the theoretical account spelled 
out in Part I. In Chapter 5, I consider the radical egalitarian proposal of enforcing a 
right to unconditional cash. I ask when the unconditional payment should be made: 
in a lump sum at the beginning of people’s adult lives – as proponents of the basic 
capital grant argue; or in regular instalments throughout people’s adult lives – as 
proponents of the basic income guarantee argue. In Chapter 6, I take issue with the 
political marginalisation of young people and evaluate a policy proposal for youth 
quotas in parliaments.  
 
My thesis thus makes an original contribution to the literature on egalitarianism in 
general and on intergenerational justice in particular. It offers an original account 
of the latter and shows how such an account can underpin practical policy 
proposals. 
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PART!I!–!THEORY!
 
CHAPTER!1!O !COMPLETE!LIVES!EGALITARIANISM!AND!ITS!
IMPLICATIONS!!
 
 
In this first chapter, I provide some preliminary elements to distinguish the various 
examples of inequalities between generations highlighted in the introduction (a-e):  
that (a) the generation of young people today will end up having paid “a higher 
share of their incomes to their governments for a lower entitlement to services and 
benefits from their governments” (Coyle 2011, 103); (b) the government’s 
spending per elderly person is several times higher than the amount spent per child 
and that “Of the [national] NHS budget of about £100bn, half goes on the over-
65s” (Willetts 2010, 158); (c) the young are entitled to a lower minimum wage than 
older adults; (d) the unemployment rate of the 16-25 years old age group is twice 
as high as for the rest of the population; and that (e) the young today have to pay so 
much in tuition fees to study towards higher education while the generation before 
them did not have to pay for the same services when they were young themselves. 
To shed some light on these cases of inequalities between generations, I examine 
both some underlying conceptual distinctions and some contrasting intuitions. 
 
First, Section 1.1 clarifies three important conceptual distinctions found in the 
intergenerational literature: between intra and intergenerational justice, between 
overlapping and non-overlapping generations, and between age groups and birth 
cohorts. These clarifications enable me to identify the gaps in the literature, narrow 
down the scope of the thesis, and make explicit where my contributions are 
located. It also allows me to locate my own object of study - young people - within 
the realm of intergenerational issues.  
 
Second, I identify one set of divergent moral intuitions underpinning the cases (a-e) 
highlighted above. More specifically, Section 1.2 looks at the implications of the 
debate spurred by Dennis McKerlie (1989a) and Larry Temkin (1993) on what 
time unit egalitarians should endorse - complete lives or simultaneous segments – 
for questions of intergenerational equality. I translate this abstract discussion into 
the intergenerational language discussed in Section 1.1, and analyse what it tells us 
about the above examples. I argue that complete lives egalitarianism, the dominant 
view, gives us prima facie reasons to be concerned with inequalities between birth 
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cohorts, but none to object to inequalities between age groups. In Section 1.3, I 
then explain CLE’s intuitive strength to explicate why the view established itself as 
the dominant approach. I then clarify what is so ‘special’ about age that 
egalitarians do not find it important to challenge age-based inequalities in 
treatment, opportunities or welfare per se. In Section 1.4, I conclude by introducing 
some limitations to CLE, and setting up the key challenges for the following 
chapters. 
 
1.1 Between!Whom!Does!Intergenerational!Justice!Apply?!
 
Those who have attempted to delineate the scope of intergenerational justice – 
including Lukas Meyer (2010), Nancy Jecker (2002), Joerg Tremmel (2006) and 
Axel Gosseries (2009), have offered different answers to the question ‘between 
whom does intergenerational justice apply?’. In the same way as one may ask 
‘between whom does distributive justice apply?’ (for instance individuals, nations, 
social classes, or families), it seems important to clarify the kinds of ‘subjects’ 
involved in the context of justice between generations. The table below 
summarizes some of the answers they offered to this question.  
 
 Subjects of IG 
justice 
WHO owes… …WHOM 
Lukas Meyer  
(2003) 
Stanford 
Encyclopaedia 
Non-
contemporaneous 
generations  
- Present 
generations… 
…future generations 
…past generations 
Nancy Jecker  
(2002) 
Encyclopaedia of 
Aging 
Age groups - Society… 
- Specific age groups 
(eg: middle-aged 
adults)… 
…specific age 
groups (eg: the 
elderly) 
 
Joerg Tremmel 
(2006) 
Handbook of 
Intergenerational 
Justice 
Generations - Present people… 
 
- Older generations… 
 
…future generations 
 
…young 
generations (i.e. 
young people and 
children) 
Axel Gosseries 
and Lukas Meyer  
(2009) 
Intergenerational 
justice 
Non-
contemporaneous 
generations; 
overlapping 
generations; 
age groups; 
birth cohorts. 
- Present people… 
 
 
- Society…         
                    
- Birth cohort X…  
…future generations 
…past generations 
 
…specific age 
groups 
 
…birth cohort Y 
Table 1 - Between whom does intergenerational justice apply? 
 
From this summary, one sees that, although ‘generations’ are always the subject of 
intergenerational discussions, we may refer to different kinds of intergenerational 
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relations: between current and past generations, between current and future 
generations, between current generations, between age groups, between birth 
cohorts, etc. This first section categorizes the types of subjects that are involved in 
the realm of intergenerational justice, so as to locate my own research questions 
and object of study in the existing intergenerational literature. I focus on the 
distinctions between: (1) intra and inter-generational justice; (2) overlapping and 
non-overlapping generations; and (3) age groups and birth cohorts.  
1.1.1 Intra-generational and intergenerational justice 
 
One first important definitional distinction that runs through the intergenerational 
literature is between intra and inter-generational justice. Intergenerational justice 
covers, by definition, the realm of issues that concern people born at different 
times. The concept of intra-generational justice is used to express what 
intergenerational justice is not about – questions of distributive justice within 
generations, such as justice between the rich and the poor, gender justice and 
international justice (Tremmel 2009). The diagram below illustrates this 
distinction. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Intra and Inter-generational justice (Tremmel 2006, 5) 
 
The constitutive difference between intra and intergenerational justices is that the 
scope of intra-generational justice concerns issues of inequality and distribution 
within a generation (within generation A and within generation B) while the scope 
of intergenerational justice covers issues of inequalities and transfers between 
generations (between generations A and B). Intergenerational and intra-
generational justice are further analytically separated in that, as Tremmel argues, 
But the ‘future’ usually has a short-term time horizon here. Intra-
generational justice goals are not supposed to materialize in a hundred
years, but within the ext l gislative period.
Intergenerational justice and intragenerational justice are fundamentally
diﬀerent in the sense of intergenerational justice comparing average individ-
uals, whereas intragenerational justice analyses the various circumstances
and living conditions of individuals at a given point in time.
Now, sustainability as a concept combines intergenerational and intra-
generational (especially international) justice. This is a result of a compara-
tive study of 60 definitions used by scientists (Tremmel 2003). It has often
been lamented that there is an unmanageably large amount of definitions of
the contested concept of ‘sustainability/sustainable development’ (Dobson
2000). Not surprisingly, part of this dispute is how it should be normatively
justified – only by intergenerational justice (17 nominations), only by intra-
generational justice (five nominations) or both combined (34 nominations).
Usually, generational justice is connected with the environment and intra-
generational justice is connected with development. The majority of scien-
tists – as well as the political actors at UN conferences – prefer the definition
that green policies have no priority to development aid policies (see Table I.1).
Introduction 5
Own source
Figure I.2 Temporal scale of intergenerational and intragenerational
justice
Generation A Generation B
Intra-generational
Justice  
Intra-generational
Justice  
Time
Intergenerational
Justice 
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the two approaches “are fundamentally different in the sense of intergenerational 
justice comparing average individuals, whereas intra-generational justice analyses 
the various circumstances and living conditions of individuals at a given point in 
time” (Tremmel 2006, 5). In the intergenerational perspective, we are comparing 
the average individual in birth cohort N to the average individuals in cohort N+1, 
N+2, and so forth.  
 
The analytical distinction between inter and intra-generational justice is slightly 
misleading, however, because it represents them as independent one from the 
other. In some sense, the isolation perceived at the political level mentioned in the 
introduction, seems to be mirrored by this conceptualization of intergenerational 
issues away from other social issues. This risks reinforcing the perception of 
generational discussions as diversions from the important business of discussing 
other inequalities. It would thus be with reason that, as Ben Little argues, “many on 
the left are suspicious of generational politics, on the grounds that it is stopping 
people talking about class” (Little 2014a).  
 
The distinction between inter and intra generational justice threatens to blind us to 
the fact that the two are inevitably intertwined. This is because, at any given time, 
there always are members of different generations. As a result, whenever we 
redistribute resources from the better off to the worse off, we simultaneously 
transfer resources from the young to the old, from the old to children, and so on. 
Moreover, most intergenerational institutions also serve as class redistributive 
mechanisms: the poorest workers do not have to finance the health care of the 
retired; in (egalitarian) theory it is the richest that ought to pay for the services that 
the poorest elderly consume. So if we are to integrate questions of time and justice 
into egalitarian thought, we may not want to isolate questions of intergenerational 
justice too sharply from other issues of social justice.  
 
This does not mean that average equality between generation A and B is not a goal 
of justice as well, but it does mean that intra and intergenerational justice cannot be 
represented as entirely independent. One of the goals of this thesis is to reconnect 
temporal issues of intergenerational justice to social inequalities by showing both 
that (a) the significance and development of social inequalities cannot be 
adequately conceptualized in abstraction from time and age, and (b) that the proper 
egalitarian way to conceptualize time is ‘intersectional’; that is, an egalitarian 
framework of intergenerational justice must integrate inequalities in advantage at 
its core. 
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1.1.2 Overlapping and non-overlapping generations 
 
An additional important distinction is between overlapping and non-overlapping 
generations. By intergenerational justice (henceforth IG justice), we may only refer 
to justice between non-contemporaries. Lukas Meyer, for instance, introduces the 
question of intergenerational justice as follows: “Do justice considerations apply to 
intergenerational relations, that is, to relations between non-contemporaries?” 
(Meyer 2010). What makes IG justice an independent field of philosophical 
enquiry, he argues, is that it is concerned with people who will never coexist in 
time. This he contrasts with other areas of social justice, which are concerned with 
what contemporary individuals, or groups of individuals, owe to each other. Meyer 
then discusses what we owe to distant future or past generations, and highlights the 
difficult theoretical issues that arise when we ask such questions. He understands 
the objects of IG justice as being future and past generations. Issues of 
intergenerational duties and rights obtain between non-contemporaneous 
generations, which can be equally referred to as distant generations or non-
overlapping generations.  
 
As far as past generations are concerned, questions of justice between generations 
may involve discussions of the possible duties of current generations to 
compensate the descendants of past victims of collective rights violations, 
especially when there is a correlation between present disadvantage and past 
wrongs. Examples include claims for reparation of Native-Americans, Australian 
Aboriginals, Afro-Americans, and citizens of former colonial states. Present 
generations and institutions can be said to owe past generations through their 
descendants. In addition, an argument could be made that we owe past generations 
something more directly: perhaps a certain degree of respect and remembrance.1 
 
However, it is the debate on what we owe to future generations that has attracted 
the most attention within the field of intergenerational justice. This interest was 
prompted by the growing awareness that many natural resources are limited or 
non-renewable. Many questions started to arise: What do we owe to future 
generations? What ought we to sacrifice today for future unborn people? How can 
we design sustainable institutions? How to best represent the interests of future 
generations? Green movements throughout the world started to appeal to the idea 
of justice between generations understood as the set of ethical and political duties 
we have to future generations. 
                                                      
1 On the topic of justice between current and past generations, see: Thomson (2008, 31-44, 
2009), Brechner (2002) and Abdel-Nour (2003). 
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These questions stimulated a lively literature. 2  Philosophers took on the task of 
‘applying’ available theories of justice to generational issues and soon realized that 
traditional accounts of distributive justice carried counterintuitive or problematic 
implications when applied to future generations: utilitarianism could potentially 
encourage infinite population growth in order to achieve the greatest good for the 
greatest number; social contract theorists would have to face the problem that 
reciprocity or mutual advantage make little sense when it comes to future 
generations, which are at our mercy; and Human Rights theories could not 
straightforwardly apply to unborn generations (Moody 2007, 4). In the introduction 
of their edited book entitled Intergenerational Justice, Lukas Meyer and Axel 
Gosseries (2009) also highlight several important philosophical problems that arise 
when it comes to justifying why we would owe anything to unborn people: unborn 
people cannot comply, or agree to anything; they do not exist yet, so cannot be said 
to have rights as such; they are so distant that we care for them much less than we 
do for those who are closer to us in time; and remoteness also implies problems of 
epistemic uncertainty. All these questions gave rise to a wave of literature on 
intergenerational justice, which focused primarily on what we owe future 
generations and examined the intersection of futurity and fairness.  
 
There is still much work to be done to solve all these issues and adapt our theories 
of justice to futurity (Gosseries and Meyer 2009). However, the overwhelming 
emphasis on future generations should not lead us believe that there is nothing to 
be said about IG justice between overlapping generations, and it should not be 
allowed to crowd out enquiries into such questions of justice. As Gosseries and 
Meyer claim in the introduction to their edited book Intergenerational Justice, “we 
should not lose sight of the fact that justice between neighbouring generations is 
not, as such, a negligible field of investigation, as those insisting on justice 
between non-overlapping and remote generations may too quickly assume” 
(Gosseries and Meyer 2009, 4).  
 
My research questions – ‘what do we owe to young people?’ and ‘what does it 
mean to treat the young as equals?’- are exclusively about the relations of justice 
                                                      
2 The literature on future generations is too vast to be referenced exhaustively, but some 
key works include: Rawls (1971, 2001), English (1977), Parfit (1984), De-Shalit (1995), 
Dobson (ed.) (1999), Barry (1999), Rawls (2001), Tremmel (ed.) (2006), Mulgan (2006), 
Gaspart and Gosseries (2007), Gosseries and Meyer (eds.) (2009), Thompson (2009), 
Gosseries (2012). It is worth saying here that, although I am essentially focusing on 
contemporary political philosophy, the history of the idea of justice between generations 
can be traced back to philosophers like Thomas Jefferson ([1798](1975)), Thomas Paine 
([1795](1984)) and Edmund Burke ([1790](1999)), who discussed whether it was fair for 
human societies to impose a constitution on future generations. 
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between overlapping generations. The literature on what we owe to future 
generations will not be directly relevant to my thesis, given that it focuses 
primarily on the problems that arise from the non-existence of future generations. 
Young people are already born and therefore the question of what it means to treat 
them as equals escapes the various problems associated with non-identity. I will be 
interested in future people only to the extent that they are today’s young people 
envisaged at later stages of their lives. When I ask ‘which inequalities between 
generations matter?’. I will therefore focus on the question of which inequalities 
between overlapping generations matter. In this way, my thesis aims to show that it 
is not the case that only relationships between non-contemporaries raise crucial 
questions of intergenerational justice.  
1.1.3 Age groups and birth cohorts  
 
The third conceptual distinction, often hidden behind the concept ‘generation’, will 
be of primary importance throughout this thesis. By generation we may mean ‘age 
groups’ or ‘birth cohorts’. Age groups are groups of people at a certain stage of 
their lives, for instance children, or the elderly. Age-group justice refers to the “the 
ethical problem of distributing scarce resources between different age groups in a 
society” (Jecker 2002). For instance, “when societies debate how much of their 
scarce resources should be devoted to areas such as education that benefit primarily 
the young, versus programs such as social security or Medicare that benefit older 
members of the population” (Jecker 2002). By contrast, birth cohorts are groups of 
people born at a specific time and age together. For instance, the baby-boomers 
form a birth cohort of people born between the end of the Second World War and 
the 1960s.  
 
The difference between age groups, on the one hand, and birth cohorts, on the 
other, lies with the fact that birth cohorts are specific groups of people who age 
together, while age groups are phases through which different cohorts pass as they 
age: “Age groups do not age. Over time, new and different birth cohorts simply 
move into an age group. In contrast, birth cohorts do age. They pass through the 
stages of life, and so, at different times, fall into different age groups” (Daniels 
1988: 13). In the diagram below, the two axes represent time and age and help us 
visualize what differentiates birth cohorts, represented by arrows, from age groups, 
represented by boxes.  
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Figure 2 - Age and time in perspective 
The diagram represents time (on the x-axis) and age (on the y-axis). It describes 
groups of people as they age. The red arrows represent two birth cohorts (A and B), 
each constituted by a group of people who go through the different stages of ageing 
together. The blue boxes represent the four age groups that exist in a society at any 
given time. At T0, for instance, we have roughly four age groups: children, young 
people, formed adults and the elderly. From this diagram, one can see that asking 
which inequalities between the two birth cohorts (red arrows) are unfair will be 
substantially different from asking which inequalities between two age groups – 
say young people and the elderly living at T0 (blue boxes) matter. The first 
question is diachronic and requires comparing people over their complete lives, 
while the second is synchronic and concerns how two age groups respectively fare 
over a limited timeframe.  
 
According to Daniels (1988), age groups and birth cohorts generate two different 
sets of problems of justice. This is because, since we all age, treating age groups 
unequally will not bring about inequalities between people, while treating birth 
cohorts unequally does bring about inequalities between persons. For instance, if 
one birth cohort benefits from free higher education and the following cohort must 
pay for it, then the institutions will have treated two groups of people unequally 
over their complete lives (other things being equal). However, if a policy 
subsidizes transport only for one age group – say those over 65 - then this 
differential treatment between age groups will not bring about inequalities between 
persons, because it is expected that everyone will be able to benefit from it at some 
point: “An institution that treats the young and the old differently will, over time, 
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still treat people equally” (Daniels 1988, 41). For Daniels, the age-group problem 
and the birth cohort problem are thus two different problems of justice.  
 
Cohort problems arise when we ask how much we ought to pass on to the next 
generation. In this case, we are in fact asking what cohort C1 owes to cohort C2. 
And in turn, cohort C2 may owe something to cohort C1. For instance, cohort C1 
may transfer institutions and savings to cohort C2, and cohort C1 may provide 
various forms of security and assistance to cohort C2, when the individuals in 
cohort C1 are older. It is important to note that birth cohorts may overlap, but of 
course not all will do. When we are concerned with those presently alive in a given 
community, we are dealing with several overlapping cohorts. When we refer to 
future generations, we are referring to an ensemble of birth cohorts yet to be born. 
An important distinction between questions of justice between non-overlapping 
generations and questions of justice between overlapping generations, is that the 
latter involves questions of age-group justice in addition to issues of birth-cohort 
justice.  
 
Age-group problems arise when we become primarily concerned with the question 
of how institutions ought to treat people as they age and how scarce resources must 
be distributed among them. Only a few philosophers have explicitly contributed to 
this set of questions; and only two monographs have been written exclusively 
about age-group justice in contemporary political philosophy: Norman Daniels’s 
Am I my Parent’s Keeper (1988) and recently Dennis McKerlie’s Justice between 
the Young and the Old (2013). 3 They both tried to establish a theory of age-group 
justice and to identify what institutions that meet age groups’ needs fairly should 
look like. The field is fundamentally under researched. As Axel Gosseries (2003) 
argues: “Theories of intergenerational justice are clearly still at an early stage. (…) 
But it is probably the domain of justice between age groups that is in need of the 
strongest research effort” (2003, 481). Once we integrate age-group justice within 
the scope of intergenerational justice, it becomes more apparent that some issues of 
justice between generations concern relations between individuals at a given point 
in time. In other words, intergenerational justice also pertains synchronically.  
 
When I ask ‘which inequalities between generations matter?’. I am therefore 
asking two questions: ‘which inequalities between birth cohorts matter?’ and 
                                                      
3 Apart from Daniels and McKerlie, whose work I will extensively discuss in this thesis, the 
following authors have also touched on these questions: Ronald Dworkin (2000b), Nancy 
Jecker (1989, 2013), Axel Gosseries (2007, 2014), Jane English (1977), and Paul Bou-
Habib (2011). 
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‘which inequalities between age groups matter?’. Similarly, when I ask what we 
owe to young people, I therefore raise two questions: (a) ‘what do we owe to 
young people as an age group?’ and (b) ‘what do we owe to young people as a 
birth cohort?’. I will provide an egalitarian theory of intergenerational justice that 
informs both sets of questions. However, given the particular research need on the 
side of age-group justice, this thesis will be primarily dedicated to establishing 
principles of justice between age groups.  
 
So far, I have introduced three conceptual distinctions. The first distinction, 
between intra and intergenerational justice, was informative because it shed some 
light on the intergenerational emphasis on average individuals in successive 
generations. I suggested that it might not capture adequately the relations between 
generational issues and more traditional egalitarian issues, especially when we are 
discussing questions of justice between overlapping generations. We should be 
cautious in conceptualizing intra and intergenerational justice in isolation as it risks 
exacerbating the perceived political concern among those on the Left that 
generational issues may divert attention from other, implicitly more important, 
forms of inequality. The second distinction, between overlapping and non-
overlapping generations, enabled me to reframe my research questions exclusively 
in terms of overlapping generations, given that my object of focus is young people 
rather than future generations. The third distinction was the most important 
conceptual clarification and will be central to this thesis’ investigation. When 
asking which inequalities between generations matter, we may look at the problem 
diachronically (over time) by focusing on birth cohorts, or we may look at the 
problem synchronically (at a given time) by focusing on age groups. Most theorists 
of intergenerational justice have overlooked the second problem of justice, either 
because they focused exclusively on the cohortal problem of justice for future 
generations or, as I will now show, because they were guided by the intuition that 
justice and equality only apply over complete lives.  
 
1.2 The!Equality!Through!Time!Debate!and!Its!Implications!
1.2.1 Equality!through!time!
 
Temkin (1993) devotes one chapter of his book Inequality to the issue of equality 
and time. He introduces the debate raised previously by McKerlie (1989a) on 
“whether the proper unit for egalitarian concern should be people’s lives, taken as a 
whole, or selected portions of their lives” (Temkin 1993, 232). Drawing mainly on 
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McKerlie, he highlights two views on what the relevant unit of egalitarian concern 
should be, as illustrated below.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Temkin's diagram on equality through time (Temkin 1993: 234). 
 
The above diagram represents the respective levels of wellbeing of two individuals 
A and B (let us call them Anna and Bob). Anna’s and Bob’s respective lifespans 
are divided into five different time segments (T1-T5) of about twenty years each, 
such that Anna was born twenty years before Bob and they each lived for about 
eighty years. In the two cases, Anna’s and Bob’s levels of wellbeing are exactly the 
same. However, each case represents a different perspective on what time unit is 
relevant for comparative purposes. In Case I, the relevant unit of concern is taken 
to be “complete lives”. The emphasis of this complete lives view is on the overall 
wellbeing of Bob as it compares to Anna’s. Over their entire lives, Anna and Bob 
both enjoy a total of 20 “points” in wellbeing. A complete lives egalitarian would 
thus be satisfied by their respective wellbeing over their lifespan.  
 
In Case II, however, the emphasis is placed on inequalities at given stages of 
Anna’s and Bob’s lives. Case II registers inequalities between Bob and Anna at T2, 
T3 and T4. This approach is called the simultaneous segments view. It emphasizes 
inequalities between Anna and Bob at simultaneous moments of their lives. At T2, 
for instance, Anna’s wellbeing was superior to Bob’s. According to this approach 
to time, inequalities that happen simultaneously matter, regardless of whether Anna 
and Bob happen to be equal over their whole lives.4  
                                                      
4 The equality through time debate is broader than I can discuss here. Given that my aim is 
to inform the distribution of resources between generations, I am instrumentally focusing 
only on the aspects of the debate that are directly relevant to my concerns. Other 
analytically interesting contributions to the equality through time debate include Kasper 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s “ranking-order segments egalitarianism” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2005) – 
which compares segments regardless of their place in the lifespan, and Larry Temkin’s 
“corresponding segments view” – which compares people at ‘comparable stages’, for 
instance first in childhood, then young adulthood, and so on (Temkin 1992). My main 
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The complete lives and simultaneous segments views thus offer two distinct ways 
to compare Anna’s and Bob’s wellbeing over time. The numbers preceded by equal 
signs on the far right of Temkin’s drawing represent the relevant count that each 
view would register. On the complete lives view, Anna and Bob have been equal 
over their whole lives in terms of wellbeing, since their respective wellbeing is 
twenty points. The simultaneous segments view registers three points of 
inequalities in wellbeing by showing that, at each of the three simultaneous stages 
of their lives, Anna was 1 point better off than Bob. Thus, we can say that, 
depending on which perspective we adopt to compare Anna’s and Bob’s lives, we 
will get substantially different conclusions.  
 
Complete-lives egalitarianism (CLE), the egalitarian theory that embraces the 
complete lives view, can be referred to as a distributive approach to social justice 
that considers as relevant only (in)equality between individuals’ complete lives. On 
this view, inequalities between people that occur at a given time do not matter as 
such. They may matter, but only ‘derivatively’, insofar as they contribute to 
creating inequalities between people over their complete lives (Bou-Habib 2011). 
So, in some circumstances, the CL egalitarian will be able to appeal to an overall 
complete lives distribution to oppose a given synchronic inequality between two 
persons. By contrast, for proponents of simultaneous segments egalitarianism 
(SSE), inequalities that happen simultaneously matter in and of themselves, 
regardless of the overall lifespan distribution. In other words, SSE holds that 
inequalities between portions of different individuals’ lives that happen 
simultaneously are of non-derivative, intrinsic moral concern.  
 
In order to see how this abstract discussion relates to our generational concerns, 
and in particular to the examples highlighted in the introduction, let me now 
translate Temkin’s puzzle into the generational language that I introduced in the 
previous section. The distinction between age groups and birth cohorts indeed 
makes particularly clear the intersection between the abstract equality through time 
debate and intergenerational equality.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
problem with the ranking segments view is that it does not acknowledge that different 
stages of our lives are ‘special’ in different ways, as Temkin has also argued (Temkin 2003, 
57). As for corresponding segments view, it is easily subsumed under complete life 
egalitarian accounts. In this thesis, I therefore focus exclusively on the two answers to the 
equality through time debate discussed above: ‘complete lives’ and ‘simultaneous 
segments’. 
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1.2.2 Age!groups,!birth!cohorts!and!equality!!
 
The debate over what time unit egalitarians should endorse has important 
implications for questions of justice between overlapping generations. Temkin 
(1992, 1993) makes this link quite explicit when he suggests that the angle from 
which we view intergenerational issues will depend on the perspective we adopt on 
what the right time unit of egalitarianism should be. In the introduction of their 
edited book on equality, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Nils Holtug (2006) also 
mention these implications. In the citation below, by whole lives and time-slice, 
they respectively refer to complete lives and simultaneous segments.  
 
According to whole lives egalitarianism, inequalities between individuals 
in different generations may well matter. (…). However, time-slice 
egalitarianism is concerned only with inequalities at particular time-slices 
and so does not give us a reason to regret intergenerational inequality. On 
the other hand, unlike whole lives egalitarianism, time-slice egalitarianism 
necessarily creates an objection to simultaneous inequalities between age 
groups.  
(Lippert-Rasmussen and Holtug 2006: 10) 
 
In Temkin’s diagram, let us consider A and B as representing birth cohorts A and 
B. A represents a group of individuals born within the same time range who thus 
pass through different age groups together as they age. B represents the cohort of 
individuals born in the following twenty years. What matters, from a complete lives 
perspective, is equality between individuals’ entire lives. From a CL egalitarian 
perspective, birth cohorts thus seem to be the right object of concern in the 
intergenerational context. Simultaneous inequalities at T0 between the elderly of 
cohort A and the young of cohort B do not matter per se. Synchronic inequalities 
between age groups at a given time only matter insofar as they constitute part of a 
larger whole. If, for instance, the individuals in cohort A are disadvantaged 
compared to the individuals in cohort B at T0, this only concerns complete lives 
egalitarians if this inequality is not compensated later or earlier in life.  
 
What should we think of the inequalities (a-e) mentioned in the introduction? In 
example (a) the birth cohort of the young today get a lower benefit ratio than 
previous birth cohorts; that is, they end up contributing more than previous cohorts 
and receiving less in benefits than previous cohorts. Since the individuals in 
different cohorts will have been treated unequally over the course of their whole 
life, there is a complete lives egalitarian case to be made against such a state of 
affairs. Policies that reduce government spending on the current elderly or baby 
boomers, for instance, can be defended on this ground. Similarly, example (e), in 
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which the young today have to pay very high tuition fees when the previous cohort 
enjoyed higher education for free, is objectionable from the complete lives 
perspective (other things being equal).  
 
The simultaneous segments perspective has very different implications than the 
complete lives approach. Since on SSE, it is synchronic inequalities that matter 
rather than complete lives, inequalities between age groups do matter. If the elderly 
are worse off than the rest of the population, this will concern the simultaneous 
segments egalitarian, regardless of whether the current young will undergo the 
same relative disadvantage when they will be older themselves. Relative levels of 
inequalities between different cohorts will not concern the simultaneous segments 
egalitarian. Being concerned with synchronic inequalities, SSE will tend to worry 
about age-group inequalities, regardless of how well cohorts A and B fare over 
their complete lives.  
 
The simultaneous perspective thus seems to underlie three of our introductory 
examples. Examples (c) and (d) - which respectively highlight (c) the inequality in 
minimum wage entitlement between young people and older workers and (d) the 
inequality in unemployment risk between young and older workers - are only 
objectionable from a simultaneous perspective. Indeed, we will find both cases 
problematic if we consider that the “bigger picture” of what happens between 
complete lives is irrelevant when thinking about synchronic inequalities in 
treatment. In this perspective, the fact that youth unemployment is always higher 
than for the rest of the population, for all cohorts, is irrelevant to deciding whether 
the synchronic differential treatment is objectionable. If we claim that example (b), 
that the government’s spending per elderly person is several times higher than for 
other age groups, is unjust, then we also abstract from the diachronic perspective to 
focus solely on two age groups’ claims to be treated equally at a given time.  
 
However, notice that determining whether these inequalities are unjust demands 
more than establishing the adequate time unit. In order to take a stand on specific 
cases, both simultaneous egalitarians and complete lives egalitarians would also 
have to specify the kinds of inequalities that matter (opportunity, wellbeing, 
welfare, resources). In example (b), if the simultaneous segments egalitarian is 
committed to equality in wellbeing or welfare between age groups, then he will 
find the inequality in the division of healthcare resources legitimate or even 
required. However, if he adopts a conception of equality as equal entitlements 
between age groups, she will object to the unequal healthcare state-spending ratio 
 
40 
between individuals. Most egalitarians will surely adopt the first approach and 
reject claim (b). This suggests that, even if simultaneous segments egalitarians 
consider that inequalities between age groups matter, other parameters will count 
in deciding specifically which inequalities between age groups matter.  
 
The abstract distributive debate on the right time unit for egalitarian concern thus 
has important implications for the question of which inequalities between 
generations matter. If we endorse a diachronic approach to equality and time, we 
will tend to consider inequalities between birth cohorts as problematic and to 
disregard inequalities between age groups as unproblematic. If we endorse a 
synchronic approach, it is the other way round. The following table sums up these 
implications.  
 
 Complete lives egalitarianism Simultaneous segments 
egalitarianism 
Which 
inequalities 
intrinsically 
matter? 
Inequalities between birth 
cohorts 
Inequalities between age groups 
Examples of 
inequalities 
that matter 
(a) Inequalities in benefit ratios 
between cohorts.  
(e) Inequalities in Higher 
Education funding between 
cohorts. 
(b) Inequalities in the allocation of 
public resources between age 
groups.  
(c) Inequalities in minimum wage 
entitlements between age groups. 
(d) Inequalities in unemployment 
risks, between age groups.  
Examples of 
inequalities 
that do not 
matter 
(b) Inequalities in the allocation 
of public resources between age 
groups.  
(c) Inequalities in minimum 
wage entitlements between age 
groups. 
(d) Inequalities in 
unemployment risks between 
age groups. 
(a) Inequalities in state benefit 
ratios between cohorts. 
(e) Inequalities in Higher 
Education funding between 
cohorts. 
Table 2 - Intergenerational implications of the equality through time debate 
 
1.3 The!Case!for!Complete!Lives!Equality!
 
Complete lives egalitarianism is the prevailing approach to equality through time 
and the dominant default view endorsed by egalitarian accounts of justice. As 
McKerlie puts it, “philosophical theories of justice tend to assign their distributive 
principles to the temporal scope of a lifetime” (McKerlie 2013, 22). John Rawls, 
for instance, claims that: “Justice as fairness focuses on inequalities in citizens’ life 
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prospects – their prospects over a complete life” (Rawls 1971). CLE is often 
simply assumed, by default, because it is quite intuitive. In this section, I will 
explain CLE’s intuitive pull (Section 1.3.1), provide justifications for its cohortal 
implications (Section 1.3.2) and discuss what makes age ‘special’ (Section 1.3.3). 
1.3.1 Explaining!the!intuitive!pull!of!CLE!
 
When egalitarians define wrongful inequalities between two individuals, they 
usually implicitly assume that the relevant time unit is the individuals’ entire lives. 
There are at least three underlying explanations for the endorsement of the whole 
life perspective: (1) a metaphysical explanation, (2) an anti-utilitarian explanation 
(which relates to the separateness of persons argument), and (3) an argument from 
compensation and responsibility. These explanations for why CLE has established 
itself as the dominant view do not justify an exclusive focus on complete lives. This 
is especially true of (1) and (2), which are more explanatory than justificatory, but 
jointly they have given a strong impetus to egalitarians having adopted complete 
lives as the right unit of concern. 
 
First, CLE draws on a widespread metaphysical view about persons – the 
continuous-identity view. If we believe that individuals are one and the same in 
youth and old age, then we are more likely to be drawn to the complete life view. 
Consider the example of a state that has an established and enduring policy that 
ensures free public transportation to anyone over the age of 65 years old. In such a 
case, the synchronic inequality in free access to transportation between a 20-year-
old, who has to pay, and a 65-year-old person seems unimportant because the 
young person will also benefit from the policy in later life.  
 
However, note that this is only true if we contend that the young person today is 
indeed the same person as the future elderly person who will enjoy the benefits of 
the policy. If we endorse a different metaphysical view – for example, that 
individuals are so different in old age and in youth that we may consider that they 
are different persons at these different stages of their lives – then the focus on 
complete lives seems to lose its grip. On such a view, shorter time segments would 
provide a better-suited temporal focus, as this would not assume continuity 
throughout people’s lives. Complete lives egalitarianism thus relies and follows 
from a conception of persons as unified selves from birth to death. For this reason, 
it is worth saying that one way to undermine CLE would be to reject the continuity 
view. However, in this thesis, I accept the view of persons as unified selves and 
consider that we are one and the same person throughout our lives. As I will show, 
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there are several limitations to the diachronic approach, independent of its 
metaphysical basis. But our tendency to endorse the continuity perspective in 
relation to personal identity is one explanation for the diachronic focus of many 
accounts of distributive justice.  
 
Second, the egalitarian commitment to complete lives can be seen as the other side 
of the coin of the contemporary egalitarian commitment to the separateness of 
persons. The opposition to the utilitarian aggregation of burdens and benefits 
across lives is constitutive of Rawls’s egalitarianism. Utilitarianism, Rawls argues, 
“does not take seriously the distinction between persons” (Rawls 1971, 26). The 
maximization of utility approach cannot be used between different persons because 
it negates each individual’s fundamental right not to be used as means for others’ 
benefit. Utilitarians, Rawls argues, treat interpersonal judgements as they would 
treat intrapersonal judgements:  
 
The striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not 
matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed 
among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one 
man distributes his satisfaction over time. The correct distribution in either 
case is which yields the maximum fulfilment.  
(Rawls 1971, 26) 
 
By contrast, for contemporary egalitarians, the maximization of utility strategy is 
adequate within a life, but not interpersonally. For instance, it is one thing to decide 
that I will do something I hate doing today because it will considerably increase 
my welfare for the following three days. It is an entirely different thing to have 
someone else do something they hate doing for a group of us to be happy. Or, in 
other words, interpersonal judgements are fundamentally distinct from 
intrapersonal judgements. 
 
The other side of a coin of the separateness of persons is thus that intrapersonal 
inequalities, as opposed to interpersonal inequalities, are represented as 
unproblematic from the point of view of equality. Similarly, McKerlie argues: “the 
price of defending the existence of egalitarian distributional constraints between 
lives is conceding that there are no such distributional constraints inside lives. This 
is the price that the egalitarian writers of the 1970s were not at all reluctant to pay” 
(McKerlie 2013, 26). The application of the egalitarian value to complete lives is 
thus the other side of a coin of the liberal egalitarian commitment to the 
separateness of persons. 
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Third, egalitarians are often drawn to the diachronic approach because they value 
the joint ideal of responsibility and compensation. Luck egalitarians, in particular, 
believe that the point of egalitarian justice is to ensure bad brute luck has as little 
impact as possible over people’s lives (Arneson 2000, 339). For this reason, those 
who are poor through no fault of their own should be compensated. However, if 
individuals make free choices that have a negative impact on their lifetime 
prospects, then they will have to assume the costs of such choices. This rationale of 
responsibility and compensation is thus fundamentally diachronic. Egalitarians 
should not be concerned about inequalities at a given point in time; they should 
look at the diachronic picture to find out whether compensation is, or is not, owed 
for a given time-limited inequality. In other words, a given synchronic inequality 
between two persons only matters if it is the sign of an unequal diachronic 
distribution of resources. Richard Wagland (2012) sums it up this way: “luck 
egalitarianism is based upon two premises: first, that diachronic equality is viewed 
as the fairest form of distribution; and second, that the cut between choice and 
circumstance is morally important because it maintains diachronic equality 
between separate persons” (Wagland 2012, 148).  
 
The metaphysical view of individuals as unified selves from birth to death is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for CLE’s plausibility. The separateness of 
persons’ explanation merely explains egalitarians’ tendency to accept intrapersonal 
judgements as irrelevant for egalitarianism, and in turn, to consider whole lives as 
the relevant unit of concern. If the unity of personhood and the separateness of 
persons both contribute to explain why egalitarians have been drawn to the 
complete life approach, the compensation and responsibility argument offers a 
potential justification for it. If we want to take into account past choices and 
unequal endowments, then we must endorse a diachronic approach that establishes 
what people are owed in the present segment based on what they had, or did, in 
previous segments. The synchronic approach, by contrast, disregards past 
distributions and thus neglects these two important egalitarian values.  
 
Having explained the intuitive pull of CLE for egalitarians, let me now turn to 
CLE’s generational implications. As we have seen, if one endorses CLE, then one 
will naturally be drawn to find inequalities between birth cohorts prima facie 
problematic and inequalities between age groups only derivatively problematic if 
they are sign of an unequal distribution of inequalities over complete lives. I will 
now show that there are important egalitarian reasons to believe that inequalities 
between birth cohorts are morally significant. I will then ask what it is about age 
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that is so special that complete lives egalitarians are drawn to find age-based 
inequalities unproblematic.  
1.3.2 The!moral!significance!of!inequalities!between!birth!cohorts!
 
The complete lives egalitarian implication that inequalities between birth cohorts 
should concern us seems justifiable from the point of view of equality. A 
particularly appealing way to frame questions of cohortal justice can be derived 
from the key premise of luck egalitarianism - that it is fundamentally unfair if 
people are unequal through no fault or choice of their own. Luck egalitarianism, as 
Richard Arneson (2004) suggests, is based on two types of views: a “luckist” view 
and an egalitarian view. The luckist view claims that it is morally wrong if brute 
luck determines people’s status and opportunities - for instance, features over 
which one has no control such as one’s sex, social background or ethnic origins 
should not limit the scope of what one may be able to do in society.  
 
In addition, there must be a correlation between individual responsibility and the 
choices people make, on the one hand, and the opportunities people end up with, 
on the other. This responsibility-based component of luck egalitarianism has strong 
implications for questions of intergenerational justice. For instance, future 
generations do not exist yet, do not have agency, and can thus never be said to be 
responsible for any damages to the environment they will inherit. Since they are 
completely at our mercy, it is prima facie unfair if we restrict their opportunities. 
Similarly, there is something wrong if children and young people’s opportunities 
have been unduly reduced as they begin their lives.  
 
The other basic element of the luck egalitarian view, the equality component, takes 
equality between persons to be the default position in matters of justice. Brought 
together, those two components result in the view that the only inequalities that are 
acceptable are those stemming from genuine choices. On luck egalitarianism, what 
we owe to future generations is that they have access to roughly the same 
opportunities. One of the clearest formulations of this view is Brian Barry’s 
important 1999 article on intergenerational justice. Discussing environmental 
justice, he argues: 
 
It appears that sustainability is at least a necessary condition of justice. For 
the principle of responsibility says that, unless people in the future can be 
held responsible for the situation that they find themselves in, they should 
not be worse off than we are.  
(Barry 1999, 106) 
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Philippe Van Parijs similarly formulates his view that intergenerational justice 
requires “each generation, each birth cohort, to make sure the situation of the next 
generation somehow measured, on a per capita basis is no worse than its own” 
(Van Parijs 1998, 106). This goal of diachronic sustainability through time applies 
to other domains than the environment. It has implications for the levels of debt we 
are entitled to pass on to subsequent generations, for the public infrastructure we 
must invest in (such as roads, libraries, and housing), for the budget we must 
devote to research (for instance health and sustainable energies), and for the extent 
to which we must protect heritage. 
 
The complete lives egalitarian assumption thus seems to point to a justifiable 
egalitarian concern for equality in opportunities for future cohorts. If we are 
egalitarians, then we should make sure that the brute luck of being born at one 
point in time or twenty years later does not illegitimately affect your opportunities. 
It is prima facie unfair if the parent generation (upstream) takes decisions that 
restrict the opportunities of their children’s generation (downstream). There may be 
some reasons for deviating from cohort equality, and it may be complicated to 
secure such goal of justice because the future is always uncertain (as I will discuss 
in Chapter 4). But the diachronic approach leads us to the important conclusion 
that approximate equality in opportunities between birth cohorts is an important 
goal of justice. 
1.3.3 What!makes!age!special?!
 
Given that individuals have as little control over their age as they have over their 
sex or ethnicity, it is not clear why treating people unequally based on their age 
should be acceptable. Egalitarians usually take inequalities between groups of 
people to be prima facie objectionable. Sexual and racial discrimination are often 
offered as exemplars of illegitimate forms of unequal treatment. What makes age 
so special that we may focus on whole lives and discount inequalities between age 
groups?  
 
Axel Gosseries (2007, 2014) points to three interesting distinctions that could 
explain the intuition that age-based differential treatments are prima facie less 
problematic than sex-based differential treatments. Gosseries (2014)’s first 
explanatory hypothesis is that while gender inequalities are binary, age is a point 
on a scale. Ages are ‘multiple’, so to speak. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
gender inequalities are more unilateral than age-group inequalities: it is not clearly 
the case that one age group tends to always end up being worse off than the other. 
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We cannot say the same of gender inequalities. A similar analysis can be given of 
the difference between age-based discriminations and ethnic discriminations. 
While the latter are likely to fall on those relegated to the bottom of the hierarchy 
of racial prejudices, the former do not disadvantage a specific age group in the 
same systematic way: consider for instance voting and driving rights, to the 
disadvantage of teenagers and the various age-based subsidies and discounts that 
are to their advantage. Third, Gosseries argues that age is often a more accurate 
proxy for morally relevant features than is gender. One could make the argument 
that at least some age ranges - like very young or very old age - are better proxies 
for ability, competence, or experience, than is gender. 
 
However, these distinctions do not fully explain the intuition that age is special. 
Even if racial and gender-based discriminations were less dialectic and binary, less 
unilateral, and only limited to cases where they are accurate sociological proxies 
for relevant features, one could still object to a society fraught with differential 
treatments based on natural features over which people have no control. Consider 
the recent debate over the use of gender by car insurance providers. Women are 
involved in considerably fewer accidents than men, so insurers in Europe used to 
apply this sociological fact to the advantage of women. Even though this gender-
based differential treatment advantaged women on the basis of good actuarial 
evidence, the European Court of Justice decided that, as a matter of principle, the 
use of gender in fixing insurance premiums was an unfair discrimination. The 
intuition to which this ruling appeals is that there is a deep sense in which we 
should not treat people unequally based on natural criteria over which they have no 
control. The mere fact that it is a good sociological proxy for risky behaviour and 
that it benefits a group that is usually worse off is not sufficient to override the 
‘principle of non-discrimination’ the European Court seems to have appealed to. 
The distinctions highlighted above are thus indicative, but do not convincingly 
explain why we may consider letting age-based discriminations off the hook. And 
if age is just like gender, then the complete lives egalitarian implication that 
inequalities in treatment between age groups are unproblematic seems to be 
undermined.  
 
Both Gosseries and Daniels, however, come to the conclusion that what makes age 
truly special is that ‘we all age’, and thus we move from one age group to another 
in a foreseeable way. Gosseries sums it up this way: “Your age is pure brute luck 
and thus should not be held against you. And yet, while we cannot change our age, 
our age keeps on changing” (Gosseries 2007). This makes age special when 
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compared with gender or ethnicity: as we age, we pass through different age 
groups, while we generally do not change gender or ethnicity. For instance, at first 
sight, it might seem unfair that some rights, such as voting rights, are only granted 
after a certain age. However, this is fundamentally different from a case in which 
women cannot vote, for instance, since age restrictions on voting rights do not treat 
individuals unequally over time while sex discrimination does. In this way, an 
adult could justify age restrictions on voting rights to his underage daughter 
complaining about the unfairness of this inequality as follows: “This situation only 
looks unfair to you because you don’t see the bigger picture. When I was your age, 
I could not vote either. You will be able to vote when you are older, too. So there is 
no injustice: over our lives, we will have been treated equally.” The idea behind 
this justification thus seems to be that, since we all age, age group inequalities do 
not matter. 
 
As a result, at least in theory, if institutions remain stable over people’s complete 
lives, differential treatments between age groups will not generate inequalities 
between persons, whereas treating people differently based on their ethnicity and 
sex does bring about inequalities between people over their complete lives: “a 
society that relentlessly discriminates between people on grounds of age can still 
treat them equally over their complete lives (…). Everyone’s turn [at being 
discriminated] comes” (Gosseries 2007). Even if young people and elderly people 
are not treated equally at T0, they can still have been treated equally over their 
lives. Ultimately, it is this that makes age ‘special’ and, arguably, it explains the 
intuitive pull of complete lives egalitarianism and its generational implications.  
 
1.4 Conclusions!
 
If age is special because we all age, then perhaps we should embrace the diachronic 
approach, be wary of inequalities between birth cohorts and accept that inequalities 
between age groups are unproblematic. I hope to have conveyed the intuitive pull 
of CLE and the moral significance of its cohortal implications. However, even if 
we accept that the diachronic concern for cohort equality should fare well in a 
theory of intergenerational equality, the complete lives egalitarian approach is 
unlikely to be sufficient on its own to establish the requirements of 
intergenerational equality. Although CLE is intuitive at first sight, as Temkin 
argues, “this is yet another area where I think there is a generally accepted, 
unexamined view, which on reflection is fraught with difficulties” (1993, 232).  
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In this thesis, I will argue that CLE is not sufficient to account for what egalitarians 
should believe in the context of intergenerational equality. While I have shown that 
CLE’s cohortal implications can be justified by appeal to luck egalitarianism, I 
have not given reasons why we should accept the view that inequalities between 
age groups are unproblematic. I have merely attempted to explain our intuition that 
‘age is special’. In fact, the only potential justification I have provided for CLE is 
that the value of responsibility applies diachronically. But when we step away from 
matters of individual responsibility to focus on cases of age-based discrimination, 
for instance, then the diachronic view is left without justification.  
 
Moreover, the idea that at least some inequalities between age groups should 
matter to egalitarians also seems intuitive. What if the young live in total misery 
while the elderly flourish? Even if the young will enjoy the same benefits as the 
previous generation when they are old, it seems that this extreme inequality 
between parts of lives is intuitively problematic. As McKerlie also puts it, on CLE, 
elderly people may be left in poverty so long as they were well off in the past. 
There are no egalitarian reasons, complete lives egalitarianism implies, to assist 
elderly people. McKerlie argues: “I find this consequence intuitively objectionable. 
To avoid it, we need a new kind of egalitarian theory” (McKerlie 1992, 281). 
 
In the next two chapters, I argue that a radical complete lives egalitarian view that 
denies that the inequality between the young and the old in the examples given 
above matters at all, or one that holds that age-based discrimination is always 
acceptable, is an unattractive and implausible egalitarian view. I show that we must 
find ways to move beyond ‘pure CLE’ to inform the distribution of resources at 
different stages of their lives, that is between age groups. In Chapters 2 and 3, I 
examine two theories of age-group justice that give us substantive guidance on 
how to distribute resources between age groups. In Chapter 2, I introduce Daniels’s 
prudential theory of age-group justice. One conclusion that can be drawn from his 
account is that inequalities between age groups are only fair when they are 
‘prudent’. Daniels’s account is still complete lives egalitarian. But Daniels finds a 
way to combine CLE with an account that provides significant guidelines as to 
what counts as a just distribution of resources between age groups, as I will now 
show. In Chapter 3, drawing on McKerlie’s simultaneous segments view, I will 
then offer a fundamentally synchronic answer to the question ‘which inequalities 
between generations matter?’ that also informs the topic of age-group justice.  
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CHAPTER!2!O !DANIELS’S!PRUDENTIAL!LIFESPAN!ACCOUNT!AND!
ITS!LIMITS!
 
 
As a society, we are harangued by Cassandras who see the 
aging of society as a divisive problem. They see competition, 
with the old pitted against the young, grandparent against 
grandchild, in a life and death scramble for scarce resources. 
By focusing on what is distinctive about age – that is, we all 
age - I have found a way to undercut this grim view. 
 (Daniels 1988, 154) 
 
 
Am I My Parent’s Keeper? by Norman Daniels (1988) is the most prominent 
volume to have been produced in the under-researched field of age-group justice. It 
is one of the very few works that directly address questions such as ‘what is a fair 
distribution of resources between age groups?’ and ‘which forms of inequalities 
between age groups are legitimate?’. Not only was Daniels one of the first authors 
who took on the challenge of filling this gap in the normative literature, but his 
work on age also remains pivotal today. Notwithstanding the numerous criticisms 
his framework prompted, Daniels’s systematic elaboration on the intuition that ‘we 
all age’ is a cornerstone for any research on age, time and justice. His theory of 
age-group justice, the ‘prudential lifespan account’ (PLA), and its limitations will 
consequently be the focus of Chapter 2. The prevalence of Daniels’s work for the 
field of age-group justice also explains the length of this chapter. 
 
Daniels’s main contribution to political philosophy has been the extension of 
Rawls’s theory of justice to the domain of healthcare. John Rawls had abstracted 
away from the circumstances of illness citizens are likely to suffer from at many 
points in their lives (Rawls 2001, 175). In Just Health Care, Daniels (1985) 
examines people’s entitlements to the healthcare resources needed to recover 
“normal species functioning”, as a requirement of fair equality of opportunity. 
Daniels’s work on age-group justice stems from this previous engagement with 
healthcare and distributive justice. Through his idealized procedure, the PLA, he 
raises the further issue of how we should fairly distribute scarce resources across 
people’s lifespan. The fact that his account emanates from his writings on 
healthcare is conspicuous throughout his work on age-group justice. This is 
illustrated by his appeal to healthcare examples, his choice of concepts and the 
level of scarcity he assumes. As I will discuss in this chapter, this context partly 
explains both the intuitive force of the PLA and its limitations.  
 
50 
 
In a nutshell, Daniels argues both that age-group justice demands the preservation 
of a “normal opportunity range” throughout our lives, and that “age rationing” can 
be justified under restricted conditions. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to 
evaluate the plausibility of the PLA as a theory of age-group justice, and more 
specifically as a diachronic account of age. As discussed in Chapter 1, while pure 
complete lives egalitarianism provides reasons to find inequalities between birth 
cohorts problematic, it does not shed much light into issues of age-group justice. 
By contrast, Daniels’s modified account provides a diachronic way to register 
inequalities between age groups (beyond their derivative impact on birth cohort 
equity) and offers a procedural solution to determine which inequalities between 
age groups matter.   
 
In this chapter, I first present Daniels’s complex procedural theory (Section 2.1) 
and make its outcomes explicit (Section 2.2). I then categorize three kinds of 
criticisms against the intrapersonal prudential procedure from within the diachronic 
paradigm - the demographic, the longevity and the impartiality objections  - and I 
rescue the account from these charges (Section 2.3). Last, I level an original 
criticism at the PLA, namely that it conceptualises the age-group problem as a 
residual problem of justice and establishes the requirements of age-group justice in 
sharp isolation from the demands of social justice (Section 2.4). This final 
discussion rises up to the challenge I posed earlier in this thesis to integrate 
generational issues into the broader realm of egalitarian social justice. 
 
2.1 The!Features!of!the!PLA!
 
The prudential lifespan account is a device that uses “what is prudent over a 
lifespan to determine a result that neither young nor old can object as unfair to 
them” (Daniels 1988, 63). The PLA rests on the two following basic observations 
about age-based differential treatment: 
 
(a) “Such unequal treatment does not mean that persons are treated 
unequally over their lifespan” (Daniels 1988, 45). 
(b) “Such unequal treatment may have effects which benefit everyone” 
(Daniels 1988, 45). 
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The first point appeals to what I have introduced and discussed in Chapter 1: the 
basic observation that we all age.  Once we adopt a diachronic perspective on age, 
we are able to see that synchronic inequalities between age groups may cancel out 
over time: “Differential treatment by age, over time, is not unequal treatment of 
persons, even if it is unequal treatment of age groups on each occasion, at each 
moment” (Daniels 1988, 42). Daniels’s first basic observation is thus an injunction 
to endorse the complete lives view. Let me briefly recall the three generational 
implications this approach carries. First, inequalities between age groups are not 
prima facie unfair. Second, inequalities between birth cohorts matter, since they 
are about individuals’ complete lives’ prospects. This way, Daniels argues that 
institutions must be designed to foster and respect approximate equality in benefit 
ratios between cohorts 5 (Daniels 1988, 128). Third, inequalities between age 
groups are derivatively objectionable insofar as they may contribute to creating or 
exacerbating inequalities between birth cohorts. For instance, if Cohort X is treated 
worse than Cohort Y at both T1 and T2, one may object to the synchronic 
inequality at T2 because it may increase the likeliness of diachronic inequality 
between Cohorts X and Y over their complete lives. 
 
If (a) is what makes Daniels’s account a ‘lifespan’ view, (b) is what makes it 
‘prudential’. Daniels’s second basic observation - that age-based unequal 
treatments may have effects which benefit everyone - can be understood in two 
ways. I will first highlight a circular way of understanding it and then propose a 
better way to make sense of the intuition. First, (b) can be understood as a common 
sense judgement on the changing nature of our needs over time. It seems 
reasonable to believe that our institutions should be responsive to changing needs 
and should thus allocate resources accordingly along the lifespan. (a) tells us that it 
may be prima facie unproblematic to treat age groups unequally. However, (a) 
does not give us reasons to treat age groups unequally and does not tell us how to 
treat them. On the contrary, (b) provides a reason to treat age groups unequally - 
they have different needs; and it also points to a possible way to do so - to each age 
group according to their needs.  
 
However, this is not the kind of unequal treatment Daniels has in mind. The fact 
that people have dissimilar basic needs and that institutions treat them accordingly 
is often constitutive of what counts as ‘equal treatment’. As Brian Barry (2009) 
argues, equal treatment often requires that we treat people differently. He takes the 
                                                      
5 Daniels defines ‘benefits ratios’ as “the ratio of benefits received to contributions made” 
(Daniels 1988, 118). 
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example of an army that provides all soldiers with size 8 boots, regardless of their 
own shoe size. This would count as ‘same treatment’ and yet “equal treatment 
requires each soldier to have boots that fit” (Barry 2001, 2). Similarly, we could 
consider that, when institutions treat age groups according to their needs, this 
counts as equal treatment. For instance, treating able middle-aged people ‘the 
same’ as elderly people would mean affording them an equal amount of healthcare 
resources. Treating them equally, however, would mean affording elderly people 
more of such resources.  
 
But then (b) may seem to lose its grip since it wrongly identifies equal treatments 
as unequal and points to a non-existent problem. Indeed, if ‘equal treatment’ means 
‘differential but adapted treatment’, then by ‘unequal treatment’ between age 
groups, Daniels cannot mean ‘differential but adapted treatment’ in this sense. In 
other words, if we understand equal treatment as treatment that gives people ‘boots 
that fit’, and if (b) means that unequal treatment is acceptable when it is in line 
with people’s age specific needs, then the unequal treatment mentioned by Daniels 
would in fact be a perfect instance of equal treatment. So by ‘unequal treatment 
that benefits everyone’, Daniels must mean something other than treatments that 
treat people according to their needs. 
 
There is an alternative way of understanding (b), however. Daniels is primarily 
concerned with the allocation of scarce healthcare resources between age groups 
and with finding out whether rationing healthcare on age grounds can ever be 
legitimate. He is thus concerned with conflicts that emerge from circumstances of 
scarcity: for instance, a case in which only one expensive medical treatment is 
available for two needy patients – a 20-year-old and a 65-year-old. In such case, 
justice requires, arguably, that it should be allocated to the younger person, even 
though both need it. The age-priority rule disadvantages elderly people person at 
T0, but it advantages everyone if we adopt a diachronic perspective. Indeed, the 
rule is such that everyone’s risk of living a short life is reduced thanks to such 
priority rules. This seems to be the best way to make sense of the basic point (b) 
that some unequal treatments between age groups may benefit everyone.  
 
The prudential lifespan account draws on (a) and (b) in the following sense. 
Because (a) treating age groups unequally is compatible with treating persons 
equally (over time) and (b) unequal treatment can benefit everyone (by making 
them all better off in principle over their complete lives), then the synchronic 
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problem of distribution that we face when considering how resources should be 
distributed between age groups can be modeled through a diachronic procedure: 
 
We are driven to convert the synchronic or time-slice distribution problem 
we first raised – namely, how to ration health care resources between 
competing groups while avoiding age-bias – into a diachronic perspective 
in which we are concerned with the treatment of the same people through 
various stages of their lives.  
(Daniels 1983, 495) 
 
In addition to this conversion from synchronic to diachronic, the PLA translates 
interpersonal questions of justice between different groups of people - for instance, 
the question of young people’s responsibilities to elderly people - into questions of 
intrapersonal transfers within the same life. This way, Daniels approaches age-
group justice through asking the following intrapersonal questions: which transfers 
would we want from one stage of our life to the other? How much should we 
forego at one stage of our life for a later time? All of these questions can in fact be 
subsumed under one single question: what distribution of resources across the 
lifespan would allow our lives to go as well as possible? The outcome of such 
intrapersonal deliberation on what savings rate is prudent will tell us which 
principles should guide our intergenerational institutions.  
 
However, Daniels’s approach has almost nothing to do with the classic economic 
model of prudential reasoning. The deliberators in charge of planning the 
distribution of resources between different stages of our lives must be impartial: 
 
My knowledge of particular facts about me allows my individual interests 
to influence choice. Any bargains struck in the light of full knowledge then 
risk allowing the accidents of current age-group competition to influence 
unduly the arrangements governing long-term cooperative schemes.  
(Daniels 1983, 507) 
 
To guarantee the fairness of institutions, Daniels argues, planners must be placed 
behind a veil of ignorance. He interchangeably refers to the idea of “social” and 
“veiled” prudence to qualify his procedure. Daniels’s prudential model is social in 
the sense that it aims to bring about fair outcomes precisely because it is veiled. He 
argues: “the prudent agents deliberating about principles to govern their 
cooperative scheme should know nothing of their age, family situation, health 
status and genetic history, socioeconomic status, or their particular conception of 
the good” (Daniels 1983, 507). The legitimacy of the move from interpersonal to 
intrapersonal reasoning relies on the impartiality of the planners, since the 
outcomes of the PLA will be imposed on everyone. The PLA rests on the 
assumption that prudent intrapersonal distributive rules translate into fair 
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interpersonal ones. Inversely, an imprudent planning would give rise to an 
institutional design that treats age groups unfairly. 
 
The most important and peculiar aspect of the prudential position is that planners 
must be age-blind. Fully informed rational agents knowing their age could discount 
distant years: there would be little incentive for them to save for their very distant 
future, let alone for their past years. A young person could be tempted to discount 
his older years and to allocate to his younger self a disproportionate amount of 
resources. At the other end, older planners could self-interestedly discount their 
younger (and past) years. Prudence thus requires time-neutrality. In other words, a 
prudent planner “should be equally concerned by all the parts of his future” 
(Daniels 1988, 159).  
 
To protect this “requirement of equal concern” for the different stages of their 
lives, planners must also be made to believe that they will live through the 
institutions they choose for their entire life. If they believed that they could then 
change the institutions to meet their changing needs as they age, then there would 
be no need for them to be prudent. Similarly, if a planner knew he was going to die 
young, then there would be no need for him to save for his old years. Prudence thus 
justifies the requirement that planners design institutions as if they had to live 
under them throughout their lives.  
 
Another important feature of the prudential procedure is that planners must be 
blind to their own conception of the good. As a planner, even if I do not know my 
age, I may still have a specific vision of the good that will undermine my 
prudential reasoning. For instance, I may love extreme sports and know that I will 
be unlikely to practice them after I turn 50 years old. I may therefore discount older 
years and want to have access to as many resources as possible between 15 and 40 
years old, leaving insufficient means to live decent older years. As I grow older 
and value life differently, I may well regret such choice. If my vision of the good 
leads me to discount my older years, I will make imprudent planning decisions and 
the corresponding institutions will thus treat elderly people unfairly. Thus, in the 
name of lifespan prudence, Daniels considers that planners should be blind to their 
own conception of the good.  
 
Just like the parties in Rawls’s original position, Daniels’s planners know a few 
facts about how society works. Intrapersonal prudence is incompatible with a total 
ignorance of the facts. Knowing some facts is important for deciding whether a 
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given choice is appealing or misguided. If planners were ignorant of the facts, in 
other words, they would make imprudent calls. For instance, they must know that 
as they age, the risk that they may be disabled and incapable of working increases. 
They must also know that some resources are likely to be scarce (for example, 
costly life-extending treatments).  
 
However, there are a few facts that they do not know. First, the possibility that they 
may die young is excluded. This is ensured by the earlier requirement that planners 
must believe that they will experience aging through the institutions they have 
designed. This may be a problematic imposition on planners because it is not so 
clear whether this is required by prudence alone, as Lazenby (2011) argues. Why 
shouldn’t prudent planners take the risk of dying young into account? Second, 
prudent planners are not aware of the demographic ratios between young and old in 
their society. They must only focus on the intrapersonal question in abstraction 
from existing demographic trends. If they were allowed to know demographic 
ratios, Daniels argues, planners would then be answering the cohortal question 
instead of the age group question. I will address these two problems in the third 
section of this chapter. For now, I will simply accept such restrictions. 
 
Last, planners must know what they ought to be prudent about. They must know 
which goods are required for a life to go well. Daniels’s own subscription to 
Rawls’s principles of justice drives his choice. Rawls’s contractors “are to think of 
their well-being as being determined by their lifetime expectation of having a 
certain distribution of basic liberties, opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
social bases for self respect” (Daniels 1988, 61). The prudential planners’ role is 
then to answer the following question: “how should that lifetime expectation of 
enjoying a certain level of primary social goods be distributed over each stage of 
life so that lifetime well-being is maximized?” (Daniels 1988, 62). The resulting 
deliberations will allow us to modify our existing principles of distributive justice 
so that they solve the age-group problem.  
 
The PLA is meant to be an extension of Rawls’s theory of justice, so Rawlsian 
language is pervasive throughout the account. However, one may endorse the 
general prudential framework and simply amend the procedure by modifying the 
currency of egalitarian justice that must be maximized across the lifespan. One 
may define lifetime wellbeing in terms of capabilities, real freedom, or welfare, for 
instance, and still ask what is the lifetime distribution of resources required to 
make a life go as well as possible. Daniels himself, throughout his book, argues 
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that the PLA is freestanding and can be attached to other theories of justice. What 
is constitutive of the PLA, however, is that planners are asked to reach a decision 
based on what will make their lives go as well as possible. That is, they aim to 
maximize diachronic utility (however defined) in the allocation of resources.  
 
To recap, Daniels operates a triple conversion with the PLA. He translates: 
questions of interpersonal justice between age groups into a problem of 
intrapersonal planning; a question of fairness into a question of prudence; and a 
synchronic problem into a diachronic one. Impartial planners are asked to allocate 
basic primary goods over their whole lifespan so as to make their life go as well as 
possible. They are rational self-interested agents placed behind a veil of ignorance: 
they do not know anything about their own particular circumstances and private 
interests, including their age and conception of the good. However, they believe 
that they will live through the institutions for their entire lives and know a few facts 
about society so that their judgements may be informed. The principles of prudent 
allocation they come up with set the guidelines for what counts as a fair 
distribution of resources between age groups. 
  
2.2 The!Outcomes!of!the!PLA!
 
If the assumption that intrapersonal veiled prudence conduces to interpersonal 
fairness between age groups is correct, then solving the intrapersonal question will 
tell us what counts as a fair distribution of resources between age groups. In his 
numerous publications on prudential lifespan planning, Daniels discusses the 
features of his procedure in great detail, as shown in the previous section, but he 
does not provide a principled review of the general outcomes that can be derived 
from the PLA. In this section, I attempt to derive two key principles of age-group 
justice from his account - the first sufficiency based and the second efficiency 
driven. 
2.2.1 The!lifespan!sufficiency!principle:!ensuring!there!is!enough!at!any!point!
 
Veiled planners obey the prudential ‘requirement of equal concern’ and thus do not 
discount one stage of their life at the expense of another. It is thus very likely that 
they will allocate resources in a way that ensures they never fall below a certain 
level. Daniels defines this threshold as a “normal opportunity range” that must be 
protected throughout the lifespan. He defines it as “the array of life plans 
reasonable persons (…) are likely to construct for themselves” (Daniels 1988, 69). 
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Planners know that they have a conception of the good life, that they will have 
particular plans in life and also that they are likely to revise such plans as they age. 
They thus have a fundamental interest in making sure they have access to sufficient 
resources to develop and revise their life plans. For Daniels, this means that: “it is 
especially important for them to make sure social arrangements give them a chance 
to enjoy their fair share of the normal range of opportunities open to them at each 
stage of life” (Daniels 1988, 76). The first outcome of the PLA can thus be 
understood in sufficientarian terms: institutions must ensure that people have 
access to sufficient resources to enjoy a normal range of opportunities at each stage 
of their lives.  
 
This sufficiency-based commitment to the normal opportunity range is primarily 
driven by a discussion on healthcare provision. In previous works, Daniels (1985) 
had argued that the role of healthcare institutions was to restore a normal level of 
species functioning. Healthcare is what enables people who have suffered from 
illness or accidents to recover a normal range of functioning. It also prevents those 
who are functioning normally from falling below a certain level. The principle of 
normal opportunity across the lifespan modifies and extends further the principle of 
just healthcare provision to the remaining age-group problem. However, the 
normal opportunity range principle also applies to the distribution of other kinds of 
resources, such as income. In Chapter 7 of Am I My Parents’ Keeper?, Daniels 
establishes the “income preservation principle” as the income-specific distribution 
rule to foster a normal range of opportunities at any point. It ensures “that the 
individual has available to himself, at each stage of life, an adequate income to 
pursue whatever plan of life he may have at that stage of life” (Daniels 1988, 121). 
Therefore, even though it was primarily framed within the realm of healthcare, the 
sufficientarian outcome of the PLA can also apply to the provision of other 
resources, such as income. 
 
Daniels defines this threshold as fundamentally age-relative: institutions should 
ensure that an age-relative normal array of opportunities is preserved over time. 
What counts as a normal range of opportunities, the argument goes, depends on 
one’s age-relative legitimate aspirations. By age-relative, Daniels does not simply 
mean that the young have different needs than their elders, but that what is 
considered normal varies according to our age. For instance, both an elderly person 
and a teenager might have an impairment that prevents them from running. 
However, we may consider that being able to run is more ‘normal’ for a teenager 
than for an elderly person, in the sense that being able to use their legs to the fullest 
 
58 
is more constitutive of the young’s opportunity range than the elderly person’s. The 
age-relative normal opportunity range is dependent on many cultural and social 
factors and on the degree of scarcity of a given society. Issues of distribution 
between age groups cannot be set once and for all and universally.  
 
One may worry that such reasoning is circular since what is due to each age group 
depends on what is considered ‘normal’ for them to have. Why would the normal 
range tell us anything about the fair range? Daniels does not pretend to solve all 
issues of resource provision between age groups. He simply points to a way to 
reframe the discussion. For instance, when it comes to the provision of scarce 
healthcare resources, institutions will have to be designed in accordance with the 
“disease-age profile” of the population. This means that, in order to meet the age-
relative threshold for each age group, institutions must be responsive to facts about 
when and how people get some conditions over the lifespan (frequency, type, etc.) 
(Daniels 1988, 76-78). Moreover, Daniels does consider that what is identified as 
being the normal opportunity range at a given time should and will progress. What 
is considered a normal range of opportunities for elderly people, for instance, 
evolves considerably with technological advancements.  
 
The lifespan sufficiency principle has interesting implications for how we should 
allocate allegedly incommensurable resources such as healthcare, income, or 
culture. Take the basic problem of state budgeting. If institutions did not set a cap 
on how much they spend on healthcare per capita, we would not spend much on 
education, culture or art. States would never invest on anything but healthcare, 
since you could always spend more to extend lives and bring people up to an ideal 
level of functioning. The institutional answer is to set an artificial cap on how 
much we are willing to spend on health per capita, so as to leave ‘enough’ for all 
other aspects of what makes a life meaningful. The age-relative sufficiency 
principle provides a less artificial way to think about how to commensurate these 
resources. For instance, the opportunity to learn and develop skills is constitutive 
of the normal range of opportunities of the young and there must therefore be a 
budget for education, just like there must be a budget for healthcare to secure the 
elderly’s normal opportunity range. Very different resources such as education and 
healthcare can thus be made commensurable through the age-relative normal 
opportunity principle.  
 
The age-relative threshold thus indicates how we should allocate resources 
between age groups. However, given that Daniels alternates between defending an 
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age-relative standard of living and promoting the goal of a society where people 
have access to basic resources throughout their lives (Daniels 1988, 58), I think 
that the best way to represent the sufficientarian outcome of the PLA is twofold: 
 
o Lifespan sufficiency principle: Institutions must distribute resources 
between age groups in a way that ensures a normal opportunity range 
throughout people’s lives – i.e. members of any age group should be 
maintained above two thresholds: (1) an absolute threshold defined by 
appeal to basic human needs; (2) an age-relative threshold set at the level 
of what counts as a ‘normal’ set of opportunities for a given age group in a 
given society at a given time. 
 
The first threshold includes what humans need to be free from deprivation. It 
coincides with the sufficiency threshold Paula Casal (2007) describes by appealing 
to the “non-comparative importance of deprivation” (Casal 2007, 305). It also 
resembles what Axel Gosseries (2011, 482-485) refers to as the requirement of 
“continuous sufficiency”, which is grounded on the view that a life well lived 
necessitates a continuous lifetime access to the necessary resources to live a life in 
dignity. If prudence requires an age-relative normal opportunity range throughout 
the lifespan, then it first demands that our most basic human needs be fulfilled. The 
second threshold thus covers the first but goes beyond it.6 It includes the set of 
opportunities that are considered ‘normal’ in a given society for a given age group. 
Even if the second threshold covers the first one, the distinction is important to 
establish what should be ensured for all age groups non-differentially from what 
should be distributed differentially. As I will now show, identifying different layers 
for the normal opportunity range threshold helps determine when the differential 
provision of resources along age lines is legitimate.  
 
The age-relative normal opportunity principle instructs that we should not increase 
the share of opportunities of the young and old at each other’s expense, but that 
their respective range of opportunities should evolve together. In other words, 
planners must not allocate resources in a way that disproportionally promotes their 
opportunities at a given time at the expense of their normal opportunity range at 
another time. For instance, in light of technological advancements and given that 
the PLA is about making lives go as well as possible, it implies that institutions 
should aim at securing a maximized normal range of opportunity for each age 
group.  Under conditions of relative abundance, we could then highlight a third 
                                                      
6 Note that this is only true of relatively rich countries. In poorer countries, the actual 
normal opportunity range may be lower than the basic needs threshold. See Brauer (2009, 
30) for an interesting discussion of the potential negative implications of Daniels’s 
framework in developing countries.  
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threshold that institutions should aim to meet:  an ideal age-relative threshold – 
which consists of a maximized and increasing ideal level of opportunities that we 
can hope to reach for each age group. However, it would be imprudent to provide 
an ideal opportunity range to your younger self while only securing a less than 
normal opportunity range for your elder self. In the same way, it would violate the 
requirement of equal concern if you saved enough to secure an ideal opportunity 
range for your elder years at the expense of your normal opportunity range as a 
young person. Even more straightforwardly, under no circumstances should 
planners jeopardize the satisfaction of their basic needs at one point to ensure a 
normal or ideal range of opportunities at another point, as this too would violate the 
requirement of equal concern. Thus, highlighting layers for the lifespan sufficiency 
threshold seems to help in ensuring that our deliberations are in line with the 
requirement of equal concern. 
 
Let me now examine the spending rules we may apply to promote the lifespan 
sufficiency principle in conditions of moderate scarcity. First, it seems that 
prudential deliberators will quickly come to the conclusion that resources ought to 
be allocated in a way that is adapted to their changing needs from birth to death. 
This means that they should not take it as a prima facie prudential requirement that 
the same kind or quantity of goods must be allocated for each stage of their lives. 
This translates into an important spending rule for age-group justice: institutions 
should be sensitive to changing needs. Healthcare needs are, for instance, likely to 
increase substantially as one ages. It would not make much prudential sense to 
devote an unsuitably high bundle of healthcare resources to my youth and deny my 
older self the required healthcare resources to live decently. Institutionalising 
intrapersonal prudence is thus likely to entail different but adapted treatment 
between individuals on grounds of age.  
 
Is it unfair then if the government’s spending per elderly person on healthcare is 
several times higher than the amount spent per child? David Willetts (2010, 158), 
for instance complains that of the annual NHS budget of about £100bn, half goes 
on the over-65s. If institutions should be adapted to changing needs, the legitimacy 
of such spending ratios depends on whether they are needed to sustain the elderly 
population above the two thresholds. In other words, Willetts would have to show 
that the elderly need fewer resources than what is being granted to them to be 
within the normal range. The mere fact that per capita spending per age group is 
not equal does not give rise to a claim of justice. This may just be exactly what 
justice requires: “Facts about the disease/age profile and the age profile, plus the 
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emphasis placed by the opportunity account on meeting needs, determine that per 
capita expenditures are likely to vary greatly between children, the young and the 
very old. These variations are what prudence and thus justice require” (Daniels 
1988, 78).  
 
In other words, Daniels argues that it is senseless to believe that equality in 
spending between age groups is an ideal to pursue: prudence requires that spending 
be adapted to changing needs. In fact, we could have reached this same basic 
conclusion without appealing to the prudential lifespan account. We could simply 
have highlighted the basic analytical distinction raised in the previous section 
between ‘same treatment’ and ‘equal treatment’. In principle, differential 
treatments are not only compatible with equality in treatment but they may even be 
required by equality in treatment. 
 
Daniels’s framework is primarily well known for another, more controversial, 
spending rule he allows: age rationing – that is the allocation of some scarce 
resources to some age groups exclusively. It may be the case that, in order to 
ensure that each age group can access the resources they need to function 
‘normally’, we will have to restrict the access of each age group to the resources 
that are not constitutive of the normal opportunity range of their age group. For 
instance, if the only way to make sure the young have access to the training and 
education they need is to restrict costly educational resources to the young, then 
this may be justifiable prudentially. Similarly, we may introduce compulsory 
retirement regulations for those reaching old age, even if they still want to work, to 
protect the normal opportunity to work of the young. So a first reason why we may 
legitimately use age-rationing is to ensure that the demands of the age-relative 
normal opportunity range are met.  
 
I have identified the first outcome of the PLA as being lifespan sufficiency. The 
principle states that institutions should be designed to ensure a normal opportunity 
range throughout people’s lives. This entails that institutions should promote an 
absolute sufficiency threshold set at the level of people’s basic human needs, and a 
further age-relative threshold that contains all the opportunities that are considered 
normal for people in an age group to have. I have also argued that, in order to meet 
the demands of sufficiency, institutions are likely to spend different kinds and 
quantities of resources between age groups, given that needs change over the 
course of our lives. The resulting inequalities in average per capita spending per 
age group are unproblematic as such. Moreover, I have pointed to a further more 
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controversial spending rule, which consists of rationing some resources by age 
when it is the only way to meet the lifespan sufficiency principle. However, the 
moral permissibility of age-rationing is further emphasized by the second outcome 
of the prudential procedure, which I will now refer to as the lifespan efficiency 
principle. 
2.2.2 The!lifespan!efficiency!principle:!maximizing!diachronic!benefits!
 
Planners behind the veil of ignorance are asked to allocate resources in a way that 
makes their lives go as well as possible. In other words, they must maximize 
intrapersonal efficiency over the lifespan. Ensuring the first requirement (which I 
have named the lifespan sufficiency principle) is already a way to make one’s life 
go as well as possible. But it is also very likely that planners will want to allocate a 
substantial amount of the available resources to their younger selves, mainly for 
two reasons: (1) because it may increase their chances of living a life of normal 
length;  (2) because early investments may increase diachronic utility in a way later 
investments cannot.   
 
First, age-rationing may be legitimate if it is the only way to guarantee that the 
young are able to live a life of normal length. It would not make sense from the 
point of view of prudent planners to implement a healthcare scheme that extends 
our chances of living a long life once we have reached old age and that decreases 
our chances to reach old age in the first place. Daniels (1988, 87) provides the 
following example. As a planner, if Scheme A will increase my chances of living 
older than 80 years old once I have reached 70, but at the same time decreases my 
chances of living until 50, then the measure is not prudent and does not make my 
life go as well as possible. The resulting institutions will be unfair. Prudent 
planners would prefer a scheme that improves their chances to live a lifespan of 
normal length to a scheme that may extend their lifespan, but reduces their chances 
of living a life of normal length. An implication of this view is that, for instance, a 
reform of healthcare entitlements that extends the lives of elderly patients at the 
cost of increasing child mortality rates would not be found prudent (all other things 
being equal). Some instances of age-rationing are thus made permissible in 
principle by the PLA: “pure age-rationing is morally permissible under certain, 
very specific, and restrictive conditions” (Daniels 1988, 84). The resulting 
institutions, that prioritize the young in such conditions, will be fair to each age 
group.  
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A second reason why planners may invest more in their youth than in later years is 
derived from the potentially radical diachronic returns of early investments. 
Planners would surely decide to invest healthcare resources so as to prevent 
conditions that would require that they spent even more of their resources in 
curative strategies. For instance, they would want to tackle child obesity as early as 
possible and invest the required resources then, instead of having to spend more 
once it has given rise to further conditions over their lives. Beyond the preventive 
provision of healthcare resources, early investment strategies also apply to 
education or training. This is important for my research question because the 
prudential requirement to invest in prevention offers strong reasons to invest 
resources in childhood and young adulthood. If disadvantage at a young age is 
likely to cause further disadvantage later in life, then prudence seems to require 
that such phenomena be avoided through an early investment of the necessary 
resources. I will explore the implications of the prudential principles for youth 
policies in greater details in Chapter 4. 
 
In some circumstances, therefore, planners will privilege investments in their 
younger years over their older years. This is compatible with the requirement of 
equal concern, because such investments increase diachronic returns, either 
quantitatively - it ensures that a normal number of years is lived prior to extending 
lives - or qualitatively - it promotes diachronic utility through preventing 
disadvantage from developing and maximising the chances of leading a good life. 
This likely tendency of the planners to allocate more resources to their younger 
selves thus gives rise to what I identify as second outcome of intrapersonal 
prudence: lifespan efficiency, which I flesh out through the following principle. 
 
o Lifespan efficiency principle: Institutions should invest resources early in 
the lifespan when it increases lifespan efficiency – that is when it improves 
diachronic returns. 
 
The relationship between the lifespan sufficiency and the lifespan efficiency 
principles remains to be established. Julian Le Grand and David Nissan (2003) 
distinguish ‘curative’ and ‘preventive’ policies in the context of income provision. 
These two concepts may help elucidate the distinction between the two principles. 
While the lifespan efficiency principle encourages preventive investments early in 
the lifespan, one may argue, the lifespan sufficiency principle promotes curative 
policies that make sure no one falls below the two pre-identified thresholds. 
However, the distinction between curative and preventive does not seem to mirror 
the distinction between the two principles. Surely the efficiency principle 
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encourages preventive measures and investments that will increase wellbeing over 
the lifespan as a whole. However, such preventive strategies also promote the 
sufficiency principle to an important extent. Preventing bad health at a young age 
from causing further disadvantages later in life, for instance, may be precisely what 
promoting lifespan sufficiency requires. It is indeed more difficult to promote good 
health in old age when preventive strategies were not implemented early on. 
Ensuring lifespan sufficiency may require both preventive and curative strategies.   
 
The two principles may thus overlap substantially in what they recommend. 
However, I believe that the distinction remains important, if only because the two 
principles may also push in different directions. Based on the lifespan efficiency 
principle, I may be tempted to invest most resources in my young age, consuming 
as much training and healthcare resources as possible, knowing that this will result 
in many diachronic returns in terms of wellbeing. Favouring young age over old 
age, in theory, is compatible with the requirement for equal concern because it may 
respect and promote wellbeing over the complete life, as I have shown. However, 
the efficiency principle allows and encourages trade-offs that may jeopardize the 
goal of lifespan sufficiency. If I only invest in young adulthood and hope that this 
investment will guarantee enough resources for my whole lifespan, I make an 
imprudent gamble. Early investments cannot act as substitutes for prudent savings 
for old age. What prudence requires, the lifespan sufficiency principle tells us, is 
that I vouch for institutions that ensure that I get enough to live well at each step of 
the lifespan. I must therefore both grant myself the required resources at any point 
in my lifespan to live a good life, hence directly saving for old age, and invest 
some resources early to maximize long-term returns.  
 
What should we do when the requirements of the two principles are in conflict? 
One possibility is to view them as lexically ordered: sufficiency would be the 
primary prudential requirement, and efficiency would be a secondary principle, 
informing the distribution of extra resources. Institutions may be required to first 
ensure the two thresholds are met (basic needs at any point and age-relative normal 
opportunity range). Then, institutions may allocate most of the remaining resources 
to the young if it is the best way to maximize lifespan efficiency. 
 
The problem with this ranking of sufficiency over efficiency is that, depending on 
the kinds of resources that they are allocating, planners may follow the principles 
in different orders of importance. They may want to distribute income in a way that 
improves the array of opportunities accessible at all stages of their lives. This may 
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well be what the requirement of equal concern demands. By contrast, as far as 
educational and healthcare provision is concerned, investing some resources at a 
young age may have an impact on the lifespan that cannot be reached by directly 
investing the resources later on. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, it may cost 
much more to cure a condition after it has caused further conditions than to prevent 
it from happening in the first place. As far as educational resources are concerned, 
lifespan returns may be quite important too: being trained appropriately may result 
in occupational security and satisfaction over the lifespan, which in turn may 
translate into increased wellbeing over the lifespan. In a world where technologies 
evolve quickly, however, we may need to have access to training throughout our 
lives. It may thus be prudent to ensure access to educational resources later in the 
lifespan instead of reserving them exclusively for our younger self. Thus, it seems 
that the lexical order may not always be the best way to account for how prudent 
planners will allocate resources. They may deliberate by going back and forth 
between the incentive, on the one hand, to invest enough at each stage and save 
enough for later times, and on the other hand, the incentive to invest earlier in the 
lifespan to generate higher returns in terms of overall wellbeing.  
 
Relaxing the lexical ordering, however, may mean that planners will end up 
leaving too few resources for old age. The planners think that they will live a life of 
normal length, but what should they save for the years lived beyond the normal 
length? Wouldn’t it be rational to leave only few resources to your future self, once 
you have reached a normal lifespan? This decision would fundamentally threaten 
the lifespan sufficiency requirement, but could be justified as promoting diachronic 
utility. Perhaps it would be imprudent to save nothing for very old age and planners 
may decide to save enough for their basic needs to be fulfilled. But it does not 
seem to be rational to save more than this, if it would mean decreasing your 
chances of leading a good life before the normal age of death. The requirement of 
equal concern for each stage of our lives does not seem to apply to the parts of our 
lives where we are very unlikely still to be alive, so planners will give decreasing 
importance to very old age. From a diachronic perspective, this may not be a 
problem. Lifespan efficiency requires that we do not spend unlimited resources to 
extend lives and then maintain people at a very high level of functioning, if it 
means that we do not then have enough resources to fulfil the basic needs and 
opportunities of the young. But this is an important aspect of the PLA. For this 
reason, it is not clear that sufficiency will always be chosen prior to lifespan 
efficiency, especially beyond a life of normal length.  
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In conclusion, Daniels’s procedural prudential framework does not provide all the 
answers. As I have tried to argue, it offers an intrapersonal framework to think of 
age-group justice and points in two directions - sufficiency and efficiency. Two 
main principles may be derived from the prudential procedure: the lifespan 
sufficiency and the lifespan efficiency principles. The principles are not entirely 
distinct. Having access to enough opportunities at any point is itself an 
interpretation of what maximizing diachronic utility may mean. However, the two 
principles may conflict in some circumstances, because lifespan efficiency may 
require waiving the requirement of lifespan sufficiency for older years. At this 
stage, we may thus consider these two principles as two dominant intrapersonal 
prudential outcomes, which jointly frame the debate on how to allocate resources 
between age groups.  
 
2.3 Three!Objections!to!Intrapersonal!Prudence!!!!!!!!!
 
Daniels’s prudential account has generated many criticisms. In the previous two 
sections, I tried to present Daniels’s theory under its best light to provide a 
plausible reading of its outcomes. I will now focus on three criticisms aimed at the 
intrapersonal structure of the prudential procedure. I will only focus on criticisms 
that come from within the complete lives egalitarian paradigm. In other words, I 
will only address objections that accept the diachronic focus but reject Daniels’s 
prudential framework.7 
 
All three criticisms - (a) the longevity, (b) the demographic, and (c) the impartiality 
objections - target Daniels’s view that questions of age-group justice can be re-
described as intrapersonal. They are grounded on the same fundamental criticism: 
there are some irreducibly interpersonal dimensions to age-group justice that are 
obscured by the intrapersonal prudential framework Daniels proposes. In other 
words, the PLA masks core constitutive challenges raised by the field of age, time 
and distributive justice, and for this reason, we should perhaps abandon the PLA. 
The longevity objection points to the overlooked interpersonal problem of 
distribution between people who die young and people who die old; the 
demographic objection highlights the unfair inequalities between birth cohorts that 
may arise if questions of age-group justice are settled in abstraction from 
                                                      
7 Objections that come from outside complete lives egalitarianism will be considered in 
Chapter 3 when I introduce McKerlie’s synchronic alternative. 
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demographic ratios; and the impartiality objection focuses on the irreducibly 
interpersonal dispute between competing conceptions of what a good life entails.  
 
2.3.1 The!longevity!objection!
 
The longevity objection takes issue with the basic observation, on which Daniels’s 
account relies, that inequalities in treatment between age groups need not translate 
into inequalities between persons. The basic fact that ‘we all age’ while we do not 
change gender or race makes age special, as I have shown earlier, because it means 
that unequal treatment of age groups will not always generate inequalities between 
persons. In a paper published in 2011, Hugh Lazenby argues that the prudential 
framework relies on the counterfactual ‘complete lives assumption’ that we all live 
lives of equal length. Daniels appeals to the complete lives assumption on two 
different occasions: as an idealizing assumption, when he argues that “there is a 
natural reduction from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal perspective” (Lazenby 
2011, 330); and as a constraint on the planners, who must believe that “they will 
live through each stage of life under the institutions they are designing” (Daniels in 
Lazenby 2011, 331). Lazenby claims that the basic counterfactual assumption 
threatens the validity of the PLA. Age-group justice, he argues, “is not special in 
the way Daniels proposes; it involves the same irreducibly interpersonal 
distributive decisions as other problems of justice” (Lazenby 2011, 328). This 
undermines the PLA as a sound theoretical framework.  
 
Moreover, Lazenby argues, this mischaracterization generates unfair distributive 
implications for those who die young. Groups of different longevity will receive 
different amounts of resources over their complete lives as a direct outcome of the 
PLA. By demanding that the normal opportunity range of the elderly be 
maintained, the PLA grants more resources to those who will be lucky enough to 
die old than to those who will die earlier. Those who will die very old will receive 
more than their lifetime share X, while those who die young will only receive a 
fraction of X. This creates an unfair interpersonal distributive inequality between 
longevity groups: “insofar as Daniels’s theory dismisses the problem of premature 
death via an idealizing assumption, he not only changes the nature of the subject he 
addresses, he changes it in a way that has potentially radical distributive 
implications” (Lazenby 2011, 333). The intrapersonal procedure misses out on the 
fundamental inequalities stemming from cases of premature death, and Lazenby 
argues that this makes the PLA unconvincing.  
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For this reason, Lazenby suggests that one solution would be to let planners know 
about the risks that they may die young when they deliberate. Instead of asking 
them to plan as if there was a 100% chance that they would die old, perhaps we 
should let them think rationally about what to do in face of the adverse 
circumstance of early death. This change would be likely to have an important 
impact on the conclusions they draw. The requirement of equal concern for each 
stage of our life may not be respected in this context. As Lazenby argues, planners 
would most probably confer significantly more benefits to earlier age groups 
(Lazenby 2011, 328). Taking into account the fact that they might die young, they 
risk wanting to leave much less for later years than they would grant under 
Daniels’s PLA.  
 
However, if planners know that they might die young, then the basic assumption 
that we all age falls apart, and the PLA no longer seems justified. Indeed, the 
translation of the interpersonal problem into an intrapersonal problem itself relies 
on the fact that we all age: “the substitution of one problem for another is 
appropriate because, in the peculiar case of age groups, they are essentially the 
same problem” (Daniels 1988, 67). If age is not special in this way, the translation 
is not valid anymore. This is exactly what Lazenby worries about, and he argues 
that, once the fact of early death is emphasized, age-group issues become, in this 
respect, like issues of race and gender: they generate interpersonal inequalities 
(Lazenby 2011, 337). This leads him to conclude that there are no small 
modifications that can be made to Daniels’s account that would fix the problem.  
 
To establish whether Lazenby is right, let me assess the legitimacy of the PLA’s 
core underlying idealizing assumption. After all, as Laura Valentini (2009) points 
out, just because some facts of social reality are distorted or just because we 
idealize away from some facts about social reality, it does not mean that an ideal 
account will be irrelevant to social reality. Lazenby is right that Daniels overlooks 
the risk of premature death and that he endorses the counterfactual view that we all 
age. However, contrary to Lazenby, I do not think that Daniels’s account is 
irrelevant for a world where we may die young. My argument is structured in two 
stages. First, I will show that Lazenby over-emphasizes the residual interpersonal 
inequality between longevity groups and does not sufficiently focus on the central 
problem of age-group justice. Consequently, he has inadequate reasons to reject the 
PLA. Second, I will deny that the PLA cannot be action-guiding and argue that 
there are in fact ways in which the PLA can address questions of inequalities 
between longevity groups.  
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Lazenby’s paper is pervaded by the idea that Daniels distorts the subject of age-
group justice by assuming that age is special. An ideal account that distorts the 
subject of one’s enquiry is what Valentini (2009) identifies as a bad instance of 
idealization. However, it seems that the disagreement between Lazenby and 
Daniels is precisely on what constitutes the primary subject of the theory. For 
Lazenby, “it is in central part that people die at different times that motivates us to 
ask the question [of] what justice requires between age groups” (Lazenby 2011, 
333). For him, therefore, asking what age-group justice requires in abstraction from 
the fact that some die younger than others is just like asking what gender justice 
requires in abstraction from the fact that there are two genders (Lazenby 2011, 
333). If, “the truly relevant categories are not age groups but longevity groups” 
(Lazenby 2011, 338), as Lazenby seems to believe, then he is right to argue that 
Daniels distorts the subject to which is theory is meant to apply.  
 
However, Lazenby’s thesis seems overstated. Lazenby complains that Daniels’s 
framework cannot tell us how to treat those who die young, and he may be right, 
but I disagree that this question is of chief importance. The primary question is not 
how we should treat those who die young but how we should treat different age 
groups as they age, given the fact that (a) it is reasonable to expect that we will age 
and (b) institutions that treat age groups differently will benefit us if we age. If we 
are concerned with designing institutions that distribute resources between age 
groups fairly, then we should assume that there is such a group as the elderly and 
that it is reasonable to expect citizens to go through that category eventually.  
 
Most of us reasonably hope to die old, and we project an image of ourselves into 
the imagined future. Premature death does not have the centrality that Lazenby 
gives it. To be off the hook, Daniels need only reply that his account aims to 
answer the central question of age-group justice rather than the question of justice 
between different longevity groups. There is a first problem of justice concerning 
the question of how institutions should treat various age groups in society, he may 
claim, and there is a second problem, which has to do with the question of whether 
those who die young, or at least younger than normal, deserve some form of 
compensation. The first problem may be considered as the core definitional 
problem of age-group justice and the second as a residual problem of justice.  
 
Rejecting the basic claim that the fact that we all age makes age special amounts to 
rejecting the idea that there is such a thing as age-group justice. On these 
conditions, it seems that we should consider that membership in an age group is 
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morally irrelevant and should be treated perhaps as other memberships like gender 
and ethnicity. I have tried to show in Chapter 1 that this view may go against our 
considered judgments. However, here I just want to suggest that if Lazenby wants 
to reject Daniels’s simplifying assumption, then he also has to abandon the claim 
that there is such a thing as age-group justice. Lazenby’s criticism of Daniels is that 
Daniels disregards a fundamental interpersonal issue by assuming that we all age, 
but the reverse criticism that applies to him is that by focusing on the cases of early 
death, he disregards the most important question of age-group justice. If one issue 
must be disregarded, then it ought to be the residual issue, rather than the core. 
Note that empirically, at least in wealthy countries, the risk that one may die 
‘young’ is very low – for instance, the risk of dying between 10 and 24 years old is 
lower than 0.1% (The Economist, 2012). For this reason, I think Lazenby is 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater just because he saw a bug in the tub. The 
longevity problem is not sufficiently important to undermine the PLA, at least in 
comparison with the age-group problem.  
 
Having argued that age-group justice is primary and the longevity problem is 
residual, let me turn to the question of whether or not it is true that the PLA does 
not tell us anything about how to treat those who may die young. Lazenby argues 
that Daniels’s complete lives idealizations are ‘permanent’ features of the theory 
and that as a result the PLA can only apply to a world that does not exist: a society 
where we all age and live lives of equal length. I think that the assumption that 
people live lives of equal lengths is only ‘temporary’, however. To be action-
guiding, all the PLA requires is that people can reasonably be expected to reach the 
normal age expectancy.  
 
First, planners are told that they must plan to live a life of ‘normal length’. 
Arguably, this requirement already includes a concern for different longevity 
groups. Indeed, the average life expectancy is a calculation that already accounts 
for the fact that some die younger and some die older. The prudent planner is like 
an ‘average’ individual - a fair representative of those who live lives of 
approximately equal lengths. Lazenby complains that the duties of justice to those 
who die young are not taken seriously, but in fact, this is just as true of our duties 
to those who live for longer than normal. As I mentioned earlier, what we owe to 
the very old, i.e., those who live for longer than normal, is not so clear on Daniels’s 
account. Perhaps this suggests that the PLA only tells us how to treat people who 
live lives of roughly normal length but does not tell us how to treat the very old and 
those who die very young. But the mere fact that the PLA is weaker on the 
 
71 
extremes does not make it irrelevant to the question of how we should design 
institutions that meet age groups’ needs. 
 
Moreover, Daniels argues that planners will be driven to invest resources in a way 
that maximizes their chances of reaching a normal lifespan before dedicating 
resources to extending lives beyond a normal lifespan. Lazenby takes inequalities 
in life expectancy as a given, but planners understand it as a requirement of 
prudence that they should not risk investing resources in a way that renders 
premature death more likely. One of the key components of Daniels’s theory, I 
argued in previous sections, is the lifespan efficiency requirement, which enables 
trade-offs between parts of lives when they maximize lifespan efficiency. 
Arguably, maximizing lifespan efficiency requires making sure that we minimize 
the risk of being ill and dying young by investing prudently in childhood and 
youth. This suggests that prudential reasoning does entail some instances of youth-
first rationing of resources, as I have previously argued. There is a prudential case 
for substantial spending early on.  
 
Last, the problem that Daniels is trying to solve with the PLA is a problem of 
‘treatment’. It is not only a problem of distribution. Does age-rationing treat people 
unfairly? Had she lived a life of normal length, she would have received the same 
as others. What matters is that institutions increase the persons’ chances to live a 
life of normal length and that she gets the same opportunities for welfare as others 
in her age group for the time she lives. This arguably suffices to fuel Daniels’s 
view that interpersonal institutional problems of age-group justice can be modeled 
intra-personally, despite the residual case of premature death. 
 
An internal conflict remains: Daniels presupposes equality between complete lives 
as a requirement of the theory that frames the account (henceforth the ‘frame 
theory’). And yet, if individuals have access to a lifetime share of resources X 
under the frame theory, it now follows from PLA that those who die young will 
only get a portion of X. The PLA thus recommends a distribution of resources that 
conflicts with the frame theory’s distribution. Lazenby argues that the PLA is thus 
doomed to work against the frame idealization of complete lives equality. 
However, there is no such conflict if planners are of average longevity, which is 
the case in Daniels’s account. The case of premature death is excluded at the ideal 
level, which does not mean that the PLA cannot be action-guiding in real life, as I 
have suggested. However, I have conceded that the prudential requirements, while 
they are action-guiding in normal cases, are weaker when telling us what to do with 
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the residual case of premature death, as Lazenby argues, but also with the case of 
the very old who live longer than ‘normal’, which Lazenby does not acknowledge. 
I will extensively take issue with the treatment of the very old by the PLA in 
Chapter 3; I will argue that prudential requirements do not exhaust the 
requirements of age-group justice and that we must also endorse a synchronic lens 
to identify what matters. 
2.3.2 The!demographic!objection!
 
The PLA addresses questions of age-group justice in abstraction from issues of 
birth-cohort justice. As Gosseries and Meyer complain (2009): “It is often assumed 
that the difference between cohort effects and age effects may be linked to two 
distinct realms of justice, though this is far from certain” (Gosseries and Meyer 
2009, 6). Daniels is aware that the separation between age groups and birth cohorts 
is not unproblematic: “some will insist that there is never any question of justice 
between the young and the old except one that is about justice between particular 
cohorts – these young and these old. They eliminate the age-group problem in 
favour of the birth-cohort problem” (Daniels 1988, 14). In other words, some may 
argue that pure, timeless and abstract age group questions never exist. Rather, we 
solely deal with questions of justice between specific cohorts born at different 
times. What I call the demographic objection challenges Daniels’s 
conceptualization of age-group justice in isolation from questions of birth-cohort 
justice. In other words, the demographic objection states that the PLA assumes 
away, and thus tolerates or even generates, problematic interpersonal inequalities 
between cohorts. 
 
For Daniels, institutions must “embody solutions to both problems of distributive 
justice” (Daniels 1988, 118). And yet, the PLA only solves the age problem: 
Daniels treats age-group justice as an independent and timeless area of enquiry, but 
in the real world, transfers between age groups are also transfers between birth 
cohorts. When a society is ageing, institutions may treat age groups ‘fairly’ in the 
prudential sense but at the same time generate inequalities between birth cohorts. 
For instance, let us suppose that we know how to invest resources prudently over 
our lifespan and that we design institutions accordingly. Take the example of an 
ageing society where a small young generation has to maintain a much larger 
generation’s age-relative normal opportunity range. This young generation is likely 
to carry a larger proportion of the burden than the previous cohort. The 
requirement of age-group justice may thus generate inequalities between birth 
cohorts: “Our idealized solution to the age-group problem thus ignores real 
 
73 
interpersonal transfers, and such transfers raise questions of distributive justice not 
addressed by our model of prudential deliberation” (Daniels 1988, 119).  
 
The demographic objection thus seems to hold some truth. Age-group and birth-
cohort issues are so interconnected that separating them may mischaracterize and 
obscure the challenges at stake. Instead, one should address them together and 
come up with principles of age-group justice that are sensitive to demographic 
variables. After all, as Daniels himself points out, it is precisely the ageing of 
society that gave birth to discourses of generational equity. In this context, asking 
what is due to elderly people, for instance, in abstraction from concerns for cohort 
equity seems misplaced. However, there are a number of points that can be raised 
in defence of Daniels’s focus on age groups in isolation from cohortal issues. Let 
me point to a few ways to rescue the PLA from the demographic charge.  
 
A first response may be that the PLA is an ideal theory of justice: it only provides 
the ideal principles of age-group justice, which then have to be modified to apply 
to non-ideal circumstances. Daniels is conscious that it is difficult to move from an 
ideal theory of age-group justice to the non-ideal circumstances in which birth-
cohort problems arise. In non-ideal circumstances, institutions have to deal with 
uneven demographic trends, alternation between periods of economic crisis and 
growth, and with institutional changes. As a result, different cohorts may end up 
having been treated unequally over their complete lives. This is not a problem for 
the theory per se; it is merely a difficulty with regard to its application. Throughout 
Daniels’s main writings on age-group justice, he indeed suggests that although age 
groups and birth cohorts involve two ‘moral’ problems, the latter is more knotted 
to non-ideal circumstances that the former. The timeless question of what age 
groups owe each other, he argues, must be settled first, and only then, applied to 
the non-ideal reality. In other words, once we have established the requirements of 
age-group justice, we may focus on finding ways to meet these demands of justice 
in face of moderate scarcity, popular disagreement, and feasibility - just as in any 
other context of justice. If this first interpretation - that the separation between age 
and cohort issues follows the lines of the ideal/non-ideal distinction - is correct, 
then Daniels is not wrong to approach questions of age in isolation from cohortal 
questions. Applying ideal prudential principles to the real world is simply complex 
and beyond the scope of the PLA.  
 
However, this first way to reply to the demographic criticism does not work. First, 
Daniels would not be satisfied with the PLA if it could not be action-guiding. He 
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argues: “theory should guide practice, and if it cannot, that is a problem for the 
theory” (Daniels 2009, 40). Second, birth-cohort issues are not restricted to the 
non-ideal realm. Both age-group justice and birth-cohort justice can be discussed 
ideally and non-ideally. Ideally, we can ask what birth cohorts owe each other and 
what one cohort must save for the next, just as we can ask what age groups owe 
each other and how resources must be distributed between age groups. Non ideally, 
we can ask what is owed to the young today and what trade-offs are fair in given 
circumstances, just as we can ask what the baby-boomers owe their children and 
what rates of savings are acceptable. So, although they can seem that way at first 
sight, age-group and birth-cohort issues are not divided along the lines of ideal and 
non-ideal theory. Moreover, Daniels explicitly endorses the complete lives 
egalitarian view that institutions should enforce approximate equality in benefit 
ratios between birth cohorts. Therefore, conflicts between the demands of age-
group justice and the reality of demographic ratios are not just problems of 
applicability but also moral conflicts between conflicting principles of justice.  
 
However, there is a more satisfactory way to defend Daniels’s choice to address 
matters of age-group justice in isolation. Indeed, the abstraction from cohortal 
issues is not permanent but only ‘temporary’8 in Daniels’s account. The PLA 
surely abstracts from birth cohort equity in its design but it is still able to guide us 
on what birth-cohort justice requires. 
 
First, in many cases, a given problem of distribution cannot be settled without 
appealing to a series of values that may conflict. In this respect, the conflict 
between birth cohort and age-group justice is like any other moral conflict. The 
challenge is to find ways to accommodate both values, when we can, and to pick 
one over the other, when we cannot. But for such deliberations to happen, we must 
have at hand principles that represent the different aspects of the problem. The 
principle of approximate equality between cohorts is not sufficient. As such, 
knowing that cohorts must be treated equally does not tell us how people should be 
treated as they age; for this we need the PLA.  
 
This is all the more important given that, at the time Daniels writes, the field of 
age-group justice is overlooked and political discourses are dominated by 
arguments for cohort equity (Daniels 1988, 3-16). By pointing to principles for 
age-group justice, Daniels’s account aims at challenging discourses of generational 
                                                      
8 I borrow the idea that an ideal account may fail if it distorts reality ‘permanently’, as 
opposed to ‘temporarily’ from Laura Valentini (2009). 
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equity that pervade political discourses. When we look at current generations, he 
argues, they only seem to be in conflict because we forget the deeper timeless age-
group problem and only pay attention to the demographic tensions between two 
specific cohorts. This categorical focus on cohort equity, Daniels argues, hides part 
of what really matters. He does not claim that cohort equality does not matter, but 
argues that there is another fundamental value involved in the equality through 
time debate, in addition to the cohort equality principle. The PLA reminds us that 
we all have an interest in institutions meetings our needs fairly as we age.  
 
Second, intrapersonal prudence already integrates some concerns that should 
please complete lives egalitarians concerned with cohort equity. Indeed, under 
conditions of extreme scarcity, we would want institutions to ensure that we are 
able to live a life of normal length with a normal range of opportunities before 
investing more in extending lives. The PLA thus has the resources to settle some 
extreme cases. This is just to suggest that the efficiency principle does provide the 
resources to promote cohort equity when serious imbalances may be at stake. Note 
that, at the other extreme, it seems that if we have access to a relatively abundant 
level of resources, we may be able to meet age groups’ needs as required by the 
PLA and to then allocate other resources in a way that promotes approximate 
equality in per capita benefit ratios between members of different birth cohorts. For 
the middle range of cases, it seems that what the PLA does is provide extra 
principles for deciding what we should do for each cohort as they age. In some 
cases, we may consider that the prudential goal of promoting a normal range of 
opportunities for the elderly is more important than equality in benefit ratios 
between existing cohorts. In other cases, we may consider that the burden carried 
by a generation is too disproportionate and we may restrict the opportunities to 
access some resources for an earlier cohort.  
 
In conclusion, the demographic objection is then partly tackled. Birth-cohort and 
age-group justice are only addressed in isolation one from another ‘temporarily’ in 
Daniels’s account. By temporarily, I mean that Daniels’s account can be action-
guiding in the real world even if it assumes away inequalities between birth cohorts 
in the design of his procedure. Daniels aims to correct an imbalance: the exclusive 
focus on birth cohorts obscures the age question; a prudential account is needed to 
complement it. It is important to know that equality between complete lives matter, 
but we also need to know how institutions should treat people as they age, and 
what counts as a good life. The cohort equality principle, for instance, cannot alone 
tell us how we ought to treat elderly people or children. Arguing that age group and 
 
76 
birth cohort issues belong to two separate realms of justice may be too much, but 
they can at least be said to constitute two different sets of issues. Daniels does not 
distort reality ‘permanently’, and his theory can therefore be action-guiding: in 
non-ideal circumstances, we must accommodate cohortal and age-based principles 
of justice. Under some very specific restricted conditions, intrapersonal prudence 
might even increase our chances of meeting the approximate equality principle by 
privileging younger people, who have not had the chance of enjoying a life of 
normal length yet, over older people. 
2.3.3 The!impartiality!objection!
 
The impartiality (or liberal neutrality) objection is leveled at the PLA for granting 
too much to the elderly as a matter of principle. On this view, Daniels’s prudent 
institutions embody one conception of the good life at the expense of other 
legitimate ones. This formulation accepts the complete lives egalitarian view but 
challenges Daniels’s narrow interpretation of prudence as requiring that planners 
show equal concern for each segment of their lives. Individuals, the objection goes, 
should be able to decide for themselves what trade-offs they are willing to concede 
to fulfill their ambitions and own projects. Paul Bou-Habib (2011) illustrates this 
position through the following example:  
 
Consider Hebe, for example, a person who is firmly in the grip of a youth-
orientated conception of the good, so that she prefers, for the same money-
value, less than age-relative normal opportunity while old in order to have 
more than age-relative normal opportunity while young. Assume that Hebe 
is not asking for something that is worth more money than her fair lifetime 
share, so that her having it would not leave others with less than their fair 
lifetime shares. To insist that Hebe’s fair lifetime share take a form that is 
insensitive to her ambitions, even when her receiving it in an ambition-
sensitive form would impose no additional costs on others, seems 
unjustified. 
(Bou-Habib 2011, 294) 
  
An alternative to the PLA would be Dworkin’s ambition-sensitive prudential 
account. Dworkin (1993, 2000a) argues that ambition sensitivity is developed 
diachronically and that institutions must enable individuals to live the life of their 
choice. Individuals should be free, for instance, to withdraw their right to 
expensive life-extending treatments once they have reached a certain age, if it 
means that they can use their resources in their youth on cultural and educational 
consumption, for instance. Hebe’s choice would be respected, just like Daniels’s 
prudent planner’s choice would be respected. Everyone would thus be equally free 
to live what they think is a good complete life. On his account, individuals may 
envy each other at any given time slice, but they will not over their complete lives. 
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Richard Wagland (2012) provides the following overview of what Dworkin’s 
approach entails: 
Some people will wish to work hard and accumulate their resources, while 
others will wish to enjoy more leisure and consequently fewer resources. 
For this reason it is viewed as fair to suggest that in order for someone to 
legitimately envy the bundle of resources of another she would also have 
to envy the level of hard work that the other person had done in order to 
accumulate those resources. Thus, while person A might envy Person B’s 
bundle of goods a year after an initial distribution, she could not envy 
Person B’s complete life and all the work he has had to do in order to 
accumulate his final complete life share. 
(Wagland 2012, 151) 
 
On this ambition-sensitive account, the problem with Daniels’s PLA is that, by 
imposing the requirement of equal concern on the planners, he de facto rejects 
many conceptions of what a good life may require, such as the view that old years 
ought to be given less weight than younger years. For proponents of the neutrality 
objection, Hebe’s conception of the good life ought to be respected. This view is 
based on the idea that individuals’ agency is exercised over time and consists in the 
ability to make plans and assume the costs of their choices. Daniels, by denying 
individuals the right to make their lives go as well as possible in the way they want 
with their fair life share, imposes his own conception of the good life and does not 
respect the fundamental ideal of liberal impartiality. However, there are several 
ways to rescue Daniels’s account from this charge.  
 
First, there seems to be a fundamental disagreement between the ambition-sensitive 
view and the PLA at the level of the theory that frames each account. Dworkin’s 
own procedure is framed by his resource egalitarian envy-free and ambition-
sensitive conception of justice, while Daniels’s account is underpinned by 
Rawlsian theory. It is precisely because Daniels endorses a Rawlsian frame theory 
that he does not subscribe to the sort of ‘you broke it, you own it’ view about 
justice, as he argues in one of his later papers (Daniels 2009). Therefore, we could 
argue that the liberal neutrality objection might well propose a competing 
conception of age group equality, grounded on a different framework about what 
matters to equality. We could even reinforce the social egalitarian commitment of 
liberal egalitarianism and argue, with Scheffler that luck egalitarian views are 
insufficiently egalitarian: 
 
By mimicking the conservative’s emphasis on choice and responsibility, 
they unwittingly inherit the conservative’s unattractive moralism and 
questionable metaphysical commitments, and they lose touch with some of 
the most important reasons why equality as a value matters to us in the first 
place.  
(Scheffler 2005, 24) 
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At best, what the liberal neutrality objection tells us is that Daniels is wrong to 
suggest that the prudential account can be attached to any theory of justice. As 
Lazenby suggests, Daniels is wrong to claim that his response is “free standing, 
with the capacity to attach to any more general ‘frame’ theory of distributive 
justice” (Lazenby 2011, 328). Daniels should concede this point. For this reason, 
one way to settle the debate would be to acknowledge and assume the importance 
of the frame theory itself and restrict the scope of my enquiry to asking what 
Rawlsians and non-luck egalitarians, instead of egalitarians in general, should think 
about age-group justice. However, I want to be able to defend the PLA without 
restricting the scope of my thesis from egalitarianism in general to Rawlsian 
justice. In the next few paragraphs, I hope to show that, even if we endorse a 
comprehensive egalitarian framework that integrates a commitment to ambition-
sensitivity, we may consider that Daniels is right to insist on the requirement of 
equal concern. 
 
First, it simply is not the case that the rationality behind Hebe or Dworkin’s view 
has no room to express itself in the PLA. As I have shown through the lifespan 
efficiency principle, the PLA already includes the idea that some trade-offs 
between parts of lives are acceptable. If institutions deny the young the resources 
needed for them to enjoy a normal opportunity range because a disproportionate 
portion of X (people’s fair lifetime share) is spent extending lives for five extra 
months once people have reached old age, then planners will be likely to say that 
institutions are imprudent. So there is room, under some restricted conditions, for 
planners to adopt youth-first principles of lifetime provision. This, however, is 
unlikely to satisfy proponents of ambition-sensitive accounts. They may prefer 
Daniels’s PLA to a synchronic age-insensitive distribution of resources, but still 
consider that the decisions should not be made in a uniform way for everyone. 
Institutions should be sensitive to individuals’ lifetime ambitions, they may insist.  
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, individuals may change their minds. This is 
a key reason why Daniels thinks that intrapersonal prudence translates into the 
requirement of equal concern. Hebe, as Bou-Habib describes her, is in the grip of a 
youth-oriented conception of what a good life is when she decides to deny her 
future self the required resources to have a normal opportunity range as an elderly 
person. It is therefore possible that she will change her mind.  What if she does? 
Can we really deny her the treatment she will need at 70 because she forfeited her 
claim to it at 20? If we endorsed a discontinuous definition of persons, then we 
could argue that it is unfair to old Hebe, who is not the same person as young 
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Hebe, to have to be made miserable as a result. If we do not endorse such 
discontinuous definition of persons, it may be more difficult to argue that the 
inequality between young and old Hebe is ‘unfair’. However, we can argue, with 
Daniels, that institutions that let the young decide give an unfair weight to the 
voice of the young over those of the old. On this view, the impartiality objection 
could be turned against Dworkin’s account: your account is partial because it gives 
more weight to the views of the young than to the views of the old. As Wagland 
(2012) argues, this could be seen as a “tyranny of youth”. Given that we know that 
people change their minds on what they think matters most, the requirement of 
equal concern seems a more reasonable understanding of prudence than the ‘youth 
decide’ approach.  
 
This touches on a deeper disagreement about the temporality of ambition-
sensitivity. Choice and responsibility, which are fundamental components of 
ambition-sensitivity, are understood as fully diachronic concepts for Dworkin and 
many luck-egalitarians: at one (early) point you make the decision and at another 
(late) point you face its positive or negative implications. Everyone must be given 
the same opportunities or resources so they can have the same leverage to decide 
what they want to do with their lives. The responsibility that they have for what 
comes out of these decisions (made with a just background) is then theirs to cope 
with. Ambition-sensitivity entails two sides of a coin: choice and freedom, on the 
one side, and responsibility and costs, on the other. This understanding of ambition 
sensitivity is thus fundamentally diachronic: at one point you make decisions, at 
other future points you enjoy the benefits or pay the costs of such decisions.  
 
I would deny, however, that ambition sensitivity can only be understood over a 
complete life. Most people would probably recognize that many of our plans and 
projects evolve and change over the course of our life. A life well lived may well 
entail different projects at different times. Ambition sensitivity may therefore apply 
to shorter segments of our lives too. Daniels’s requirement of equal concern seems 
to stem precisely from this conception. A life well lived is a life in which our 
ambitions and plans at different stages are respected, not a life spent paying the 
prize of our youth-oriented conception of a good life. Moreover, the PLA’s first 
outcome, as I have proposed in the last section, is best expressed as sufficiency 
driven rather than egalitarian. It still leaves room for trade-offs between stages of 
life, even perhaps chosen by individuals, beyond the threshold. Nothing suggests 
that the PLA is not compatible with some degree of individual planning, but the 
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PLA at least has the merits of ‘leaving options open’ thus increasing our freedom 
to develop life plans at different stages of our lives.  
 
In Section 1.3, I have examined three criticisms directed at the PLA, as 
summarized by the table below. 
Table 3 - Three diachronic interpersonal objections to the PLA 
 
The first objection concerned the interpersonal inequality between longevity 
groups obscured by the PLA, while the second claimed that the PLA could not be 
action-guiding because it approached questions of age-group justice in abstraction 
from cohortal issues. I argued that neither of those two objections dangerously 
threatens the PLA. They both mischaracterize the subject to which the PLA is 
meant to apply, and their alternative propositions - to focus on longevity groups or 
birth cohorts – are inadequate. Furthermore, I have argued that they are wrong to 
claim that the PLA cannot be action-guiding in a world in which we may die young 
and belong to a specific cohort. The third objection I examined bears on the fact 
that Daniels’s account is not sufficiently ambition-sensitive. I have shown that 
there is indeed an important disagreement at the level of the frame theory. 
However, I have argued that, if we endorse a comprehensive egalitarian theory, we 
may still accept the PLA. In light of the simple fact that we may change our minds 
about what matters over time, the luck egalitarian diachronic understanding of 
ambition sensitivity is not fully adequate. I praised the PLA for ‘leaving options 
open’ by promoting a normal opportunity range throughout the lifespan, hence not 
Objections Overlooked 
interpersonal 
distributive 
inequalities… 
Why was it overlooked? 
The longevity 
objection 
 
…between those 
who die young and 
those who die old 
- Assumption that we all age and live 
lives of equal lengths 
 
- Imposition on the planners that they 
must plan as if they were going to 
live to old age 
The demographic 
objection 
 
… between births 
cohorts 
- Assumption that there is a timeless 
question of age-group justice 
(independent of demographic trends) 
 
- Planners are ignorant of current 
demographic ratios 
The impartiality 
objection 
 
…between 
different 
conceptions of 
what makes a life 
go well 
- Planners are blind to their 
conception of the good life 
 
- The requirement of equal concern 
restricts the scope of individuals’ 
ambitions 
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subscribing to the ‘tyranny of youth’. In the next section, I will level an original 
criticism at the PLA, which I believe is more important. 
 
2.4 AgeOgroup!Issues!Are!Not!Residual!
 
Daniels idealizes away from questions of social justice to focus exclusively on age-
group justice. He assumes that society is just but for questions of justice between 
age groups. Individuals have access to their fair share X of opportunities and 
resources over their complete lives, as determined by the frame theory of justice, 
and planners must now decide how to allocate resources across the lifespan. Age-
group justice is treated as a residual problem and is tackled in isolation from other 
problems of social justice. As McKerlie argues, however, “it is strange that Daniels 
does not tell us more about the frame theory or more about the division of labor 
between the frame theory and the prudential lifespan account (the part of the theory 
concerned with distribution across temporal parts of lives)” (McKerlie 2013, 37).  
 
In some sense, Daniels inherits a mistake from previous thinkers, precisely while 
he was trying to fix it. Philosophers had left questions of age-group justice out, 
thus treating it as a residual question of justice. Daniels’s account aims to fill this 
problematic gap. But by doing so, he inherits the understanding of age-group issues 
as residual. Paradoxically, while Daniels designed the PLA to make the Rawlsian 
theory more relevant to the real world in which we age, he risks having produced a 
theory for a world that does not exist. Indeed, given that inequalities between social 
classes tend to be more significant than inequalities between age groups, assuming 
away age issues (as Rawls did) may be much less problematic than assuming away 
inequalities between social classes (as Daniels does). This would not be entirely 
fair to Daniels, however. He does not overlook issues of social justice, but endorses 
the Rawlsian theory of justice and complements it. However, given that the PLA 
examines the requirements of age-group justice once an otherwise just society is in 
place, it is unclear whether it can be action-guiding in the real world. Can the PLA 
- which works at such a high level of idealization that it assumes society is already 
fully just but for age-group issues - still be action-guiding in an unjust world such 
as ours?  
 
When I introduced and rejected the longevity and demography objections, I 
touched on similar methodological issues. Ideal theories always assume a series of 
counterfactual details. In many cases, that does not prevent the theories from being 
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action-guiding. Good instances of idealization, Valentini argues, are only 
temporary because they do not distort the very subject to which they are meant to 
apply. Ideal theory cannot be action-guiding when it “entails an idealised account 
of the subject to which it is meant to apply, and not merely by virtue of it being 
constructed under idealised assumptions” (Valentini 2009, 334). Ideal accounts that 
rely on bad cases of idealization are likely to be of no use to practice because “the 
gap [between theory and practice] is unbridgeable” (Valentini 2009, 342). The 
problem with such accounts, Valentini argues, is that they offer no tools to mediate 
theory and practice and are therefore irrelevant to non-ideal circumstances. Worse, 
such accounts are at risk of obscuring unjust power-relations instead of 
illuminating them (Valentini 2009, 342). Abstracting away temporarily from 
cohortal and longevity issues, I argued, did not distort the core subject of age-group 
justice and was a justifiable way to proceed. As I have shown, the idealizations 
involved in the demographic and longevity cases did not prevent the PLA from 
guiding action in an ageing world in which some die younger than others. So what 
is different about the assumption that we live in an otherwise just society? 
 
Will Kymlicka and John Rawls, respectively in Multicultural Citizenship and The 
Law of Peoples, both start from an idealized account of the state from which they 
then work out the requirements of minority rights and global justice. Kymlicka 
considers what just states owe to just minorities, and Rawls examines how well 
ordered liberal societies ought to act. Valentini argues that these are both instances 
of bad idealizations because they “design their principles surreptitiously assuming 
that such a background is in place” (Valentini 2009, 352). Such idealizations, she 
argues, “build into a normative theory a false, i.e., idealised account of the social 
phenomenon the theory itself aims to put under moral scrutiny, in this way severely 
undermining its potential for guiding action in the real world” (Valentini 2009, 
352). As Simon Caney and Thomas Pogge both argue, Rawls’s global theory is 
irrelevant because it assumes the existence of well-ordered liberal societies that do 
not exist (Valentini 2009, 351). For this reason, Valentini argues that The Law of 
Peoples is not action-guiding.  
 
The PLA’s assumption that we live in an otherwise just society may be of the same 
nature. The PLA may be deemed inapplicable to the non-ideal circumstances it is 
meant to inform because our society is not interpersonally just, and the PLA only 
tells us what to do once that condition is met. This core idealizing assumption is all 
the more problematic that it mischaracterizes the subject to which it is meant to 
apply. Indeed, it seems to me that age issues are much less residual and much more 
 
83 
constitutive than Daniels makes them out to be. Age-related problems are 
fundamentally intertwined with other problems of justice. Institutions that transfer 
resources between age groups are essential tools to achieve the goal of 
interpersonal equality since they may create new inequalities, exacerbate existing 
inequalities, or on the contrary, reduce them or cancel them out. By contrast, 
adequate age-group institutions may work for the frame theory instead of against 
it. I will argue that, for these reasons, it is misleading to frame age-group justice as 
a residual problem of justice.  
 
What is important about the life course is the phases of vulnerability that come 
with it. Age groups are all potentially vulnerable: children are relatively powerless 
and their disadvantage can have crucial long-term consequences; young adults are 
vulnerable because they are often at risk of unemployment, poverty and exclusion 
which undermine their process of socialization; formed-adults are potentially 
vulnerable because they are likely to have children and having dependent children 
multiplies risks of poverty; elderly people are vulnerable because they are much 
more likely to be disabled, impaired, and to lose their autonomy. In the real world, 
these risks are very unequally spread across the population, and their significance 
depends on how institutions that meet age groups’ needs are framed. This suggests 
that age-group institutions can play a key role in increasing our chances of meeting 
the demands of egalitarianism, traditionally understood. To illustrate this claim, let 
me turn to two examples: (a) old age and disability, (b) young age and 
disadvantage.  
 
Disability almost becomes the norm with old age: “Around one in twenty children 
are disabled, compared to around one in seven working age adults and almost one 
in two people over state-pension age in Great Britain” (Office for Disability Issues 
2011). For most of history, and for related reasons, being old and losing physical 
capacity considerably increased people’s chances of being poor and marginalized. 
By providing universal benefits, institutions can contribute (and have contributed) 
to reducing inequalities between the non-disabled young and the elderly, and also 
within the elderly population. Old age is a radically different experience whether 
lived in relative disadvantage or not. Moreover, whether or not one has 
experienced poverty, manual work, and high levels of stress or insecurity 
determines one’s health in old age. When institutions are not active enough in 
dealing with impairments and lack of income, aging triggers and accelerates the 
loss of autonomy and welfare. Since individuals are fundamentally unequal in 
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facing these challenges, this will create or exacerbate existing social inequalities 
(between classes, genders and ethnic groups).  
 
Consider the second example of structural youth unemployment - which I will 
extensively discuss in Chapter 4. Experiences of unemployment at a young age can 
cause further experiences of poverty, and unemployment, as well as social 
exclusion, and lowered self-confidence in later life (Chauvel 2010, Standing 2011). 
Those who have sufficiently wealthy and supportive families will undergo the 
same trends, but will be affected in radically different ways. They can afford more 
training, work experience, and education in the meantime. In this way, 
unsupportive institutions for the young create or exacerbate social inequalities 
within a generation. For instance, in France in the 1970s, parents’ economic 
participation was not crucial for the young’s chances of success. Today, French 
young people have very little chance of success without the economic support of 
their families (Chauvel 2010). As a result, in France, while inequalities within age 
groups have fallen, they have increased within the 18–24 age group (Maurin and 
Savidan 2009, 95). While institutions may exacerbate existing disadvantage, they 
may also achieve the opposite and reduce the risk of youth disadvantage clustering 
into further social inequalities.  
 
The literature on intersectionality offers strong arguments for refraining from 
addressing different portions of people’s identities in isolation. Feminist thinkers 
such as Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) have argued that focusing solely on gender, in 
isolation from other issues, can lead us to overlook the heterogeneity of women’s 
conditions and leave behind those women at the bottom of the class and racial 
social hierarchies. Formal equality between genders is surely a fundamental goal of 
justice. However, alone, it cannot address the complex causes of the domination 
women suffer from, because it misses out on how gender, social class and race 
overlap. Crenshaw (1991) argues for the need to focus on groups that are “multiply 
burdened”, and for this purpose, to make our theoretical frameworks more 
intersectional. Non-intersectional theory, she adds, also risks recommending 
inadequate practical solutions.  
 
Jonathan Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), propose an intersectional approach to 
inequality which emphasizes how disadvantage clusters into further disadvantage. 
For instance, poverty can lead to disability and disability can lead to poverty. 
Intersectional theorists mainly focus on gender, race, class and disability, but 
membership of an age group is another fundamental variable for understanding and 
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challenging patterns of disadvantage. Not only does disadvantage affect the 
population along age lines, just as it does along class, race and gender lines, but 
disadvantage also clusters over time. By isolating the challenge of age-group 
justice from other aspects of social justice, the PLA misses these fundamental 
connections. 
 
Furthermore, by assuming social inequalities away, the PLA could even guide 
practice in a way that contradicts the frame theory. Indeed, because it stems from a 
concern for rationing scarce healthcare resources between age groups, the PLA is 
very ‘scarcity-driven’. It thus risks providing arguments that reinforce the status 
quo. Daniels wanted the PLA to ‘undercut the grim view’ of the young pitted 
against the old for scarce resources (Daniels 1988, 154). But, as it stands, the PLA 
may in fact reinforce the grim view instead of challenging it. The PLA instructs 
that when there is a conflict between young and old over scarce resources that they 
both need, it is fair to privilege the young - it thus justifies cutting benefits aimed at 
the elderly in the name of fairness. The burden of such cuts is very likely to fall on 
the poorest within the elderly population. Reconnecting the requirements of age-
group justice to broader discussions of social justice is therefore critically needed. 
It will offer the necessary critical lens to guide the designing of fair institutions that 
treat age groups fairly in a way that does not work against social justice, broadly 
understood.  
 
Moreover, social inequalities themselves have an important impact on health and 
wellbeing (Pickett and Wilkinson 2010). This implies that the need for some 
healthcare resources would decrease if inequalities decreased. The solution to the 
age-group problem is thus likely to depend on how we solve the class problem and 
vice versa. It seems to me that my criticism can be understood in parallel to the 
challenge posed by the literature on the social determinants of health for normative 
accounts of just healthcare. If we are to keep the PLA, then we should perhaps seek 
to make its recommendations more intersectional.  
 
Valentini (2009) argues that in bad instances of idealization, the assumptions 
become permanent in such way that you cannot take them away without changing 
the entire theory. As mentioned earlier, The Law of Peoples may be an example 
where the theory cannot be action-guiding, and where relieving the bad idealization 
destroys the theory: if there is no such thing as a ‘well-ordered liberal society’, as 
Rawls understands it, then the problem his theory aims to solve disappears. In 
Daniels’s case, it seems that the assumption that society is just other than in 
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relation to age-group justice justifies the move to an intrapersonal account. If 
Valentini is right, this suggests that we have to come up with another theory.  
 
However, I do not think that we have to go as far as to reject the entire account. As 
I have shown in previous sections, there are appealing aspects of the PLA that 
should fare well in any account of age-group justice. Moreover, as my responses to 
the longevity, demographic and neutrality objection suggested, the PLA is one of 
the strongest diachronic egalitarian accounts of age-group justice. Furthermore, 
there is hope that the outcomes of the PLA can be applied so as to work towards 
other goals of social justice. Indeed, as I have shown, if institutions that meet age 
groups’ needs are designed adequately, they may work to prevent the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty and the clustering of disadvantage across 
the life course. I will show in Chapter 4 that the two prudential principles can 
inform practice in an otherwise unequal society if its two core principles are made 
more intersectional. My goal is not to provide an account of ‘justice-all-things-
considered’. Overlapping generations remain my main object of study. But I 
propose to see the scope of age and time in a less residual manner than Daniels 
does. I will explore this possibility in Chapter 4 as I use Wolff and De-Shalit 
clustering of disadvantage model to establish the implications of the lifespan 
efficiency principle for what we owe to young people.  
 
2.5 Conclusions!
 
We are thus left with the two following prudential principles: 
 
o Lifespan sufficiency principle: Institutions must distribute resources 
between age groups in a way that ensures a normal opportunity range 
throughout people’s lives – i.e. members of any age group should be 
maintained above two thresholds: (1) an absolute threshold defined by 
appeal to basic human needs; (2) an age-relative threshold set at the level 
of what counts as a ‘normal’ set of opportunities for a given age group in a 
given society at a given time. 
 
o Lifespan efficiency principle: Institutions should invest resources early in 
the lifespan when it increases lifespan efficiency – that is when it improves 
diachronic returns. 
 
We are also left with the challenge of making these two outcomes of the PLA more 
sensitive to other social inequalities (in particular inequalities between social 
classes) so they may work with the grain of the egalitarian frame theory rather than 
against it, which I will take on in Chapter 4.  
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One of the important limitations of the PLA, which I have already hinted at, is that 
it risks granting too little to the elderly, or at least to those who have already lived 
for longer than normal. McKerlie’s synchronic account is motivated by this 
concern. In Chapter 3, I will consider his synchronic alternative to the PLA: the 
simultaneous segments view (SSE), already introduced in Chapter 1. I will now 
elaborate McKerlie’s intuition and propose a synchronic theory of my own. 
However, I will show that it should supplement rather than replace the diachronic 
approach. 
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CHAPTER!3!O !A!RELATIONAL!ALTERNATIVE!TO!MCKERLIE’S!
SEGMENTS!VIEW!
 
 
From the end of the 1980s, Dennis McKerlie took part in the ‘equality through 
time’ debate (1989a, b, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2006, 2013) and critically assessed the 
diachronic nature of most egalitarian accounts of social justice. In his numerous 
contributions, McKerlie claims that complete lives egalitarianism is fraught with 
difficulties and regrets that it became established as the dominant default approach 
to equality through time. McKerlie thus agrees with Daniels that radical complete 
lives egalitarianism is an implausible view. However, while Daniels offers a 
diachronic complement to CLE with the PLA, McKerlie offers a fundamentally 
synchronic alternative approach, which relies on the view that inequalities between 
segments of our lives matter as well as complete lives. McKerlie resolutely argues, 
against diachronic accounts, that synchronic equality has intrinsic moral value. The 
specificity of Mckerlie’s view is that it offers the basis for an account of what is 
wrong with synchronic inequalities that does not appeal to the quality of whole 
lives.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the moral significance of synchronic inequalities. Given 
that inequalities between age groups are by definition synchronic, the view that 
synchronic equality matters per se has important implications for establishing the 
requirements of age-group justice. I show, with McKerlie, that diachronic accounts 
of equality, even when complemented by a prudential account, miss out on one 
fundamental aspect of age-group justice. However, I also show, against McKerlie, 
that the relational conception of equality better explains our reluctance to accept 
some cases of synchronic inequalities than does any distributive account. I suggest 
that the dominance of the distributive paradigm in egalitarian thought partly 
explains the predominance of complete lives egalitarianism over questions of 
equality through time. I argue that we should endorse a further principle of age-
group justice, which I call the ‘synchronic relational equality principle’. 
 
Chapter 3 is structured into three sections. In Section 3.1, I describe McKerlie’s 
criticism of the PLA. I argue that there is something very strongly intuitive about 
the counter-examples he puts forward against the PLA. I raise several issues with 
McKerlie’s theory and attempt to rescue his account. I argue that his reliance on 
the distributive view - that temporal segments morally matter - persists as a major 
problem. In Section 3.2, I then propose a non-distributive synchronic alternative 
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that draws on relational egalitarianism. After highlighting the differences between 
the distributive and relational approaches, I argue that our reluctance to accept 
some cases of synchronic inequalities is best explained by the relational conception 
of equality. In Section 3.3, I evaluate three possible responses to my relational 
view (the prudential, sufficientarian and currency objections) and show that they 
each fail.  
 
3.1 Evaluating!McKerlie’s!Egalitarian!Theory!of!AgeOgroup!justice!
3.1.1 The!simultaneous!segments!view:!an!alternative?!
 
Consider the following two hypothetical examples, which I refer to as the 
‘Swapping Castes’ and the ‘Unequal City’ examples. First, imagine a feudal 
society with two castes that swap position every twenty years (McKerlie 1989a, 
479). The first caste dominates the second for twenty years, then the second 
dominates the first for the subsequent twenty years, and so on. At the end of their 
lives, the two castes will have exerted equal amounts of control over each other. 
Second, imagine an ‘Unequal City’ where elderly people live in miserable, 
overcrowded retirement homes with little prospect for happiness, while younger 
people live in lovely affluent residences (McKerlie 2013, 6). The older residents 
enjoyed the same happy lifestyles in their past, and the younger residents will end 
up in the same miserable homes themselves when they grow old. The members of 
the Unequal City, just like the members of the Swapping Castes system, are thus 
equal over their complete lives.  
 
These two examples are part of a series of challenging examples that McKerlie 
raised against CLE, which came to be referred to as changing-places examples. If 
complete lives were the relevant unit of egalitarian concern, he argues, we would 
not find these examples objectionable. On ‘pure’ CLE, inequalities between age 
groups only matter insofar as they create inequalities between people’s complete 
lives. In the Unequal City example, each cohort is treated in the same way as they 
age, and thus the synchronic inequality between young and old does not create 
inequalities between people’s complete lives. And yet, most of us do find them 
problematic from the point of view of equality. This simple synchronic objection 
undermines the complete lives view, McKerlie claims. Phases of inequality, like in 
the Swapping Castes example, do not cancel out diachronically. On the contrary, 
they add up.  
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The fact that people are equal over their complete lives is little consolation when 
half of the population is miserable and the other half is thriving. If we, as 
egalitarians, have to bite the bullet and believe that such inequalities are 
acceptable, we might as well forget that we are egalitarians. In other words, any 
egalitarian thinker must be able to provide reasons for why such cases are wrong, 
from the point of view of equality. And yet, McKerlie argues, complete lives 
egalitarians cannot. The fact that some are worse off than others at any given time 
is morally relevant and gives rise to a special claim of the worse off to various 
resources. Distributive justice, he insists, not only applies to complete lives, it also 
concerns temporal parts of lives. This objection has important implications for the 
field of age-group justice: 
 
In morally assessing inequality between age groups we should continue to 
think of it as inequality between different people, inequality that is 
objectionable. If the elderly live in poverty while others are affluent, this 
inequality is wrong in itself. The view does not deny that we are the same 
people in youth and in old age, but it does ask us to care about equality in a 
different way than the complete lives view. 
(McKerlie 1992, 295) 
 
In response to the shortcomings of CLE, McKerlie puts forward the simultaneous 
segments view. Temporal segments matter morally in and of themselves for 
distributive reasons. McKerlie does not deny that complete lives may matter as 
well. However, he argues that we should complement our account of time and 
equality with simultaneous segments egalitarianism (SSE) and that, in some cases, 
what happens at simultaneous segments may even trump what happens over 
complete lives. The following diagram by Temkin, which I have already 
introduced in Chapter 1, represents the levels of wellbeing of two individuals, A 
and B, at different moments of their lives (Temkin 1993, 234).  
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Case I in Temkin's diagram 
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Figure 5 - Case II in Temkin's diagram 
 
In the first case, we look at how they fare comparatively over their complete lives. 
In the second case, we look at how they fare at simultaneous segments. The first 
approach is the dominant view that McKerlie criticises and the second is the 
alternative view he himself endorses. On SSE, when considering people born at 
different times, we should focus on how they fare in relation to each other at 
specific moments in time.  
 
The Swapping Castes and the Unequal City examples are both intuitively appealing 
and the simultaneous segments view seems to be an important alternative to radical 
CLE. However, it is not clear how far SSE challenges the dominant modified 
complete lives egalitarian view that I have discussed in Chapter 2 – Daniels’s 
prudential lifespan account. Let me thus now establish more precisely what sort of 
alternative McKerlie’s simultaneous segments theory offers to the PLA. There are 
at least three ways in which McKerlie’s theory might be an alternative to Daniels’s: 
(1) it might draw on the same prudential account, but reach distinct conclusions 
(same account, different conclusions); (2) it might be radically alternative, if it 
provides a distinctive account and reaches different conclusions (different account, 
different conclusions); (3) it might use a different account - that is, a different set 
of reasons and arguments - to reach the same conclusions (different account, same 
conclusions).   
 
We can immediately reject the first possibility (same account, different 
conclusions) because McKerlie rejects the diachronic approach that frames 
Daniels’s theory. He does not appeal to a lifespan prudential account to decide 
whether a given synchronic inequality is problematic. An alternative to the PLA of 
this kind would for instance be a view that accepts that veiled prudence should 
dictate what the requirements of age-group justice are, but denies that the result of 
the planners’ deliberations would in fact be lifespan sufficiency and efficiency. 
McKerlie’s theory is thus either a type (2) or a type (3) alternative.  
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Consider the Swapping Castes example. It seems clear that veiled planners would 
reject such a society as imprudent. As I have shown in my previous chapter, 
Daniels argues that institutions should aim at making people’s lives go as well as 
possible. Inequalities between age groups are thus only permitted when they are 
prudent. In the Swapping Castes example, not only is the lifespan sufficiency 
requirement not met, but there is no diachronic ‘added value’ to the phases of 
domination. Thus, the temporal inequalities cannot be justified by the lifespan 
efficiency principle, which requires that trade-offs maximize utility over people’s 
lives as a whole. There are therefore strong prudential reasons to explain our 
intuition that the Swapping Castes example is unjust. This example seems to 
suggest that McKerlie’s theory may be a type (2) alternative to the PLA: it 
provides alternative reasons but reaches similar conclusions. This seems to be in 
line with Hugh Lazenby’s comment that Daniels and McKerlie’s accounts have 
very similar implications and that Daniels’s account in fact comes close “to 
McKerlie’s preferred ideal of strict temporal equality” (Lazenby 2011, 337).  
 
Looking at the other case - the Unequal City example – may confirm or contradict 
the view that McKerlie’s simultaneous segments account does not reach radically 
distinct conclusions. At first, it seems that, as in the Swapping Castes example, 
prudent planners would reject the Unequal City organization as imprudent. 
Lifespan sufficiency requires that elderly people have access to an age-relative 
normal opportunity range. The elderly in the Unequal City example do not seem to 
have access to sufficient such resources. This distribution of resources over 
people’s lifespan is objectionable on prudential grounds, because it seems to 
violate the requirement of equal concern for each stage of one’s life. Those who 
planned the Unequal City seem to have endorsed the view that a happy life at a 
young age matters more than a happy life later on, which contradicts the veiled 
prudential perspective. The Unequal City example thus seems to confirm the view 
that McKerlie’s theory is a type (2) alternative. 
 
However, there is at least one way to argue that McKerlie’s theory may also 
sometimes have implications distinct from the conclusions of the PLA. McKerlie 
worries that diachronic views, including prudential views, will always put at risk 
the benefits of the elderly and may authorize cases like the Unequal City example. 
Because risks of death increase with age, it is easier to justify from a whole life 
perspective to allocate most resources early on. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is not 
clear why prudent planners would leave resources for the elderly once they have 
reached a life of normal length. The eldest may thus be left with less than needed to 
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live a decent life on that basis. I interpreted prudential planning to imply lifespan 
sufficiency, which requires that the elderly have access to sufficient resources. 
However, I have rejected the lexically priority of lifespan sufficiency over to 
lifespan efficiency. Moreover, I have conceded that the lifespan sufficiency 
principle might not generate as strong obligations to the very old elderly, who have 
already lived for longer than ‘normal’, than for younger people. For this reason, 
McKerlie may well be right that diachronic approaches, even prudential ones, risk 
granting to the elderly less than the simultaneous segments view does. This 
suggests that McKerlie’s theory also provides a type (3) alternative to Daniels – 
different account, different conclusions.  
 
Therefore, McKerlie’s theory is an alternative to the PLA in at least two ways. 
First, it provides distinct reasons to explain what is wrong in cases like the Unequal 
City and the Swapping Castes examples. It proposes that there is something 
intrinsically synchronically wrong in such cases, while the PLA provides only 
diachronically derivative explanations. SSE and PLA will sometimes reach similar 
conclusions about which inequalities matter, but for radically different reasons. 
When given synchronic inequalities have no lifespan prudential justification – that 
is, they have no lifespan benefits or are detrimental to lifespan efficiency compared 
to other arrangements - the PLA will oppose them. For instance, consider the 
following ‘Reverse Unequal City’ example: this time, the young live miserably 
while the elderly thrive. Just like for the Unequal City example, this is an 
inequality between simultaneous segments to which McKerlie would object. Such 
example of synchronic inequality would also be unacceptable from a prudential 
perspective. Lifespan efficiency would in fact give us strong reasons to beware 
such cases, which may have a negative impact on the lifespan as a whole. 
However, at other times, the two accounts will come to different conclusions. As 
previously shown, McKerlie’s account may reach a distinct verdict than the PLA 
about given cases of synchronic inequalities, especially in cases where the elderly 
are worse off.  
3.1.2 Three!objections!to!simultaneous!segments!egalitarianism!
 
I will now consider three objections to SSE. First, one might claim, as Daniels 
does, that SSE appeals to a different currency of egalitarian justice than complete 
lives egalitarian accounts. Second, one may argue that SSE cannot compete with 
the diachronic view because there are compelling egalitarian reasons to focus on 
complete lives – including compensation, responsibility and prudence. Third, one 
may argue that McKerlie’s reliance on the moral value of ‘temporal segments’ is 
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unconvincing. I conclude that SSE can easily escape the first difficulty, can be 
rescued from the second under some conditions, but cannot withstand the last 
objection.  
 
Wellbeing and opportunities 
 
First, McKerlie assumes throughout his book that egalitarianism is ultimately 
concerned with wellbeing and not with opportunities or resources: “Egalitarian 
values should be concerned with what is most important, and well-being is more 
important than the other items cited” (McKerlie 2013, 21). However, we may 
seriously question the extent to which such an assumption weakens his enterprise, 
not only because he is too quick to exclude non-wellbeing-oriented egalitarians 
from the discussion, but also because he risks missing part of the problem, and 
talking past those he tries to challenge, who are mainly concerned with 
opportunities. McKerlie’s account may therefore be vulnerable to a criticism that 
Daniels raised a few years ago: that SSE is “irrelevant to concerns about 
institutional design in the age-group problem. (…) McKerlie is talking only about 
reasons we might have for adjusting the well-being of individuals, not about the 
design of actual institutions distributing goods over the lifespan” (Daniels 2008, 
481).  
 
However, there are in turn some problems with this objection to McKerlie. Indeed, 
Daniels himself is concerned with wellbeing as part of his commitment to the 
quality of whole lives: “I shall assume in what follows that a time-neutral concern 
for well-being over the lifespan is one of the demands of prudence itself” (Daniels 
1988, 57). There is a strong connection between seeking to distribute opportunities 
throughout the lifespan and asking how resources should be allocated to promote 
people’s wellbeing. Furthermore, arguably, whether we consider that it is 
wellbeing or opportunities that matter, the question of how to allocate resources 
between age groups will have to be raised. Ultimately, all egalitarians must take a 
stand on whether we should approach the problem diachronically or 
synchronically, or both. The relevant distinction between McKerlie and Daniels is 
thus that McKerlie does not translate questions of age-group justice into a 
diachronic intrapersonal prudential problem, while Daniels does. It is not that 
McKerlie focuses on wellbeing and Daniels on opportunities. The first objection to 
SSE, that it talks past other egalitarian accounts because it is focused on wellbeing, 
can thus be escaped.  
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Simultaneous segments versus complete lives 
 
A more important objection to McKerlie is that his account cannot compete with 
the diachronic approach. McKerlie (2013) conceded in his most recent publication 
on age-group justice that there are three important egalitarian values that are not 
captured by SSE: compensation, responsibility and prudence. There is a strong case 
to be made for the diachronic approach on such grounds, as I explained in Chapters 
1 and 2. For this reason, the value of equality, McKerlie worries, may in fact be 
better expressed by an approach that focuses on the life course. There is ground, he 
believes, to be suspicious about the adequacy of the view he himself 
conceptualized because it may not be in a position to compete with CLE. In the 
end, he argues, "we should have serious reservations about this view" (McKerlie 
2013, 87). For this reason, McKerlie eventually turned to a prioritarian view about 
age-group justice, which he calls “time-specific priority”. The root difference 
between prioritarianism and egalitarianism, McKerlie claims, is that the former 
considers that the more absolutely worse the quality of life, the more valuable the 
benefit will be, while the latter focuses on the relative position of the worse off 
with respect to the better off.    
 
The new view, time-specific priority, states that the value of priority should be 
applied to any relevant temporal segments – priority being given to those segments 
for which the value of the gain would be most significant based on “the level of 
well-being of that person when the gain is experienced” (McKerlie 2013, 98). 
Consider the following example, put forward by McKerlie to explain his view. At 
T1 Anna and Bob are both experiencing a low wellbeing level of 1, and at T2, 
Anna is at 5 and Bob is at 4.  
 
 
Figure 6 - The time-specific priority view 
 
Imagine we can add an extra unit of wellbeing to Bob either at T1 or at T2. On 
time-specific priority, McKerlie argues, we should give 1 unit to Bob at T1, rather 
than at T2, because that is when he is doing worst. (McKerlie 2013, 97). 
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With this new view, McKerlie argues, one does not run into the same difficulty as 
with SSE, because priority can be applied to both complete lives and temporal 
stages. Contrary to SSE, which cannot really offer reasons for why equality applies 
to short segments, priority applies to any relevant segments. McKerlie works with 
two understandings of well-being: one that focuses on overall quality of life, and 
one that is focused on well-being at a particular stage of one’s life. Priority does 
not run into the same problems as SSE because it is a non-comparative and non-
relative value (McKerlie 2013, 89). It is primarily concerned with improving the 
quality of the life of the worse off:  
 
A benefit added to a life that is of low quality assessed as a whole will 
have special value, as will a benefit received by someone which is 
currently badly off. Which has more value will depend on the size of the 
benefit and the degree of priority, and I see no reason why the result must 
be that the first benefit is more important.  
(McKerlie 2013, 117) 
 
Simultaneity, McKerlie argues, does not matter to priority, while it does to SSE. 
For instance, “if I must choose between helping the person who is worse off now 
or waiting and helping someone else [who is even worse off] a year from now, I 
should make the second choice. The fact that a person is suffering now does not 
give me an extra reason to help her” (McKerlie 2013, 91). As he moves away from 
SSE and rejects the significance of simultaneity, McKerlie thus renounces the idea 
that there is something intrinsically valuable in the goal of synchronic equality. 
   
I do not accept this move from equality to priority, for a series of reasons. First, I 
find it difficult to believe that there is nothing wrong ‘from the point of view of 
equality’ in the Unequal City and Swapping Castes examples. The aim of this 
thesis is to provide an egalitarian account of intergenerational equality. Unless it is 
impossible to provide an egalitarian explanation for what is wrong with synchronic 
inequalities, therefore, I will carry on with this task. I do not deny that there are 
other values that may help in framing the age-group problem like priority or 
freedom, but I do not consider that McKerlie’s reasons for abandoning the value of 
equality are sufficient.  
 
Second, McKerlie’s renunciation of SSE is itself unmotivated. He still thinks that 
diachronic arguments do not entirely refute the simultaneous segments view 
(McKerlie 2013, 87) and states that he is himself “not convinced that the objections 
raised (…) show conclusively that it is unreasonable to care about simultaneous 
segments inequality” (McKerlie 2013, 88). If we are committed to the question of 
equality through time, we should not too readily abandon the view that synchronic 
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inequalities may matter. We should instead look at potential ways to strengthen the 
view.  
 
Third, the significance of the diachronic prudential approach need only undermine 
the synchronic approach if we are trying to replace the former with the latter. 
McKerlie himself is not entirely clear about whether he thinks SSE should replace 
or complement the PLA. At the end of his critical chapter on Daniels, he suggests 
that SSE may be an alternative to the PLA: “I hope the objections give rise to 
considering an alternative approach to justice between the young and the old that 
might avoid the difficulties that arise for Daniels’s theory” (McKerlie 2013, 51). 
However, SSE does not have to be evaluated as a replacement for the PLA. We 
may assess it as a complement, which can be incorporated as part of a 
comprehensive theory of intergenerational equality.  
 
In this way, the significance of synchronic temporality for equality can be 
acknowledged without denying that the diachronic temporality is significant too. 
McKerlie himself points to this possibility of a division of labour between the 
synchronic and the diachronic approaches in the introduction to his recent book 
(McKerlie 2013, 18). In establishing what is morally significant about synchronic 
inequalities, we may therefore be modest and attempt to identify what the 
prudential account cannot capture, without attempting to find a view that can 
replace it - especially if it means abandoning the value of equality. Perhaps SSE 
can be salvaged as a complement to the diachronic approach in such way. 
 
The arbitrariness of the distributive segments view 
 
That said, there is a deeper problem in McKerlie’s SSE, which will lead me to 
abandon it and develop an alternative synchronic view to complement the 
diachronic approach. McKerlie argues that if an individual is worse off at Tx, then 
he should be assisted, but how the Tx segment is defined is not so clear. The main 
problem is that, once we have defined the temporal segment that matters morally 
(say twenty years), then we do not know whether we should find inequalities that 
occur within these smaller units of time unproblematic or not. One could always 
highlight shorter segments, in which case defining the worse off would become 
arbitrary. There is no justification for specifying that a given segment matters 
morally more than the previous one.9  
                                                      
9  I am indebted to Nils Holtug for helping me identify this problem at the 2012 
‘Conceptions of Justice’ conference in Aarhus. 
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McKerlie himself points to this problem with SSE:  
 
In the case of equality, we seemed forced to choose between an arbitrarily 
specified stretch of time – arbitrary because any such stretch might contain 
within itself simultaneous inequality that our principle could not take into 
account – or making the temporal scope a mere moment, a designation that 
also seemed to lead to implausibility.  
(McKerlie 2013, 105)  
 
However, McKerlie does not elaborate and misses out on what I take to be the core 
underlying issue. To illustrate the problem, consider the following modified 
version of Temkin’s diagram (Case II is just as it appears on his diagram and Case 
III is my version). 
 
 
Figure 7 - Case II in Temkin's diagram 
 
In Case II, we compare A and B at the simultaneous segments T2, T3 and T4 of 
approximately twenty years each. At each segment, A is one point better off than 
B. As Temkin notes on the right, this means that they are unequal (to the value of 
3) at these three simultaneous segments. 
 
 
Figure 8 - A modified version of Temkin's diagram 
 
Case III is wholly similar to Case II: A is equally well off in Case II and Case III 
both over her complete lives and at T2, T3 and T4; and the same for B. However, 
we compare A and B at the shorter simultaneous segments T2(a), T2(b), T3(a), 
T3(b), T4(a) and T4(b), of approximately ten years each.  
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In Case II, A is better off than B at T2(a), T3(a) and T4(a). However, B is better off 
than A at T2(b), T3(b) and T4(b). This illustrates the problem with McKerlie’s 
simultaneous segments view. In Case II and III, depending on whether we register 
simultaneous inequalities every twenty years or every ten years, we will draw 
substantially different conclusions as to who is worse off. If we only register 
inequalities between twenty years segments, we may compensate B and increase 
inequalities at shorter segments (for instance, increasing the distributive imbalance 
in favour of B). If we consider ten years segments, it is not clear who is worse-off 
anymore. 
 
This problem suggests that the simultaneous segments view arbitrarily defines the 
segments that matter. This undermines the distributive anti-complete lives 
egalitarian case, since the complete life segment is the least arbitrary. In other 
words, a solely distributive view will find it difficult, or perhaps impossible, to 
provide better reasons for adopting temporal stages than complete lives. As Iris 
Marion Young (1990: 15-18) puts it, the distributive paradigm is fundamentally 
static: it measures and compares respective levels of goods being distributed over a 
set time segment. McKerlie attempts to apply this thinking to temporal segments, 
but he cannot provide a rationale for why any given division of segments matters 
more than others, and cannot win the complete lives egalitarian over to the view 
that a given segment is most relevant to justice.  
 
For this reason, it is unlikely that there can be a coherent and plausible distributive 
story about why specific segments matter. This suggests that there is a strong non-
accidental connection between distributive approaches to equality and complete 
lives egalitarianism. Complete lives may be thought as the par excellence time unit 
of distributive equality. I will now put forward an alternative non-distributive 
account of why some synchronic inequalities between age groups matter. I will 
show that once we step away from the distributive paradigm and endorse a 
relational conception of equality, we see more clearly what is wrong in cases of 
synchronic inequalities like the Swapping Castes system or the Unequal City 
example. 
 
In conclusion, there is therefore at least one strong reason to abandon simultaneous 
segments egalitarianism. It is not that it focuses on the wrong currency. It is not 
that the synchronic temporality is irrelevant for the value of equality. It is that the 
least arbitrary way of applying the value of distributive equality over time is over a 
whole life. However, this does not mean that there is no moral significance to 
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synchronic inequalities like the Unequal City and the Swapping Castes examples; 
and it does not mean that what happens in those cases has nothing to do with the 
value of equality. In fact, I will now argue that there is a fundamentally, non-
derivatively synchronic egalitarian explanation for the intuition that there is 
something strongly non-egalitarian about these cases. 
 
3.2 An!Alternative!Approach:!Synchronic!Relational!Equality!
3.2.1 The!dispute!between!relational!and!distributive!conceptions!of!equality!
 
In the last two decades, a relational egalitarian conception of equality has gradually 
emerged. 10  Its proponents reject the widespread and dominant ‘distributive’ 
understanding of equality, which they believe misrepresents the real point of 
equality. Iris Young (1990) argues that distributive accounts disproportionally 
emphasize patterns of distribution while most forms of injustice have little to do 
with the respective holdings to which individuals have access. The distributive 
paradigm, she argues, neglects the social structures and relationships that create 
and reinforce unequal distributions. Similarly, Anderson (1999) argues that the aim 
of egalitarian justice is to end relationships of oppression. Relational egalitarians 
primarily take issue with the way people relate to each other in a community. For 
instance, they are concerned with whether people are able to appear in the 
community without shame, whether they are respected, and whether minority 
groups are recognized or, on the contrary, whether they are victims of exclusive 
norms and are marginalized or demonized (Lippert-Rasmussen 2012, 127-128).  
 
The distinction between the two conceptions can be simply expressed this way: 
while distributive egalitarians believe that it is a moral requirement of justice that 
people get an equal amount of X (other things being equal), relational egalitarians 
believe that the point of equality is the realization of a community where people 
are able to stand in front of each other as equals. Relational egalitarians draw 
heavily on the badness of oppressive relationships like exploitation, oppression, 
domination or exclusion to explain why equality matters. In contrast, distributive 
egalitarians focus on individuals’ relative levels of goods (however understood) 
and ask whether the division of these goods is morally justified or whether some 
individuals should be compensated, for instance for consequences of bad brute 
                                                      
10 Key texts on relational (or social) egalitarianism include: Young (1990), Anderson 
(1999), Scheffler (2003), Scanlon (2004), Wolff (2007), O’Neill (2008), Schemmel (2011) 
and Fourie (2012). 
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luck. According to Schemmel, “relational egalitarians present their conception as 
an alternative to distributive egalitarianism” (Schemmel 2011, 7). 
 
One may doubt the relevance of the categorical distinction. Arguably, we could 
reframe relational egalitarian accounts in distributive terms, where the good X that 
must be equalised is power or status. In the same way, one may argue that most 
distributive egalitarians believe that unequal relationships matter to justice, but 
simply object to them in distributive terms. Relationships of domination and 
oppression, one may argue, are wrong precisely because they are evidence of a 
fundamentally unequal distribution of opportunities, welfare, income and 
resources, or because they directly involve an unfair distribution of power and 
status. Iris Young expressed this objection herself: the distributive paradigm, she 
argues, feels very malleable since in theory most things can be distributed, from 
voice to status and power (Young 1990, 15-39). Relational and distributive 
understandings of equality might thus be best understood as two expressions of the 
same value, rather than as rival conceptions; the distinction would then be of little 
significance. Arguably, if the distributive paradigm is so adaptable to various 
things we may value (opportunities, resources, power, respect, welfare, etc.) then 
the relevance of the relational approach seems to wither. For instance, Lippert-
Rasmussen (2012) argues, against Anderson, that relational concerns can be 
captured by luck egalitarian accounts. 
 
However, the claim that the relational egalitarian conception can be re-described as 
distributive is inadequate. Relational egalitarians consider distributive justice as a 
lever to achieve the goal of a community of equals, which means that distributive 
equality is required only when it promotes the goal of a relationally equal 
community. Distributive egalitarians, however, defend the moral ideal of 
distributive equality and consider that inequalities in opportunities, resources, 
income or welfare matter intrinsically. This means that distributive inequalities that 
have no impact on status and power will be considered irrelevant by the first and 
unfair by the second. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen expresses this distinction this 
way:  
 
The latter [distributive egalitarians] take the distribution of goods to 
matter, from the point of view of justice, independently of its effect on 
social relations. The former [relational egalitarians], by contrast, contend 
that distribution matters only instrumentally in virtue of its impact on 
social relations and the degree to which these are suitably egalitarian.  
(Lippert-Rasmussen 2012, 118) 
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Think of a very equal society where people enjoy the same opportunities, fairly 
equal outcomes, have the same standard of living, enjoy a full and equal set of 
capabilities, etc. Imagine that some happen to have very luxurious cars, and others 
do not. Those who do not possess luxurious cars, however, have no need for them 
because they have efficient cars of their own. Moreover, let us consider that 
luxurious cars do not happen to grant a higher status in this specific society. On 
relational egalitarian grounds, there are no reasons to object to this specific 
distributive inequality. On most distributive egalitarian accounts, however, it may 
well be unfair. It all depends on the reasons why these individuals have luxurious 
cars: did they work harder; do they have higher needs; or is it a result of pure brute 
luck? This society is still problematic for distributive egalitarians, which suggests 
that relational and distributive accounts are likely to diverge when identifying 
which specific inequalities are objectionable. From this example, one may suppose 
that the two conceptions have distinct implications. 
 
And yet, it seems that the Luxurious Cars example is not fully satisfying, because it 
merely shows that the two conceptions conflict in marginal circumstances. One 
may claim that the two conceptions have the same implications in the vast majority 
of cases, with few exceptions. The distinction between the two conceptions could 
thus be considered as of little importance. The non-reducibility thesis - i.e. the view 
that the relational conception cannot be re-described as distributive – thus requires 
a less marginal example. Moreover, an ideal example in support of the non-
reducibility thesis would be a case in which one conception tells us that we ought 
to do one thing while the other conception tells us to do its opposite. In the 
Luxurious Cars example, the relational egalitarian might not have reasons of her 
own to restore distributive equality, but she may not have reasons to object to the 
luxurious cars being redistributed either. A better illustration would show that the 
two conceptions can pull in opposite directions. One may then more plausibly infer 
that they are not reducible one to another and perhaps even that they are 
fundamentally in tension.  
 
I now want to propose that the Unequal City and Swapping Castes examples have 
the features that the Luxurious Cars example lacks. I will show that they 
successfully account for the significance of the non-reducibility thesis. These 
examples are likely to offend any egalitarian, and yet distributive egalitarians do 
not have the resources to explain why these examples matter from an egalitarian 
point of view, as explained in my earlier criticism raised against McKerlie. I will 
therefore argue that, even if we are distributive egalitarians, there are cases we can 
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only make proper sense of if we endorse the relational conception of equality. To 
clarify, I make the following three claims in the remainder of this chapter:  
 
(a) Our reluctance to accept synchronic inequalities (like the Unequal City 
and the Swapping Castes examples) is best explained by the relational 
conception of equality (Section 3.2.2). 
 
(b) The non-reducibility thesis - which states that the relational and 
distributive approaches to equality count as two distinct conceptions and 
cannot be reduced one to another - is true (Sections 3.2.2 ad 3.3). 
 
(c) Even if we are distributive egalitarians, we must endorse the relational 
conception of equality to make full sense of age-group justice (Sections 
3.2.2 and 3.3). 
 
(a) is an original contribution to the field of age-group justice, (b) is a contribution 
to the broader debate between relational egalitarians and distributive egalitarians, 
and (c) is a contribution to both age-group justice and egalitarianism in general. 
3.2.2 The!synchronic!relational!egalitarian!explanation!
 
What is worrying in the Swapping Castes and Unequal City examples is not that 
there is a time-slice inequality in distribution as such, but rather that relationships 
of inequality may pertain. In the first example, the relationship between the two 
castes is fraught with domination and oppression. In the second case, the elderly 
are likely to be segregated and marginalised, which is incompatible with the social 
egalitarian goal of a community of people standing as equals. The fact that equality 
over complete lives is granted in both cases is largely beside the point. What is 
problematic is precisely that these societies may not be communities of relational 
equals.  
 
Phases of domination (in the first case) or marginalisation and segregation (in the 
second case) cannot be thought to cancel out diachronically. These phases are non-
derivatively offensive: they matter to us precisely for the relationships they 
contain. Diachronic equality is compatible with synchronic relations of oppression, 
exploitation, domination, exclusion, stigmatisation, marginalization or exclusion. 
Our reluctance to accept synchronic inequalities is best explained by the relational 
dimension of equality understood as a social and political value. From this 
perspective, social inequalities between age groups – for instance, between the 
young and formed-adults or between formed-adults and the elderly – matter insofar 
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as they constitute relationships of inequality in and of themselves and 
independently of the fact that the young will end up being old at some point too.11  
 
Take the case of age-based discrimination. Some policies of discrimination may 
benefit younger cohorts: for example, forced retirement for workers over 60 years 
old may benefit new entrants. There may be valuable diachronic reasons to 
introduce such a scheme, as well as many other forms of age-based discrimination. 
If we are concerned that youth unemployment is so high that the cohort of younger 
people will be worse off than the previous generation, we may think that those who 
have already enjoyed a career of normal length should retire and leave space for 
younger people. However, we should also consider what the impact of such policy 
would be for the kind of synchronic relationships that would pertain between age 
groups. Adopting a comprehensive framework that integrates both concerns 
decreases the risk of egalitarians missing out on part of what matters.   
 
The distinctiveness of the relational egalitarian conception of equality is that it has 
a strong presumption against inequalities in rank, status, and respect. As Scheffler 
puts it, to understand the value of equality, one must “investigate the specific 
respects in which egalitarian relationships must be free from regimentation by 
considerations of rank or status” (Scheffler 2005, 18). Many forms of 
differentiation will be compatible with the goal of a community of equals. But 
synchronic inequalities should be considered from the relational egalitarian point 
of view too.  
 
Relational egalitarians would ask the following questions to find out whether a 
given arrangement is satisfactory from the point of view of equality. Are the young 
and the old equally respected and recognized? Or are the very young demonized 
and the very old marginalized? Are the very old condescended to and the young 
patronized? Are the elderly able to appear without shame and are the young 
exploited in the labour market? Do the elderly hold a higher authority and do they 
control and dominate the political life? These are questions that would not be 
straightforwardly asked (or answered) by a diachronic prudential account. Of 
course, having access to sufficient opportunities and resources is needed to stand as 
equals. But questions of respect, authority, rank, status and power also deserve to 
be raised. And these may arise in the synchronic temporality. 
 
                                                      
11 Interestingly, this point is also made by the cancer care specialist Richard Wagland 
(2012). 
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The topic of age-group justice has not attracted much attention from egalitarians. 
This problematic oversight can perhaps be explained by the dominance of the 
distributive paradigm over egalitarian thought in general. Indeed, my earlier 
criticism of McKerlie’s simultaneous segments distributive account suggested that 
complete lives are the ultimate time unit of distributive equality. I thus suggested 
that the connection between the complete lives view and the distributive paradigm 
is non-accidental. Paul Bou-Habib (2011) discusses another fundamental reason 
which explains the close tie between, on the one hand, luck egalitarianism, and, on 
the other, complete lives egalitarianism. Luck egalitarians are logically drawn to 
the diachronic view because it leaves scope for ambition sensitivity, while 
synchronic views do not. Perhaps the dominance of the complete lives egalitarian 
approach to equality through time can thus also be explained by the dominance of 
the luck egalitarian paradigm over egalitarian thought, as I already suggested in 
Chapter 1. These connections help explain why very little attention has been paid 
to the question of synchronic inequalities, why questions of equality between age 
groups are under-researched, and why few philosophical objections to age-based 
discriminations exist. 12  However, once we step away from the distributive 
paradigm and endorse the relational egalitarian approach, the relevance and 
objectionable nature of synchronic inequalities becomes clearer.  
 
3.3 Distributive!Objections!to!the!Relational!View!
 
In the previous section, I argued that our reasons for finding some inequalities 
between age groups unjust are primarily relational. Complete lives egalitarians 
have missed out on an important explanation for wrongful inequalities that is non-
derivatively synchronic and relational in nature. I thus suggested that even if we 
are distributive egalitarians, we need to endorse a relational approach to make 
sense of some objectionable synchronic inequalities.  
 
In order to fortify this claim, I will now show that there are no convincing 
distributive ways to explain what is wrong with the synchronic inequalities I have 
identified as relationally wrong. I have already shown why McKerlie’s distributive 
segments account is implausible. Let me now turn to three further potential 
distributive objections that might be raised against my relational explanation. All 
three offer a distributive account of why and when synchronic inequalities matter. 
                                                      
12 Exceptions include: Colla and Gosseries (2013), Gosseries (2007, 2014). 
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All three are compatible with complete lives egalitarianism and provide an 
explanation of what is wrong with synchronic inequalities of the sort we 
highlighted earlier without appealing to relationships. I will show where they each 
fail.  
3.3.1 The!prudential!lifespan!objection!
 
The first objection says that complete lives egalitarian accounts of equality that 
integrate a prudential dimension can explain why McKerlie’s examples are 
problematic without appealing to the relational view. Let us assume that we are 
committed to the double prudential requirement of lifespan efficiency and 
sufficiency. As I have already pointed out, Daniels’s account does not accept the 
view that as long as complete lives are equal, what happens within lives is 
irrelevant to justice. Inequalities of the changing places type are imprudent. Periods 
of domination, prudential complete lives egalitarians may argue, generate a strong 
disutility over complete lives. This suggests that they would be able to reject many 
cases of synchronic inequalities of the changing places type by appealing to the 
derivative effect of such inequalities on people’s quality of lives and thus without 
appealing to a relational approach.  
 
However, the diachronic approach will always tend to threaten the status of the 
elderly as fully equal members of their communities. If scarce resources like jobs 
and healthcare are distributed solely along diachronic lines, then multiple cases of 
age-based discrimination will be found acceptable to protect the opportunities of 
new entrants against those of older persons who have already had their share of 
opportunities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the PLA may leave too little for the very 
old, because of its scarcity-oriented diachronic focus. Perhaps the very old have 
‘exhausted’ their entitlement to the lifetime fair share, but if they are left in a 
situation of second-class citizens as a result, then there is another fundamental 
egalitarian reason to object to this treatment - a fundamentally synchronic one.  
 
Moreover, even when veiled prudence can provide reasons to reject age-based 
discriminations, it seems that these are not the right sorts of reasons. What is 
offensive in the Unequal City example is not primarily that it is an imprudent 
distribution; it is that the elderly are worse off and therefore that the fundamental 
egalitarian goal of achieving a community of equals is jeopardized. The scope of 
egalitarian concern when it comes to age-group inequalities extends beyond their 
impact on the quality of whole lives. The diachronic prudential approach has some 
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strength in distributive terms, but it fails to see that there are some non-derivative 
reasons to be cautious about synchronic inequalities.  
 
The first objection to my relational approach was that most cases of wrongful 
synchronic relational inequalities can in fact be rejected based on their impact on 
the quality of whole lives. My answer has been first, that the focus on diachronic 
prudence may threaten the status of the elderly as fully equal members of society, 
and second, that even when diachronic distributive accounts can be stretch to 
provide a prudential argument against the examples of synchronic inequalities that 
my relational synchronic account objects to, the reasons provided are not the right 
reasons. That the Swapping Castes and Unequal City examples are offensive to an 
egalitarian eye has little to do with the fact that they are inefficient over a complete 
life. The prudential reasons may prescribe the right answers in many cases, but 
they constitute the wrong sort of reasons. Whether it creates utility or disutility 
over complete lives is largely beside the point. The examples are offensive 
precisely because they create relations that are incompatible with the goal of a 
community of relational equals. For this reason, the distributive prudential 
explanation is often inappropriate. Insofar as we accept that changing places 
examples raise issues of justice, these are better explained by the relational view 
and cannot be re-described as distributive.  
3.3.2 !The!sufficiency!objection!
 
The second potential objection to my relational view closely relates to the 
prudential lifespan objection. It consists in saying that we should aim to ensure 
equality over complete lives, but that we should also secure continuous sufficiency 
throughout lives. Paula Casal (2007, 320-323) illustrates this view by appealing to 
the example of two potential recipients of limited resources: an octogenarian 
woman who has lived extremely well in the past and now finds herself facing 
hardship, and a teenager who faces a whole life of relatively lower quality. We 
should be concerned with complete lives equality, she argues, but we should also 
aim to ensure that people have enough at any point: “Faced with the choice 
between benefiting the octogenarian or the teenager, it is not implausible to believe 
that (…) it would be wrong to allow the octogenarian to fall below some critical 
threshold during the last segment of her life” (Casal 2007, 321). With this example, 
Casal aims to show that we may endorse a mixed view that leaves space for both 
distributive equality and sufficiency: “If such a conviction [that we ought to help 
the elderly woman] is sound, then there is still a place for certain types of 
sufficiency principles within distributive ethics” (Casal 2007, 321). 
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As I have shown in Chapter 2, Gosseries (2011) and Daniels point to an even 
stronger connection between both principles: they suggests that it is a requirement 
of the quality of lives as a whole that enough be provided at any time. In other 
words, their concern for continuous lifespan sufficiency is itself derived from a 
concern for the quality of complete lives. The sufficientarian view can thus be 
phrased as such: the right time unit for equality is complete lives; to make sense of 
some cases of synchronic inequalities like the Unequal City Example, we do not 
need to appeal to the relational conception of equality, we can simply appeal to the 
view that ensuring that no one falls below a certain threshold at any point is 
constitutive of the complete lives egalitarian view. This continuous sufficiency 
objection thus shares at least two features with the prudential objection: it reduces 
the synchronic problem of age-group inequalities to a diachronic problem about the 
most justified distribution of resources over a lifetime; and it states that a life well 
lived is incompatible with extreme hardship at any point.  
 
However, the sufficiency objection differs from the prudential lifespan objection in 
at least one respect. While the latter view argues that synchronic inequalities 
between age groups must be justified by appeal to intrapersonal prudence, the 
former considers that equality between age groups is simply not a goal of justice. 
The real worry is not synchronic inequalities; it is the fact that the worse off, in the 
Swapping Castes or Unequal City examples, do not have enough. This view does 
not need to appeal to a procedure to decide which inequalities between age groups 
matter once the threshold is met. The sufficiency threshold view threatens my 
relational view because it denies that synchronic equality matters at all in theory, 
but in practice it can still explain why cases like the Unequal City example are 
objectionable: the elderly simply do not have enough.  
 
However, this objection does not hold. In the Unequal City example, the problem 
may be that the elderly do not have enough, but defining the threshold for what 
counts as enough is a fundamental problem. One can envisage at least three 
sufficiency thresholds: (1) an absolute threshold - defined through an appeal to 
basic human needs and constituted by the resources necessary to be free from 
deprivation; (2) a relative threshold - dependent on what others have and set by the 
resources necessary to function ‘normally’ in a given society at a given time; (3) a 
relational threshold - sensitive to the relational imbalance that may prevail when 
some individuals or groups have more influence or status than others, and 
constituted by the amount of resources necessary to stand free from domination. 
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These three thresholds may overlap slightly, but the relational threshold can only 
be defined through considering the relationships of inequality that may pertain 
between age groups at any given point.  
 
In the Unequal City example, the elderly may have enough in terms of their basic 
needs being met: they have access to basic resources including income, housing, 
healthcare, etc. They may be said not to have enough in the relative sense, 
depending on whether we consider that what they have is commensurable with 
what others have. Even though they have fewer opportunities to flourish than 
younger people, however, what they have is within the normal opportunity range of 
the elderly in their society, and they have had the opportunity to live a normal 
lifespan. However, the elderly of the Unequal City fall below the third threshold: 
they are spatially segregated and at risk of marginalisation and social exclusion. 
 
Therefore, sufficientarians may find it difficult to provide an explanation for what 
is problematic in the Unequal City example without appealing to the relational 
conception of equality. And yet, as soon as one appeals to the relational threshold 
to explain what may be wrong, one commits oneself to the view that synchronic 
relational inequalities matter. In other words, continuous sufficiency throughout 
our lives could be a good way to express the requirement of age-group justice, but 
the best underlying explanation for why ensuring sufficiency matters in cases like 
the Unequal City example is egalitarian in nature – it derives from the relational 
egalitarian goal of achieving a community of equals.  
3.3.3 The!currency!objection!
 
The last objection I will consider is that there may be an important qualitative 
distinction between, on the one hand, goods that must be distributed equally over 
complete lives, and on the other hand, goods that must be provided equally to 
individuals, regardless of their age. In other words, there are basic rights and 
liberties that should not be distributed so as to maximize lifespan efficiency. 
Proponents of this view could argue, for instance, that the problem in the changing 
places examples is that those who are oppressed have lost their basic liberties. 
Basic liberties cannot be traded off at one point in the lifespan for more later on.13 
Some resources like healthcare resources and income may be subject to diachronic 
rationality, but basic liberties should not be. On this view, the distributive paradigm 
does not need to be supplemented; we should just acknowledge that there is an in-
                                                      
13 I am grateful to Norman Daniels for phrasing a version of this potential objection at the 
York 2013 Intergenerational Justice conference. 
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kind distinction between what must be distributed diachronically and what must be 
distributed synchronically. This objection threatens the relational view in the same 
way the two previous potential objections did: it offers a fundamentally distributive 
explanation for why the cases of synchronic inequalities discussed in this chapter 
matter without appealing to the relational egalitarian conception of equality.  
 
A first way to answer this objection is to argue that the best way to make sense of 
the in-kind distinction is precisely to ask which goods are required for people to be 
able to stand as equals, continuously, throughout their lives. The relational 
conception would thus provide the rationale for separating goods that must be 
distributed over complete lives, at shorter segments, or continuously. However, in 
any case, the in-kind distinction does not seem convincing. Having or not having 
access to goods almost always has an impact on whether people will be able to 
stand as equals or not. Jobs, housing, income and healthcare all have a fundamental 
impact on relational equality. If our ability to stand as equals before others is 
fundamentally dependent on the bundle of resources we have access to, then the in-
kind distinction does not seem to hold as an explanation for why the Unequal City 
example is repellent. At least, it does not threaten the view that the best reasons for 
rejecting synchronic inequalities are relational.  
 
In Section 3, I have identified three potential distributive alternatives to my 
relational view: the prudential lifespan, the sufficiency threshold, and the currency 
objections. I have shown that none of them gets to the core of what is 
fundamentally unattractive from an egalitarian point of view in the changing-places 
examples. What is problematic in those examples cannot simply be derived from a 
diachronic appeal to the quality of whole lives. Some synchronic inequalities carry 
non-derivative moral weight, and the relational egalitarian conception stands on 
firm grounds as the most plausible and satisfactory egalitarian explanation for why 
we should be cautious in such cases. 
 
3.4 Conclusions!
 
I have not suggested that complete lives egalitarianism and prudential planning are 
irrelevant to justice. However, I have shown that complete lives egalitarians have 
missed out on an important aspect of equality and that there is a strong non-
accidental connection between the complete lives view and the distributive 
paradigm. Indeed, I suggested that political philosophers may have engaged so 
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little with questions of age-group justice partly because of the dominance of the 
distributive paradigm (and luck egalitarianism) over egalitarian thought. I therefore 
argued that a view that fully rejects the appeal to relational egalitarianism and re-
describes the problem as entirely distributive is very likely to be unsatisfactory. 
This is sufficient to infer that, even if we are distributive egalitarians, there are 
cases that can only be made proper sense of by appealing to the relational 
conception of equality. 
 
A broader conclusion may be drawn from this discussion about the link between 
distributive and relational conceptions of equality. I have established that the non-
reducibility claim – which states that the two conceptions cannot be reduced to 
each other - is true for two core reasons. First, the two conceptions pull in opposite 
directions: in the examples we offered, the distributive approach emphasizes 
diachronic equality and tells us to secure birth cohort equity, while the relational 
approach highlights the goal of synchronic equality and tells us to ensure age group 
equality. In the Luxurious Cars example, the relational egalitarian may not have 
reasons of their own to redistribute the luxurious cars, but they might not have 
strong reasons to object to their being redistributed. However, in our examples of 
synchronic inequalities, relational and distributive positions are more 
fundamentally in tension.  
 
Second, the cases I assessed were not marginal in the way the Luxurious Cars 
example was. The Unequal City example touches on serious inequalities between 
young and old. This establishes that the two conceptions are irreducible in 
fundamental instances of inequalities, not merely in marginal cases. Given that the 
distributive and relational conceptions of equality have opposite implications in 
important cases, the distinction is relevant and the two views cannot be reduced 
one to the other. They constitute two different conceptions of equality, which 
appeal to different kinds of moral reasons.  
 
Last but not least, a large part of this chapter has been concerned with arguing that 
adopting an exclusively distributive view may lead us to overlook some 
fundamental inequalities. I have shown that distributive egalitarians must 
acknowledge that some fundamental egalitarian commitments extend beyond the 
distributive paradigm and thus cannot be re-described as distributive. If we accept 
to take seriously the intuitive dystopian sense that the changing places and Unequal 
City examples leave us with, then I have argued that, even if we are distributive 
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egalitarians, we must endorse the relational conception of equality to explain it 
adequately.  
 
The following additional principle can thus be spelled out: 
 
o Synchronic relational equality principle: synchronic inequalities between 
age groups are unjust if they generate relationships of inequality (such as 
oppression, demonization, stigmatisation, marginalisation, and 
domination).  
 
The synchronic relational equality principle is the third principle of 
intergenerational equality that I have highlighted so far. I must now make more 
explicit the overlaps and conflicts between these principles of intergenerational 
equality. Chapter 4 will be partly devoted to laying out the frame of a 
comprehensive theory of IG equality drawing on these principles. 
 
In the past three chapters, I have discussed questions of justice between 
overlapping generations in general, but I have not explicitly emphasized the 
implications of such discussions for young people. This will be my main task in 
Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER!4!O !TREATING!THE!YOUNG!AS!EQUALS:!WHAT!DOES!IT!
MEAN?!
 
 
Having discussed the normative value of equality over complete lives, prudent 
lifespan planning and simultaneous equality, I am now better armed to respond to 
the question of what counts as treating the young as equals. This chapter will draw 
on the previous discussions to determine what counts as an adequate institutional 
treatment of the young. I aim for this chapter to serve the double purpose of 
bringing together the different aspects of intergenerational equality discussed in 
previous chapters and to provide the theoretical basis for the two subsequent 
chapters, which look at the normative adequacy of specific youth policies.  
 
To this end, I first briefly establish the contours of a comprehensive theory of 
intergenerational equality based around the three principles discussed in the three 
previous chapters: the complete lives egalitarian principle of approximate cohort 
equality, the two-part prudential requirement of lifespan sufficiency and efficiency, 
and the synchronic relational principle of age-group justice (Section 4.1). The 
remainder of Chapter 4 determines what the framework implies for what is owed to 
young people. I first ask what counts as an age-relative normal opportunity range 
for the young (Section 4.2). I then look at the double phenomena of clustering of 
disadvantage (Section 4.3) and scarring effects (Section 4.4). I suggest they 
provide a good basis for establishing the implications of, respectively, the 
prudential and complete-lives-cohortal requirements of justice for the young. Last, 
I examine the implications of the synchronic relational egalitarian principle for 
what treating the young as equals means (Section 6.5).  
 
4.1 Towards!a!Comprehensive!Theory!of!Equality!Through!Time!!
 
In previous chapters, I have highlighted important intuitions about time and 
equality, and critically assessed the theories that have been advanced in the debate, 
modifying each of them. The result of this critical discussion is a set of principles 
designed to answer the core question of which inequalities between overlapping 
generations are unfair. Inequalities in opportunities between birth cohorts, I have 
argued, are prima facie unfair on complete lives egalitarian grounds. I have 
referred to this as the approximate equality between cohorts principle. Inequalities 
between age groups, I have also argued, far from being irrelevant to justice, are 
only acceptable when they meet the following requirements.  
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First, inequalities between age groups are objectionable when they produce 
inequalities between birth cohorts (this derives directly from the approximate 
cohort equality principle above). Second, inequalities between age groups must be 
‘prudent’. That is, they must meet both: (a) the lifespan sufficiency principle, which 
requires that resources be distributed in a way that ensures the preservation of a 
normal opportunity range throughout people’s lives (i.e. members of any age group 
should be maintained above an absolute basic threshold, and an age-relative 
threshold set at the level of a ‘normal’ set of opportunities for someone of a given 
age group in a given society); and (b) the lifespan efficiency principle which states 
that institutions should invest resources early in the lifespan when it maximises 
diachronic utility. Third, inequalities between age groups are problematic if they 
generate relationships of inequality - such as oppression, demonization, 
stigmatisation, marginalisation, and domination. I have called this last principle the 
synchronic relational egalitarian principle. The principles are summarized below. 
 
1. Approximate equality between birth cohorts 
2. Prudential lifespan principles of age-group justice 
a. Lifespan sufficiency principle 
b. Lifespan efficiency principle 
3. Synchronic relational egalitarian principle of age-group justice 
 
This list of principles is not quite properly action-guiding yet. In order to decide 
which specific inequalities between generations matter, we now need to establish 
how these principles may fit together as part of a theory of equality between 
overlapping generations. We must know the appropriate weight to give to each 
principle in case of conflict. I have offered some answers to this in previous 
chapters. My task in this section is to bring together the elements of response that 
have already been mentioned and to develop the further points that need 
discussion.  
 
The best way to describe the relationship between principles 1, 2 and 3 is that they 
are complementary, since each principle is individually insufficient. Drawing on 
Daniels, I showed that the complete lives egalitarian perspective is implausible 
without a prudential component: the quality of whole lives matters as well as their 
equality, and it fundamentally depends on the distribution of resources between 
stages of lives. Drawing on McKerlie, I have also shown that the diachronic 
perspective, even when complemented by a prudential lifespan view, is not 
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satisfactory without a relational synchronic supplement. Some synchronic 
inequalities, I argued, matter for reasons that cannot be adequately captured by 
principles 1 or 2, because they matter for reasons that are irreducibly synchronic 
and relational. I have also shown in Chapter 3 that the ideal of synchronic 
relational equality does not exhaust discussions on age group and birth-cohort 
justice. On its own, the synchronic perspective is fairly age-insensitive and does 
not provide reasons for prevention or for age-based differential treatments that can 
potentially benefit us all in the long run. All three principles are important, they are 
not simply saying the same things in different ways, and none of them can be 
reduced to another – they are each independently insufficient. 
 
We are thus left with three individually insufficient but jointly complementary 
principles of intergenerational equality. But the mere fact that they are 
complementary does not mean that they will not conflict. There are four possible 
lines of conflict: conflicts between the approximate equality between cohorts 
principle and the prudential principle; conflicts within the prudential principle, 
between its two components; conflicts between prudence and the synchronic 
relational principle; and conflicts between approximate cohort equality and 
synchronic relational equality.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the prudential ideal may recommend transfers towards 
elderly people that are difficult for a small cohort of taxpayers to afford; as a result, 
a larger cohort may benefit more than the smaller cohort from intergenerational 
cooperation. As also mentioned in Chapter 2, lifespan efficiency and sufficiency 
may pull in different directions too - for instance, when discussing the extent of our 
obligations to the elderly. The lifespan efficiency principle, on the one hand, 
emphasises preventive measures, early investments, and youth-first rationing when 
necessary. The lifespan sufficiency principle, on the other hand, works as a 
counterweight to the lifespan efficiency maximizing rationality that often works to 
elderly people’s disadvantage. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the synchronic 
relational principle’s injunction to direct spending towards combatting 
marginalisation may conflict with the prudential efficiency injunction to invest in 
the youngest members of society. Moreover, the synchronic relational equality 
principle will tend to direct resources towards those who are worse off now, while 
the complete lives egalitarian commitment will encourage transferring resources 
towards those who are likely to be worse off over their complete lives.  
 
 
116 
One way to give adequate weight to the principles would be to adopt a lexical 
priority ordering. The diachronic injunctions would be more important than 
synchronic relational equality, or the opposite. For instance, in the Unequal City 
example, given that diachronic requirements are met and that meeting synchronic 
requirements would disrupt it, we might decide to do nothing. On the contrary, we 
might decide that synchronic requirements are more important, and that we should 
ignore the goals of diachronic equality and prudent planning for synchronic 
equality when we cannot do both. However, such lexical ordering does not seem to 
capture what I argued in previous chapters. Indeed, since I have claimed that the 
diachronic principles are insufficient in Chapter 3, it would make little sense now 
to say that synchronic equality starts to matter only once diachronic requirements 
are fulfilled. Similarly, if we take the opposite view - that diachronic justice should 
only be paid attention to once synchronic equality is met, then we seem to be 
doomed to leave too little room for prudent planning and cohort equality to express 
themselves. 
 
Therefore, I propose to develop an alternative pluralist solution. All three 
principles matter, and we should do our best to ensure that they are all promoted 
through institutional planning. In other words, we should try to find compromises 
that give adequate consideration to all three principles. Rather than lexical 
ordering, or trying to reduce each principle to a commensurable common unit, we 
should endorse a pluralistic decision-making way of proceeding. How then to reply 
to the previous trade-offs cases? We should consider that the Unequal City is 
unjust: institutions must ensure elderly people have enough in later life; they must 
also ensure that they are free from domination, exclusion and marginalisation. 
Further, they must ensure that such treatment is ensured in a way that is sustainable 
and gives equal consideration to the prospects of different cohorts.  
 
An important conclusion that I will lean towards in this chapter and Chapter 5 is 
that, when asking what we owe the young, it is not very difficult to accommodate 
all three requirements. I will show that they often point in the same direction, but 
emphasise different aspects of the problem. For instance, limiting the risk of 
exploitation or domination at a young age tends to be prudent because of the long-
term implications it is likely to have for the quality of their lives as a whole. 
Moreover, it is likely that a society in which the young are not viewed as equals 
will risk granting them with fewer opportunities than they should on prudential 
grounds. Another example is that it is impossible to ensure synchronic relational 
equality without ensuring lifespan basic sufficiency. These examples suggest that, 
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more often than not, we may be able to accommodate these three principles in 
institutional design and they may in fact work to facilitate each other. I will 
nevertheless proceed by analysing the implications of each principle one after 
another, rather than mixing them together, because they emphasize slightly 
different aspects of the problem.  
 
Another remark that I am now able to make about which principles should be the 
primary focus of our concerns is that the cohort equality principle is less 
substantive and guiding for institutional planning than the two other principles. 
While prudence informs us about how goods should be distributed across the 
lifespan and synchronic relational equality informs us about how age groups should 
be treated and relate to each other, approximate cohort equality seems to be more 
of a side-constraint. That is, it tells us relatively little about institutional design 
because it says nothing of quality of life or community. It simply says, whichever 
quality you pick, distribute it approximately equally by cohort. This is not to say 
that approximate cohort equality is not an important moral goal. It is simply to say 
that it is likely to be less substantively guiding for institutional planning than the 
two other principles.  
 
With the main lines of the comprehensive framework summarized, we are now 
equipped to ask what ‘treating the young as equals’ means. As I have discussed, 
the question must be answered both diachronically and synchronically. As I isolate 
the specific prescriptions of each principle, I will mention potential similarities and 
differences with the other principles, and will then synthesize the resulting 
guidance for youth policies. My primary focus will be on unemployment and 
prolonged parental dependency (although I will also touch on skill formation and 
relationships of domination). I will not provide a full fledge account of what is 
owed to the young, nor will I attempt to highlight the policy implications of my 
framework in detail. I only discuss a few implications of my principles for 
institutional design. My aim is to emphasize some of the directions the account 
points us towards. I thus aim for the next three sections to serve as transition from 
the theory of Chapters 1-3 to the detailed policy discussions of Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.2 Lifespan! Sufficiency:! Ensuring! Young! People! Have! Enough! to!
be!‘Normal’!!
 
To be above the absolute deprivation threshold, which is set to cover basic human 
needs, young people need to have access to roughly the same basic things as other 
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age groups. When I introduced this first sufficiency threshold, I noted that what 
constitutes basic human deprivation is largely ‘ageless’ – or in Paula Casal 
(2007)’s words basic human deprivation is ‘non-comparative’. For instance, we all 
need shelter, access to food and clothing, and so on regardless of our age. Children 
and elderly people may need more of some goods or they may need goods of better 
quality, but essentially, the young also need access to all of these basic resources 
not to be deprived. So let us move directly to the second component of the lifespan 
sufficiency principle, that people be maintained within the range of opportunities 
that is ‘normal’ for people in their age group to have. On this second view, we owe 
the young the necessary resources for them to enjoy an age-relative normal 
opportunity range.  
 
Young adulthood is the transition from childhood to adulthood. It is a process that 
involves seeking economic and spatial independence from one’s parents. As we 
discussed in Chapter 2, the normal opportunity range describes the “array of 
reasonable life plans” people are likely to make for themselves. The plan to leave 
the family household seems to be among those ‘reasonable’ plans that constitute 
the youth normal opportunity range. So perhaps one of the implications of the 
lifespan sufficiency principle is that governments should help ensure that the young 
are able to gain parental independence at a normal age. It is reasonable for the 
young to want this opportunity, which is key for them to gain autonomy and live 
on their own conception of the good life. We may thus consider it as a crucial and 
legitimate aspiration for young adults to have. This opportunity may also be 
thought as derivatively valuable, because it facilitates other ‘reasonable’ life plans 
young people may have - such as building relationships of their own and having 
children.  
 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit introduce the phenomenon of “planning 
blight” which occurs when people facing uncertainty in terms of income, 
employment or housing put off reasonable plans that they importantly value such 
as founding a family or leaving home (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 69). Perhaps 
such postponement of the reasonable plans that constitute the youth normal range 
should be seen as one of the primary targets of institutions trying to enforce the 
normal opportunity range principle. The opportunity to leave the parental 
household by a normal age can be seen as one of those important opportunities to 
be protected. I use this key opportunity as main example in this section. To shed 
some light to how the age-relative normal opportunity range may be implemented, 
I ask at which age young people should be able to leave the parental household. 
 
119 
For this purpose, I consider a series of possible indicators that may guide us in 
deciding what should count as the ‘fair age’ for a state to ensure the young are able 
to gain independence from their parents. The age for independence may be aligned 
with (1) the average age of independence, (2) the age culturally perceived as 
normal, (3) the age at which middle-class young people are able to leave home, or 
(4) the age at which most young people want to leave home. 
 
First, we can derive the youth normal age from the average age - or the median age 
- at which young people leave home in a given time and place. Indeed, what is 
‘fair’ on the age-relative normal opportunity range principle is for the young to 
have access to the opportunities that are ‘normal’ for a given society at a given 
time. In France and the UK, the average age at which young people leave the 
parental home is about 23,5 years old (Eurostat 2009, 29). If we index the range to 
the empirical average, then it seems that what we owe the young is to ensure that 
they do not have to depend on their families for much longer than age 23,5 in 
France and in the UK. This may have implications for how housing and income 
benefits should be designed.  
 
However, it is important to note that indexing the sufficiency requirement to the 
average age means that, if it became normal for young people to be low-paid or 
poor for longer, and thus dependent for longer, then the State’s obligation would be 
to give young people the opportunity to leave home at the new (later) normal time. 
In Italy, Portugal, Spain and Poland, the average age for people to leave the family 
home is closer to 30 years old (Eurostat 2009, 29). Does that mean that young 
people should have access to the opportunity to leave their home at that later age in 
those countries?  
 
One may worry that the appeal to what is to establish what should be is 
normatively problematic. In Chapter 2, I mentioned the limited normative 
adequacy of the appeal to normality to establish what the fair range is. Nancy 
Jecker (1992), for instance, has raised many criticisms against the PLA for its 
strong reliance on normality: 
 
Although the history of ethics teaches that ought statements cannot be 
derived from is statements, this does little to deter such appeals. For, 
despite ourselves, we tend to think that what is ought to be. The upshot of 
this is that those attuned to the added force that appeals to nature give often 
refer to is statements in order to lend support to ought statements.  
(Jecker 1992, 270) 
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The circular appeal to what is to establish what should be, Jecker argues, pervades 
Daniels’s account and makes it normatively weak. However, as I argued in Chapter 
2, the important added value of Daniels’s appeal to the age-relative opportunity 
range is that it allows comparing what is owed to the young with what is owed to 
elderly people. It would not be fair to deny the elderly the necessary resources to 
live decently (both absolutely, with respect to their humanity, and relatively, with 
respect to their age) in order to provide a more than normal, or ideal, level of 
functioning to the young. Similarly, it allows us to explain the important intuition 
that: if we can either invest in an expensive Scheme A to restore the physical 
mobility of young disabled people, so they may be able to run like any other young 
person, or an expansive Scheme B to restore the physical mobility of disabled 
elderly people, so they may be able to run like they were able to in the past, we 
should favor Scheme A. The appeal to normality is helpful, in other words, to set 
some limits fairly. For these reasons, I accepted the PLA’s age relative normal 
opportunity range as one important aspect of a theory of age-group justice.  
 
Moreover, I showed that Daniels is conscious that under moderate conditions of 
scarcity, we may be able to ensure more than what is empirically normal. If there is 
widespread youth unemployment and precariousness, or during an economic 
recession, what the young are able to do is considerably reduced. So rather than, or 
in addition to, using the empirical norm to set the threshold fairly, we could index 
the normal range on the cultural norm: what people think should be normal at a 
given time in a given society. Even when prolonged dependency is becoming more 
common (in the average sense), it may still not be considered as what ‘should’ 
count as normal.  
 
Louis Chauvel’s (2010) sociological study of French young people is an 
illuminating example in this context. According to Chauvel (2010, 75-78), three 
stages of young adulthood have emerged in young adults’ processes of 
socialization in France. The first stage brings together those under 25 years old and 
involves the first experiences of transition to adulthood. The second stage refers to 
the steps of partial independence through the labour market and occurs between 25 
and 30 years old. This second stage is also characterized by long-term dependence 
on parents for economic support – mainly because wages do not match the costs of 
the housing market. The third stage involves those who failed to gain independence 
in the previous stages. Chauvel identifies this third stage as correlated with a 
situation of never-ending dependence on family (until 35 or even later). This stage 
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is made all the more difficult that economic dependence after 25 years old is 
viewed as abnormal (Chauvel 2010, 76).  
 
So perhaps we could appeal to the stigma attached to the third stage of youth to set 
the age by which the State should ensure that the young are able to leave home. 
The stigma attached to prolonged dependency in Stage 3 is evidence that it is not 
perceived as a normal phenomenon. One underpinning reason for why we may care 
about both the empirical and the cultural norm in a given society is that it may have 
an important impact on the social basis of self-respect. Young people who are not 
able to leave home by the normal age may be suffering from low self-esteem and 
status.  
 
We may thus consider that the normal opportunity range principle requires that 
institutions end the third (abnormal) stage of youth by the age that is considered 
normal at a given time in a given society, as indicated by cultural reactions to it. 
This way, for instance in France, we could consider that experiences of dependence 
before 25 years old are acceptable because no stigma is attached to it. This may 
justify emphasising Stages 2 and 3 of youth unemployment and poverty and 
ignoring dependency in Stage 1 as largely unproblematic. Interestingly, the 
absence of individualised ‘revenu minimum’ (the UK equivalent is the Job 
Seeker’s Allowance) for the young under 25 years old in France was partly 
justified in this manner. It is seen as quite normal for the young under 25 years old 
to be dependent on their parents for housing and shelter, the argument went, so the 
denial of income support to those under the age of 25 is acceptable (Bidadanure 
2012). 
 
Prolonged dependence on one’s family after 25 may be stigmatised, and this may 
indicate that it is not perceived as what should be, but perhaps if we give a new 
phenomenon a generation or two it becomes perceived as normal. For instance, 
nearly half of young adults in the US now return home after having moved out 
(Goldfarb 2014, 54). As Sally Goldfarb claims, while the phenomenon is new, 
expectations have already changed in such way that it is now unrealistic for parents 
to expect their children to become independent upon reaching adulthood (Goldfarb 
2014, 54). We may thus consider that parental dependency is normal and, as a 
result, that institutions do not have to secure such opportunity. After all, in a 
society where it is normal to be dependent for younger, the young’s self-respect 
may not be affected. Both knowing at what age most young people are able to 
leave home and knowing from when it becomes stigmatising to still live with one’s 
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parents are indicative to establish the normal range. However, we may still worry 
that the principle does not push us to question the reality of norms at a given time 
in a given society sufficiently.   
 
We may look at two further indicators to establish the age at which the young 
should be helped to leave home if they want to. We could find out what young 
adults of relatively well-off families are able to do. We may look at the age at 
which they are able to leave home and then try to ensure that the same 
opportunities are available to all. As Furlong and Cartmel (2007) argue, family 
affluence is strongly associated with early departures: “where parents are able to 
subsidize their children financially, early moves tend to be common” (Furlong and 
Cartmel 2007, 62). This may lead us to decide that the young should be able to 
leave home at 20 years old, for instance, even if most cannot until much later, and 
even if dependency on one’s family is not stigmatised until much later. Another 
way to set the threshold would simply be to look at what the young themselves say 
they want. From when do they feel as though living with their parents is not 
adequate anymore? If it turned out that the young expressed a strong frustration 
about not being able to leave home before 25 years old, for instance, then this 
could give us a reason to ensure that the young have access to the opportunity to 
lead an autonomous life before that age.  
 
However, these two indicators (what young people want and what middle class 
young people are able to do) seem to do more than merely flesh out the normal 
opportunity range requirement. All the lifespan sufficiency principle instructs is 
making sure the young have access to the opportunities that are ‘reasonable’ or 
‘normal’ for the young to have in a given society at a given time. The empirical 
and cultural norms seem to be more in line with the requirement. If we are still 
partly dissatisfied with this result and still think it is too indexed with the 
practicalities of the moment, then this may suggest that we have intuitions that are 
not captured by the sufficiency principle itself, and may be explained by the other 
principles. For instance, we may consider that the young should be able to leave 
home early to avoid risks of unwanted parental dependency, which may be 
associated with domination, control, and authority, as I will discuss in Section 4.5 
on synchronic relational equality. In addition, we may worry that the unwanted 
postponement of independency will lead to further postponements over the young’s 
life as a whole. This worry may be better captured by the lifespan efficiency 
principle, as I will discuss in Section 4.3.  
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Besides the opportunity to make plans like leaving home and founding a family, 
the opportunity to educate oneself and to get training is another fundamental 
opportunity for the young to enjoy as part of their normal opportunity range, at 
least in Stage 1 (18-25 years old). Stage 1 is primarily about transiting from 
childhood to adulthood through schooling and training. This requires access to the 
relevant courses, apprenticeships, training and internships. An affordable access to 
such goods is a requirement of lifespan sufficiency since institutions must ensure 
that young individuals have access to the normal opportunity range of their age 
group.  
 
David Cameron and Ed Miliband both claim that young adults should be earning or 
learning (Cooke 2013a, 11). However, the set of opportunities that young people 
have access to, depending on whether they pursue a university education, are not in 
education employment or training, are unemployed with a higher education degree 
or are employed in a precarious positions, are very different. How do we set what 
counts as a normal set of opportunities in light of youth heterogeneity? Further, the 
heterogeneity of youth results from many years of differentiation through unequal 
school attainment. For this reason, we can only say something quite general: the 
young are owed affordable training and educational opportunities, whichever these 
resources are (apprenticeship, higher education, internships, workfare). I will show 
in the next section that the lifespan efficiency principle is more informative for 
discussing educational and training opportunities than the sufficiency principle. 
The diachronic returns of such or such programmes are better indicators for 
deciding which kinds of such opportunities should be secured.  
 
In Section 4.2, I tried to unpack some of the implications of the age-relative normal 
opportunity component of the lifespan sufficiency principle. The normal 
opportunity principle will not necessarily instruct that the young be given the 
required resources to be independent from their families, at least before 25 years 
old. But it will require that they have access to the necessary resources to be 
autonomous after an age where it becomes abnormal for a person to remain 
dependent - that is after 25 years old perhaps, and surely after 30. It will also 
require an access to training and educational resources. The range of what counts 
as adequate training and education can be defined more or less substantially, 
however: on the least radical account, unpaid workfare programmes would count 
as acceptable opportunities, while on more radical accounts young people would 
have access to quality training instead. I have tried to suggest, however, that the 
appeal to norms may give too much weight to the contingencies of the current 
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practices. It may provide useful indications as to what counts as ‘not enough’ in a 
given society at a given time (which is the point of a sufficiency threshold), but it 
does not tell us much about what else we may do for the young, once the quite 
minimal threshold is met. The efficiency principle, I will now show, provides the 
basis for a more ambitious forward-looking politics of youth. By focusing on 
lifespan returns, it elucidates better which opportunities must be secured at a young 
age. 
 
4.3 Lifespan!Efficiency:!Regulating!Diachronic!Clustering!
 
Other than lifespan sufficiency, Daniels’s veiled planners, I have claimed, also 
conclude that institutions must maximize lifespan efficiency. This principle is 
pivotal in establishing what we owe the young. To show why, I first need to 
introduce Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit’s (2007) concepts of clustering of 
disadvantage, corrosive disadvantage and fertile functionings. I aim to show that 
these concepts offer a good basis for deciding what counts as promoting lifespan 
efficiency in the context of youth policy. I argue that the principal way in which 
institutions should promote the lifespan efficiency principle is by preventing the 
lifespan clustering of disadvantage and investing in early fertile functionings. 
Moreover, I show that the strategy of connecting lifespan efficiency with the 
clustering of disadvantage model generates recommendations for youth policies 
that may work towards, rather than against, the egalitarian goal of reducing the 
development of inequalities between life courses.  
4.3.1 Diachronic!clustering!of!disadvantage!
 
According to Wolff and De Shalit (2007), if we were all disadvantaged in one 
respect, then egalitarians would not have much to worry about. What is 
problematic from the point of view of equality, however, is that disadvantage 
clusters in such way that those who are disadvantaged in certain fundamental 
respects, such as the lack of access to an income or the lack of shelter, risk 
becoming disadvantaged in other respects. Their suggestion is that:  
 
If by improving the lives of the least advantaged, governments can achieve 
a general declustering of disadvantage to the point where we can no longer 
say who in society is worst off overall, then they have every reason to 
claim that they have moved society significantly in the direction of 
equality. Moreover, we suggest that a good way of doing this would be to 
search for what we call corrosive disadvantages’ (namely, disadvantage the 
presence of which yields further disadvantages) and ‘fertile functionings’ 
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(i.e. those functionings the securing of which is likely to secure further 
functionings) and to pay special attention to these. 
(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 10) 
 
The clustering of disadvantage phenomenon refers to the empirical fact that one 
serious form of disadvantage rarely comes alone. The least advantaged may, for 
instance, be unemployed, homeless, disabled and not have access to a network of 
emotional support. These forms of disadvantages will most probably not have 
occurred simultaneously. It is likely that they happened one after the other, and 
most probably one as the result of another.  
 
The concept of corrosive disadvantages refers to the forms of disadvantages that 
are most likely to yield further disadvantages. Unemployment, for instance, is 
particularly corrosive because it induces further disadvantages through 
significantly increasing the risk of poverty, exclusion, unhappiness, and isolation. 
Lack of income as such is particularly corrosive too because it may provoke 
homelessness, bad health, stress and depression. Public policies, Wolff and De-
Shalit (2007, 119-128) argue, should be targeted at corrosive disadvantages to 
prevent the phenomenon of clustering of disadvantage. This requires empirical 
work to identify which forms of disadvantage cause which. This would allow us to 
identify which kinds of disadvantage are most corrosive. Preventing the clustering 
of disadvantage by reducing the risks of corrosive disadvantages in the first place, 
or by blocking its clustering, should thus be the key goals of egalitarian public 
policy.  
 
Fertile functionings, by contrast, are “those functionings the securing of which is 
likely to secure further functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 10). Identifying 
these functionings is as important as identifying corrosive disadvantages. While 
identifying corrosive disadvantages serves preventive purposes, identifying fertile 
functionings helps both in preventing initial (and potentially corrosive) 
disadvantages, and in reversing the trend once disadvantage has already clustered. 
Alongside identifying and precluding corrosive disadvantages, implementing 
policies that restore fertile functionings is thus a second way to contribute to 
declustering disadvantage (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 154).  
 
One may think of corrosive disadvantages as mirror images of fertile functionings. 
However, the authors emphasize that in many cases, knowing which disadvantage 
caused the clustering will not directly help in declustering it: 
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‘Causation in’ is not always the same as ‘causation out’. To use a well-
known example, if someone is run over by a steam roller, then the cure is 
not to have the steam roller reverse back over them.  
(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 134) 
 
We may know, for instance, that there is an important correlation between 
homelessness and alcohol addiction and that in many cases the former causes the 
latter. But, while we may learn from this that homelessness is particularly 
corrosive, giving people a home may not solve the addiction problem. This is to 
say that once disadvantage has clustered into many different forms, fixing the 
symptoms as well as fixing the cause itself is often required. Similarly, we should 
not always deduce the cause of a problem from its cure. Aspirin may fix a 
headache, but the cause of the headache is not the lack of aspirin (Wolff and De-
Shalit 2007, 134). Policies aiming at declustering disadvantage should identify how 
some disadvantages cluster systematically into others. But they should also identify 
which functionings are fertile, and while at times such functionings will mirror the 
corrosive disadvantage that cause the clustering, this will not always be the case.  
 
According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2007, 120), the phenomenon of clustering of 
disadvantage is “dynamic” - that is, the accumulation of disadvantages occurs over 
time, as in the example of a person who becomes unemployed, then depressed, 
loses his friends and eventually becomes homeless. The groups that are most at risk 
of such dynamic clustering of disadvantage, the authors argue, are those at whom 
we should aim our preventive policies. Instead of referring to the clustering as 
dynamic, I will refer to it as diachronic. Clustering of disadvantage is almost 
always dynamic, but the word diachronic emphasizes that some may have more 
long-term consequences than others. For instance, child obesity may cluster into 
many further health risks over time: such as increased risks of type 2 diabetes and 
heart diseases. Therefore, we may refer to such clustering as fundamentally 
diachronic.  
 
I want to propose that the goal of lifespan efficiency principle finds an interesting 
expression in this model, especially if we are committed to making our politics of 
age-group justice work within the grain of social justice in broader terms. The 
diachronic clustering model of lifespan sufficiency, I will argue, is particularly 
helpful for understanding the normative significance of youth disadvantage. For 
Wolff and De-Shalit, success is defined as a society which “in effect gives priority 
to the worst off by making it unclear who the worst off are. Some will be less well 
off in one respect, others in a different way, but no one by multiple measures” 
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(Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 131). For the lifespan efficiency principle, success 
means that we live in a society where disadvantage occurring at an early point does 
not cluster into further disadvantages later in life, either because we have prevented 
the first disadvantage from occurring, or because we have blocked its clustering. 
Success also means, more positively, that policies are designed so as to promote a 
high rate of returns on lifespan utility, through early investments in fertile 
functionings. The identification of how early disadvantage clusters into further 
disadvantages over time, or in other words, the identification of which forms of 
disadvantages are most diachronically corrosive, seems to form a first good basis 
for a politics that meets the lifespan efficiency requirement. One could therefore 
argue that, the younger the disadvantage, the worse the quality of life, and thus the 
more imprudent the distribution. 
4.3.2 Toddlers!and!children!as!preOdistributive!priorities!
 
One implication of the lifespan efficiency principle is that investing in children 
makes more sense than investing in young people. Many studies have shown the 
considerable impact of disadvantage in childhood for cognitive, behavioral and 
emotional development. If we are determined to such an important extent by the 
quality of our childhoods, then arguably the lifespan efficiency principle requires 
that we invest resources much earlier than in young adulthood. James Heckman, 
for instance (2013) argues that our institutions should privilege “pre-distributive” 
over “re-distributive” policies. He understands the concept of pre-distribution 
primarily temporally – as policies that privilege early investments in the lifespan 
over compensatory policies once disadvantage has clustered. He justifies such early 
investments by the equity-efficiency equation: public policies, to be effective, must 
be aimed at early years because that is what will promote an equitable start best, 
and because “later intervention means hustling to correct one by one a whole 
cascade of inequalities that accumulate into adolescence and adulthood”, as 
Almagor (2013, 99) sums it up. Early investments in childhood are thus required 
by equity (between life courses), because it gives children a ‘fair start in life’, and 
by lifespan efficiency.  
 
Identifying childhood as the key stage when resources should be invested is both 
intuitive and strongly empirically grounded. It corresponds quite well to the two 
policy goals of identifying corrosive disadvantages (such as childhood 
disadvantage) to minimize its diachronic clustering, and identifying fertile 
functionings (such as adequate cognitive and emotional functionings in childhood) 
to maximize their lifespan returns. So why should we spend much on adults, 
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including young adults, if it is relatively much less efficient than investment in 
childhood? Heckman in fact partly answers this question. Investing in adolescence, 
especially in IQ boosting and problem-solving ability, he argues, is much less 
effective than similar investments earlier on, given that most cognitive skills 
develop in childhood. However, there are still worthwhile investment strategies for 
young people which consist in boosting other kinds of skills:  
 
social and personality skills are another story. They are malleable into the 
early twenties, although early formation of these skills is still the best 
policy because they boost learning. Adolescent strategies should boost 
motivation, personality, and social skills through mentoring and 
workplace-based education.  
(Heckman 2013, 38) 
 
Heckman thus supports relatively light investments in young adulthood, primarily 
in behavioural skills, while he favours extensive investments in childhood on 
grounds of fairness and efficiency.  
 
Carol Dweck (2013) ran a series of psychological tests on adolescents that seem to 
give some more weight to the view that investments in behavioural skills tend to 
have a positive impact on young people. She simply taught a group of teenagers 
that their brains were malleable, that their neurones formed new connections as 
they learned, and that such processes enhanced their intellect. As a result of this 
simple intervention, the students started getting better grades, while the students in 
the control group saw no improvements. The main reason for the positive result, 
she hypothesizes, is that the motivation of the students in the first group was 
enhanced after learning the simple scientific fact (Dweck 2013, 71). This result, 
Dweck believes, gives at least some support to Heckman’s view that adolescent 
policy strategies should aim at boosting behavioural and motivational skills. On 
such an account, while the lifespan efficiency principle would require us to invest 
in the development of ‘cognitive skills’ primarily in childhood, what we would 
owe adolescents and young adults is to develop their ‘social and personality skills’.  
 
Investing in cognitive developments in childhood may well be the most cost-
effective way to allocate resources. It may also be true that investing in cognitive 
skills improvements for adolescents and young adults will be expensive and 
produce smaller returns. There may be some efficiency-based reasons to favour 
motivational and work-based (or workfare) programmes for the young. 
Nevertheless, there are very strong lifespan-efficiency-based reasons to believe that 
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investments in young adulthood (beyond spending on personality and social skills) 
are also crucial pre-distributive policies, as I will now show.  
4.3.3 In!defence!of!prudential!investments!in!young!adults!
 
Young adulthood remains a fairly early phase to effectively tackle corrosive 
disadvantages and prevent its clustering. Youth unemployment increases risks of 
further negative experiences across the lifespan. The good news is, if young 
experiences of unemployment risk generating further experiences of 
unemployment later in life, the converse is also true: experiences of employment at 
a young age produce positive outcomes in terms of employment rates and wages in 
the future (European Commission 2012, 9). In other words, while youth 
unemployment is corrosive and may provoke a clustering of disadvantage over the 
lifespan, employment at a young age increases one’s chances of having jobs later 
in life and of earning a good wage.  
 
The quality of the job opportunities in question also has an important impact on life 
courses. Guy Standing worries that many jobs may generate negative outcomes in 
the long run. Such bad jobs may involve: a mismatch between a person’s skills and 
interests and the job in question (as is the case for unemployed graduates who 
cannot find a job in their field); no wage (as is the case for some work placements 
where the only income earned is the JSA); a job that does not pay a decent wage; a 
precarious contract (for instance, fixed-term contracts, zero-hours contracts, part-
time contracts, or short contracts with no promise of employment at the end); a job 
that is demeaning, or boring and feels pointless.  
Of course, this is not an exhaustive list. Moreover, some of these features may not 
be sufficient for a job to be detrimental to a young person’s interests. For instance, 
a part-time contract may be just what one may want to accommodate other life 
plans, and an unpaid work placement or training may also be a stepping stone to a 
good job. However, it is clear that precariousness at a young age, when it involves 
several of the above, is fundamentally imprudent because the “earlier someone can 
define their skills and ambitions, the longer they have to let them roll, 
accumulating size and power. If early precious years are spent groping around in 
precarious jobs, the capacity to develop will be permanently impaired” (Standing 
2011, 78).   
Let us take the recent example of a young biology graduate doing an unpaid work 
placement in Poundland to keep her JSA entitlement (Malik 2011). The reason why 
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Shiv Malik argues that there is something particularly wrong with this example is 
that it is a bad job in many of the respects mentioned above: the individual in 
question had graduated from a higher education course but could not find a job and 
was compelled to accept a work placement without a wage, without a promise of a 
contract after the placement, and without experience gains because she had worked 
in sales already. The long-term negative effects of this kind of bad job are 
consequent: “if an unemployed person takes a job for which they are unsuited it 
has a negative effect on their long-term earnings and capacity to work” (Standing 
2013, 25). On lifespan efficiency grounds what young people need is not any job, 
but rather opportunities that will have positive returns over their lifespans. 
 
Similarly, Mike Rose (2013) complains that policies aimed at young disadvantaged 
adults are overwhelmingly about “soft skills” that have to do with behaviour - such 
as perseverance, individual responsibility and motivation (as apparent in workfare 
programmes) - and neglect “hard skills” - such as literacy, numeracy, and problem-
solving. The risks of such an approach, he argues, is that programmes aimed at 
young people and adolescents are likely to be built around “un-engaging tasks or 
exercises” (Rose 2013, 51). Spending on hard skills for the young may be more 
costly than for children for relatively lower returns. Still, investments in young 
adulthood will mitigate risks of diachronic clustering of disadvantage given that the 
transition from schooling to work has a significant impact on the life course too.  
 
Ideally, perhaps, meeting the requirement of lifespan efficiency would mean 
eliminating poverty and inequalities in childhood and creating a society where very 
few compensatory redistributive programmes were needed. But in a society with 
unequal young adults facing high risks of unemployment, there is much need to 
seek to prevent further clustering of disadvantage later on. In other words, 
investments in young adults should still count as pre-distributive policies. 
Moreover, the fact that young adulthood is such a significant transitional moment 
in our lives means that important investments in young adults are always likely to 
be needed.  If risks of youth unemployment are fairly high, for instance, the young 
will still need to be assisted, even if important resources were devoted to their early 
years as children. The further fact that young people are likely to be or become 
parents of young children themselves offers another (indirect) lifespan-efficiency 
based reason to focus on young people.  
 
Furthermore, as Lelac Almagor remarks (2013, 103), it is unlikely that we will ever 
design a society without disparities between children - and hence without resulting 
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life course inequalities. Direct early investments in childhood are thus insufficient 
and must be complemented by investments in young adulthood. From the point of 
view of complete lives equity, it gives a second chance to those who have not 
benefited from suitable support in their early years. From the point of view of 
lifespan efficiency, there are still some lifespan returns associated with investments 
in older age groups, even if they are smaller than the returns to investments in 
young children. One can thus reject the solely children-centred focus and argue that 
there is a strong case to be made for investments on young adults on grounds of 
lifespan efficiency; and so, beyond investments in behavioural skills and without, 
of course, denying that investments in childhood are also strongly required.  
 
The social investment model helps demonstrate what this might mean for social 
policy. This refers to the idea of investing in future and younger generations. That 
is, primarily investing in childhood through family policies, labour market policies 
that include training for the young unemployed and for the unemployed in general, 
and also educational policies as a key investment strategy. Rita Nikolai (2012, 93), 
for instance, distinguishes social investment policies from compensatory social 
policies which are primarily aimed at elderly people. Social investments are pre-
distributive, in Heckman’s sense, while compensatory policies are redistributive. 
But social investment policies are not just aimed at children and young people, 
directly. They are also aimed at parents (family policy including programmes for 
gender equality for instance, given that economic insecurity fuels child poverty) 
and at future generations (infrastructures, sovereign wealth funds, research). So this 
seems to be an economic model that emulates the lifespan efficiency pre-
distributive proposal more inclusively. 
 
Actions necessary to de-cluster diachronic disadvantage from a young age also 
works towards the goal of reducing inequalities between social classes over their 
complete lives. The reduction of inequalities between life courses comes as an 
outcome of lifespan efficiency. By appealing to Wolff and De-Shalit’s vocabulary 
of clustering and declustering, I thus highlight a suitably egalitarian way to apply 
lifespan efficiency in an otherwise unequal world. I suggested that making 
institutions more prudentially efficient would not only be compatible with but 
would also promote the reduction of inequalities between life courses. I have 
suggested, with Heckman, that pre-distributing resources towards children works to 
equalize starts in life and would tend to reduce the diachronic development of 
inequalities between life courses. But investments in young adults have the same 
effects. 
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To take the example of France, there are at least three variables that constrain the 
social attainments of new cohorts of young adults: inherited wealth, education 
(which Chauvel argues has become more necessary but less sufficient for social 
success), and family economic support (Chauvel 2010, 75). While in the 1970s the 
economic participation of the parents was not crucial for the young, Chauvel 
argues, in today’s France, young people have very little chance of success without 
economic support from their families. These processes of fragmentation along 
educational, family support and inherited wealth lines have created important 
divisions among the young. Young people have to go through the same institutions 
but their social advantage makes them more or less armed to face adversity. These 
first experiences have a fundamental impact on future attainments. What this 
analysis shows is that quality education, wealth, and income are three key factors 
to focus on if we are to limit the clustering of disadvantage and, as an outcome, 
reduce inequalities between life courses. The basic capital and basic income 
proposals I introduce in Chapter 5 aim precisely to radically redistribute assets and 
income (respectively) in a way that would reduce the fragmentation of youth 
through declustering diachronic disadvantage.  
 
In Section 4.3, I hope to have shown that Wolff and De-Shalit’s focus on 
controlling the clustering of disadvantage, if made more explicitly diachronic, can 
serve as a good basis for promoting the prudential requirement of lifespan 
efficiency, in a way that also reduces the development of social inequalities in 
general over life courses. Adequate youth policies, from the lifespan efficiency 
point of view, will prevent corrosive disadvantages from clustering in the first 
place, as well as invest in fertile functionings - through investing in hard skills, 
quality training, and through providing the young with the wealth or income 
required for a successful transition to adulthood.  
 
4.4 Approximate!Cohort!Equality:!Mitigating!Scarring!Effects!!!
4.4.1 Treating!young!cohorts!equally:!three!problems!
 
It is not an easy task to ensure that the young, as a birth cohort, enjoy roughly the 
same burdens to benefits than their co-existing generations. Any attempt to do 
justice to the young in this sense will run into at least three problems: uncertainty, 
incommensurability, and priority. First, there is the important problem of 
uncertainty. We may predict that the young will have worse or better lives on 
average than their parents. But such approximations stand on weak foundations. 
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Given that many unexpected events may occur, such as an energy-related event, 
technological discovery, or a war, it is difficult to know which generation will 
actually be worse off than another.  
 
Second is the problem of incommensurability. The young as a birth cohort may be 
worse off in some respects - for instance in terms of their job prospects over their 
lifetime. But they will also probably be better off in other respects - for instance, 
they will be in better health on average, live longer lives, and have access to many 
more technological resources. In establishing what counts as treating a cohort 
equally, how should we weight different kinds of resources one against the other? 
 
The third problem – priority – is that it is not clear why we should be too 
concerned with the goal of approximate cohort equality when there are so many 
more urgent problems of justice. This problem is not as important in the context of 
justice between co-existing generations than it is in the context of asking what we 
owe to future generations. When it comes to co-existing generations, the question 
becomes whether we should help those who are worse off now, or those who are 
likely to be worse off over their complete lives.  
 
One way to solve the incommensurability issue is to contend that there are a 
number of things that matter to a life well lived, and that we cannot fully 
compensate some important kinds of goods with others. One way to treat young 
cohorts adequately, therefore, could be to make sure that across each important 
aspect of their life, such as access to decent job opportunities, they fare 
approximately as well as the prior generation. For instance, even if the young fare 
better in health-related terms than the prior generation, if they fare worse in terms 
of job opportunities they could still be treated unfairly. I will put forward an 
argument for basic income or basic capital on this basis in Chapter 5. This 
approach is helpful for designing policies because we can consider that polices that 
are concerned with income, jobs, and pensions must take into account matters of 
cohortal equality and sustainability, regardless of the cohortal distribution of other 
goods.  
 
One way around the priority problem is to follow the lifespan efficiency 
requirement. Social investments of the kind described in the previous section have 
an important cohortal dimension. For instance, if Generation 1 (G1) invests in 
programmes aimed at alleviating child poverty in G2, this will also determine the 
quality of life of G2 when they themselves are parents and grand-parents. This 
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means, for instance, that G3 and G4 (children and grand-children of G2) will have 
to spend less on its elderly population than they would have had to otherwise. But 
when G1 invests in G2, they contribute to redistributing resources intra-
generationally, towards the poorest parents in G1. In conclusion, pre-distributive 
social investments may work to reduce risks of intergenerational transmission of 
poverty and inequalities between cohorts at the same time. It helps solve the 
priority problem because it breaks the false dilemma between assisting the worse 
off now and promoting cohortal equality. 
 
One way around the uncertainty problem is to focus on minimizing risks. If we 
cannot predict what will happen for sure, we can anticipate a certain number of 
risks, so we may invest in research to confirm those risks and act upon them. When 
it becomes a concern that younger generations will be disproportionately burdened 
by debt, or when the lifetime job prospects of the young seem endangered, then 
there is scope to take particular care in reducing such risks as a requirement of 
approximate cohort equality. Treating the young as equals, in this sense, would be 
about mitigating risks that may affect their lifetime prospects unduly. Here I want 
to focus particularly on one kind of risk: the scarring effects of youth 
unemployment, precarious jobs and poverty over a lifespan. I will show that there 
is scope for striving to substantially mitigate such risks on grounds of approximate 
cohort equality. The call for mitigating such scaring effects does not run into the 
three problems pre-identified: the incommensurability problem is avoided because 
I focus exclusively on young people’s long-term employment and income 
prospects; the priority problem is avoided because the young who are likely to be 
among the worse off over their complete lives are also those who are currently 
among the worse off; and the uncertainty problem is addressed by focusing on the 
mitigation of ‘risks’. 
4.4.2 The!scarring!effects!of!youth!unemployment!
 
Many sociologists and economists contend that youth unemployment brings with it 
lifelong scarring effects for the concerned cohorts (Gregg and Tominey 2005, 
Chauvel 2010, Khan 2010, Standing 2011). Because of these effects, early 
experiences of unemployment and precariousness are problematic from the point 
from the point of view not only of lifespan efficiency, but also of approximate 
cohort equality. This discussion has many similarities with the previous discussion 
of diachronic clustering of disadvantage. The two analyses reinforce each other.  
However, scarring effects apply to a birth cohort as a whole, thus creating risks for 
approximate cohort equality. 
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In France, Chauvel argues that there is a generational “fracture”: those born in the 
1980s are experiencing specific trends which will render them vulnerable in the 
long term. In 1970, the gap between the earnings of the 25-30 and the 50-69 age 
groups was 18%. For the past ten years, the difference is of 50% (Chauvel 2010, 
79). Moreover, over the past twenty years, the wages of the youngest workers have 
stagnated while there was a 20% increase in the wages of older workers (Chauvel 
2010, 79). The problem here, according to Chauvel, is that the citizens who are 55 
years old today were relatively better off than their seniors when they were young 
and are now better off than the young: “The generational gaps result from double 
gains and double pains” (Chauvel 2010, 79).  
 
Scarring effects work as follows. When jobs are scarce, new entrants have to 
accept lower wages in order to find a job; then there is a lack of a catch-up on 
earnings, so they remain low because of the point at which they entered the labor 
market. Similarly, the lack of valued work experiences causes a decline in 
ambitions, and self-confidence, which in turn sends negative signals to employers. 
This leads to further experiences of unemployment, a slowdown in job progression, 
and it explains why such workers often suffer from low earnings. Paul Gregg and 
Emma Tominey (2005) conducted a study on the wage scar of youth 
unemployment in the UK. They found a significant wage penalty of early 
experiences of unemployment with long lasting effects, especially when the 
individual surveyed had been unemployed several times. Those who were 
unemployed during youth suffered a wage penalty of up to 13-21% in their forties 
(Gregg and Tominey 2005, 500-506). Similarly, Lisa Khan’s study of graduates in 
the US shows that “the labor market consequences of graduating from college in a 
bad economy are large, negative and persistent” (Khan 2010, 303). She also finds 
negative correlations with wages and occupational attainments. As a result of this 
series of scarring effects, “when the difficulties disappear, the cohorts who faced 
these problems continue to suffer from long-term consequences of past handicaps” 
(Chauvel 2010, 84).  
 
The long-term economic consequences of youth unemployment are likely to be 
supplemented by another set of negative outcomes. Standing (2011) explains the 
unhappiness, dissatisfaction and eventually violence of some youth groups by the 
psychological affects that arise from the discrepancy between what they feel they 
are entitled to and what they end up getting. Because they studied more than their 
parents, for instance, they expect at least similar jobs. Such feelings of frustration 
and insecurity are likely to persist over the lifespan or to transmute into other forms 
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of resentment and unhappiness. Another long-term consequence affecting the 
‘jilted’ generation is disengagement from political participation and political power 
(Howker and Malik 2010, Standing 2011). According to Chauvel, young people in 
the elites respond to these challenges by dedicating most of their energy to their 
own careers; the middle class oscillates between lack of participation and short 
periods of activism; and the less educated and lower classes become hostile to 
politics. The result is that the young do not exist as a political force. This political 
disengagement is ramified by the physical absence of the young from the structures 
of political representation (Chauvel 2010, 87), as I will discuss in Chapter 6. 
 
Because of these scarring effects, young people who are socialized in contexts of 
job scarcity are unlikely to be ‘naturally’ compensated later in their lifespan. On 
the contrary, there is a risk that the birth cohort of current young people will do 
worse than the previous cohort over their complete lives, at least in terms of their 
relative job (and related) prospects. Scarring effects make it harder to achieve 
approximate cohort equality for cohorts who have experienced a particularly high 
rate of unemployment when young, as is the case for the current cohort of young 
people in many OECD countries. If a generation is scarred by abnormal levels of 
precariousness at a young age, there are reasons to worry that the long-term 
prospects of the cohort will be substantially affected by this. An important 
precaution to take thus seems to be fundamentally in line with the lessons taken 
from the lifespan efficiency discussion: we must attempt to preclude scarring 
effects such that, for the current cohort of young people, even if rates of 
unemployment are higher than when their parents were the same age, their lifetime 
prospects are not destined to be significantly lowered. Treating the young equally, 
as a birth cohort, would require a least mitigating the scarring effects that early 
poverty and unemployment may provoke. 
 
4.5 Synchronic!Relational!Equality:!Ensuring!the!Young!Are!Able!to!
Stand!As!Equals!
 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, inequalities in rank, status and power are to be 
approached with great suspicion. This does not mean that any relationship 
involving hierarchies will be objectionable from an egalitarian standpoint. But it 
does mean that, to fully understand the demands of equality, egalitarians must 
“investigate the specific respects in which egalitarian relationships must be free 
from regimentation by considerations of rank or status” (Scheffler 2005, 18). What 
I have shown in Chapter 3 is that relational inequalities between age groups are no 
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different. They should be approached with the same suspicion. This section 
considers what the synchronic relational equality principle has to say about what 
counts as an equal treatment of the young. 
 
First, in order to stand as equals without the risk of entering, or staying, in 
wrongful relationships of inequality, young people need to have access to some of 
the same basic resources that I identified as required by the lifespan sufficiency 
principle. Indeed, it follows from the goal that no one should have to alienate one’s 
freedom from domination to survive, that we must ensure that people have access 
to sufficient resources to avoid or escape domination throughout their lives.  
 
However, there is an important distinction to be made between the requirements of 
lifespan sufficiency and  synchronic relational equality. While parental dependency 
on one’s parents in Stage 1 of youth may be perfectly adequate to satisfy the 
sufficiency principle, the synchronic relational principle encourages us to question 
relationships of dependency between young adults and their parents. If we are 
worried about relational domination, then we should ask whether there is 
something problematic about the fact that young adults may live under the 
authority and control of their parents, being potentially infantilized and patronised. 
The assumption that we can trust parents with their young-adult children is 
understandable, but the fact that young adults are expected to depend on their 
parents’ support for survival has to be questioned. On synchronic relational 
egalitarianism, we may want to make sure that there are exit options available 
earlier than 25 years old, whereas as I have shown earlier, it is not clear why this 
would be required from the appeal to lifespan sufficiency. The synchronic 
relational equality principle can potentially justify granting the young more 
independence than the sufficiency principle. 
 
The young may be forced into taking pathways that they do not want as a pre-
condition of their staying in the family home. At worse, they may be severely 
abused or neglected by their families and then have to turn to further abusive or 
exploitative relationships to survive. One extreme example is that of young 
homeless people in the US. A recent study by the Williams Institute at UCLA 
showed that at least 40% of young homeless people in the US are LGBT (Durso 
and Gates 2012, 2). The most common reasons why they were homeless (or at risk 
of becoming homeless) were that: they had ran away because of family rejection 
and stigma (46%); they had been forced out by their parents because of their sexual 
preferences (43%); they had been sexually, physically or emotionally abused at 
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home (32%); or they had been financially or emotionally neglected by their 
families (14%) (Durso and Gates 2012, 4). Moreover, homelessness itself increases 
risks of sexual exploitation and dependence on an abusive partner: 42% of young 
LGBT homeless surveyed have been subject to sexual exploitation at some point, 
and a third of young LGBT homeless young people surveyed had been or were in 
an situation of domestic/partner abuse (Durso and Gates 2012, 10). Studies also 
show that approximately 30% of the young homeless population in urban areas in 
the UK are LGBT (O'Connor and Mollov 2001, 15).  
 
This example is extreme and surely not generally applicable as an account of the 
risks associated with relationships of dependency between young adults and their 
parents. However, it shows that parental control, authority and domination in 
relation to adult children, just like any other relationship of dependency, must meet 
a certain number of criteria to be unproblematic. This case also speaks against the 
‘normalization’ of young people staying with their families until age 25 and urges 
us to acknowledge that, since not all young people can be expected to depend on 
their families for survival, we must provide exit options for young people. This is a 
first sense in which we may respond to the question of what it means to treat the 
young as equals on synchronic relational grounds. We must ensure that they are 
able to lead lives free from domination or other wrongful forms of relational 
inequalities, which entails that they be able to leave the parental home when 
necessary. 
 
Another important aspect of the synchronic relational response to what we owe the 
young is that they must be recognized as equals in their communities. I have 
already suggested that control and authority within the family context may itself be 
questionable, but we should also be concerned when other age groups do not 
respect the young - if they are despised, demonized and patronised. In his report on 
the stereotyping of young people, Maurice Devlin (2006) led focus groups with 
young people in Ireland and concluded that there was strong agreement among 
young people that they were stereotyped and treated unequally by the population in 
general: “Overall, the message emerging from the focus groups is that, while there 
are certainly exceptions, the young people see their institutional relationships with 
adults as for the most part unequal, troubled, and rooted in stereotypical ideas 
about their attributes and abilities” (Devlin 2006, 65).  
 
The persistence of such negative stereotyping of young people not only in Ireland, 
but also in England and in the US, Maurice Devlin argues, is itself “a diminution of 
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their status” and is therefore problematic from the point of view of equality. 
Particular attention must thus be paid to stereotyping and to labels used to refer to 
young people. This may apply to the way they are represented in the media, the 
way they are referred to by politicians and treated by the police, social workers, 
police officers, JSA advisers, trainers, etc. A conclusion of both Devlin’s focus 
groups and qualitative analysis of media reporting on young people is that the 
media plays an important negative role in such feelings of exclusion: “stereotyping 
young people in very negative ways, ‘tarring them with the same brush’ by 
constantly associating ‘youth’ with crime, deviance, delinquency, drug and alcohol 
problems, sexual promiscuity and general disorderliness” (Devlin 2006, 64). 
 
If we are to ever live in a community of synchronic relational equals, older age 
groups must relate to young people with a presumption of equality. Young people 
must be appreciated in their status as equal citizens and treated with respect. The 
political sphere is a particularly important and symbolic context from which some 
groups may become marginalised. Particular attention should be taken in ensuring 
that the young are able to voice their concerns. For this reason, Chapter 6 is 
devoted to the introduction of youth quotas in parliaments.  
 
4.6 Conclusions:!Four!Responses!!
 
In this chapter, after having brought together the key requirements of equality 
through time, I discussed the implications of the principles for the question of what 
it means to treat the young equally. I argued that while the principles sometimes 
implied that they ought to be treated the same as others, at other times they implied 
that they had to be treated substantially differently. Young people are treated 
equally if they are acknowledged as relational equals by their communities; if they 
are able to stand free from domination; if institutions ensure access to sufficient 
resources to enjoy age-relative normal opportunities; and if institutions pre-
distribute resources so as to promote a life of good quality and block the diachronic 
clustering of disadvantage and scarring effects that undermine their lifespan 
prospects, also creating unequal life courses. The four paragraphs below 
summarize my argument. 
 
Drawing on the lifespan sufficiency requirement, I argued that the young must be 
sustained above two levels. First, they must have access to the required resources 
to be free from basic human deprivation. This fairly minimal threshold, I claimed, 
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consists of what any human requires, regardless of age, to survive. Second, more 
substantially and differentially, I suggested that institutions must make it possible 
for young people to enjoy the normal opportunity range that young people in their 
society at a given time are meant to enjoy (for instance, that they must be able to be 
independent from their families from 25 years old in France). An important 
concept I appealed to as part of this discussion was Wolff and De-Shalit’s planning 
blight - the normal projects and plans (such as leaving home) that young people are 
unable to carry through by lack of means. I highlighted some limits with the appeal 
to empirical normality to establish what should count as a fair treatment of the 
young. The appeal to normality may provide useful indications as to what counts as 
‘not enough’ in a given society at a given time, but it does not tell us much about 
what else we may do for the young, once the quite minimal threshold is met.  
 
I then spent a substantial part of Chapter 4 discussing the implications of the 
lifespan efficiency principle, which I showed is particularly informative and 
ambitious. The lifespan efficiency principle points towards pre-distributive policies 
and is thus relevant when it comes to asking how the young should be treated. I 
drew on Wolff and De-Shalit to put forward the following interpretation: 
maximizing lifespan efficiency requires investing resources early in the lifespan to 
both prevent diachronic clustering of disadvantage and to promote positive 
diachronic returns. I argued that the younger the disadvantage the worse the quality 
of life, and thus the more imprudent the distribution. I showed that one implication 
of this view, however, was that our pre-distributive effort should be aimed 
primarily at children and not at young adults. In defence of prudential investments 
in young adults, I showed how important a negative impact youth unemployment, 
bad jobs and poverty can have for young people’s life courses, and argued that the 
label ‘pre-distributive policies’ could thus also be applied to some youth policies. I 
also argued that the strategy of regulating diachronic clustering from a young age 
could also be expected to work towards the reduction of social inequalities between 
life courses.  
 
Third, I discussed the implications of the approximate cohort equality principle for 
what we owe the young. I pointed to the triple problem of uncertainty, priority and 
incommensurability that arises when taking a complete life approach. I proposed 
solutions to avoid these three problems: adopting a focus on how well the young 
are likely to fare on one single aspect of their life (to solve the incommensurability 
problem); attempting to promote policies that are contributing to several co-
existing generations at the same time (such as social investments strategies); and 
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focusing on minimizing risks (as a limited answer to the uncertainty problem). 
Cohort equality will always be a very approximate outcome, but I argued that one 
implication of the cohortal injunction is to mitigate the risk that poverty, 
unemployment or precariousness at a young age may scar cohorts who are 
socialised in a context of job scarcity. I concluded that we must attempt to preclude 
scarring effects such that, even if they are subjected to higher rates of 
unemployment than the previous generation at the same age, their lifetime 
prospects will not be substantially undermined over their lives as a whole. Such 
implications are substantially in line with the implications of the lifespan efficiency 
principle.  
 
Finally, I discussed the potential implications of synchronic relational equality. I 
highlighted four main implications. First, the implications of synchronic relational 
equality are likely to overlap a great deal with the requirements of lifespan 
sufficiency. Second, the relational approach urges us to worry about the kinds of 
relationships young adults may have with their parents when they depend on them 
for financial support. This gives some weight to the view that it is important to 
secure the opportunity for independence from a young adult age. This argument 
will be particularly important to my case for basic income in Chapter 5. I also 
pointed to the important idea that we must ensure that older age groups relate to the 
young as equals and that the young are respected rather than demonised, 
stereotyped and marginalised. I suggested that this meant that we should be 
cautious about the way young people are portrayed in the media, but also about the 
ways in which they are treated by the police, and other state officials. I also 
suggested that the acknowledgment that the young were afforded in the political 
sphere could also play an important part in the symbolic recognition that the young 
are political equals. These conclusions play an important part in my argument for 
the introduction of youth quotas in parliament in Chapter 6. 
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PART!II!–!POLICIES!
 
 
In Part II, I now discuss two public policies in light of the theoretical framework 
set out in Part I. In Chapter 5, I consider the radical egalitarian proposal of 
enforcing a right to unconditional cash. I ask when the unconditional payment 
should be made: in a lump sum at the beginning of people’s adult lives – as 
proponents of the basic capital grant argue; or in regular instalments throughout 
people’s adult lives – as proponents of the basic income guarantee claim. I show 
that my previous conclusions on equality through time and justice between 
overlapping generations allow us to see the basic income versus basic capital 
debate in a new light. In Chapter 6, I take issue with the political marginalisation of 
young people and evaluate a policy proposal for youth quotas in parliaments. Both 
chapters start with an extensive introduction to the problems in question. 
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CHAPTER!5!O !BASIC!INCOME!VERSUS!BASIC!CAPITAL:!A!
TEMPORAL!PERSPECTIVE!
 
 
The past three decades have seen the elaboration of a vast body of literature14 on 
basic income – a policy proposal Philippe Van Parijs referred to as a “disarmingly 
simple idea” (Van Parijs 1992, 3). It consists of a monthly cash allowance given to 
all citizens, regardless of personal desert and without means-test “to provide them 
with a standard of living above the poverty line” (Wright 2006, xi). For instance, in 
the UK, basic income would be set at about £800 per person per month to ensure 
individuals are free from poverty.15 Basic income proponents have identified, 
evaluated and deconstructed many potential and actual objections against this 
radical proposal. They have identified the various benefits basic income (BI) could 
have both for society as a whole and for specific disadvantaged groups. For 
instance, proponents of BI have discussed whether women, workers in poor 
countries, and the unemployed could particularly benefit from its implementation.16  
 
Showing that a specific group would benefit from unconditional monthly cash 
transfers is not sufficient or indeed necessary for a successful defence of basic 
income. However, if BI is likely to be detrimental to specific vulnerable groups, its 
case will inevitably be weakened. On the contrary, when we are able to show that a 
specific vulnerable group - for instance unemployed women in abusive 
relationships - would benefit from the policy proposal, we strengthen the case for 
BI. And yet, very few articles focus specifically on young people and how they 
would benefit from an unconditional basic income. The age and generation-specific 
arguments for and against BI are in fact still largely unexplored. 17 
                                                      
14 For instance see: Philippe Van Parijs (1991, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2006), Stuart White 
(2003, 2006, 2007), Louise Haagh (2007), Karl Widerquist (2013). The following edited 
books also offer an extensive series of essays on basic income: Dowding, De Wispelaere 
and White (eds) (2003); Erik Olin Wright (ed) (2006), Vanderborgth and Gosseries (eds) 
(2012), Widerquist, Noguera, Vanderborght and De Wispelaere (eds) (2013). 
15 The amount considered varies from one proposal to another. Philippe Van Parijs (1995), 
for instance, calls for a maximized unconditional income in his ideal theory of real 
libertarianism, but has also pragmatically defended the introduction of a much lower basic 
income. For instance, he recently put forward a proposal or a euro-dividend of 200 euros 
per months (Bidadanure 2013). In this chapter, I focus on a basic income set above the 
poverty threshold. In the UK, for an individual without dependent children the poverty 
threshold is set at £500 per month after housing costs or £700 before housing costs 
(MacInnes et al. 2013, 12). So the monthly basic income would have to be set above this 
level at the very least for an individual without children.  
16 For instance for discussions of the positive impact of basic income on gender equality, 
see Anca Gheaus (2008), Ingrid Robeyns (2008), John Baker (2008). 
17 It is informative to see that in a recent anthology of basic income edited by Widerquist, et 
al. (2013) (featuring 74 key texts) there are no articles directly on intergenerational justice, 
age-group justice, cohort justice, young people, or the elderly and basic income. One of the 
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Despite the lack of attention to the generational dimension of BI, I think that there 
are at least two crucial reasons why more research on the youth-based arguments 
for basic income is needed. First, the primary objective of BI is to break the 
correlation between unemployment and under-employment, on the one hand, and 
poverty, on the other. Because they are disproportionally affected by 
unemployment, the young seem to constitute evident candidates for a basic income. 
Moreover, as Armano and Murgia (2014) argue: “Young people are far more likely 
than other age groups to be employed in precarious jobs, independently of their 
education and skills” (Armano and Murgia 2014). Because young people, both as 
an age group and as a cohort, are particularly vulnerable to the harmful conditions 
basic income proponents object to – such as poverty, unemployment, and exclusion 
- they need to be more directly acknowledged and emphasized as potential 
recipients of unconditional cash.  
 
Second, as I have already highlighted, current political discourses on youth are 
largely dominated by anti-benefits attitudes. Young people seem to be considered 
as essentially undeserving and their legitimacy as welfare recipients is always 
questioned. For this reason, putting forward a defence of unconditional cash for the 
young goes against the wind. And yet, because anti-benefits discourses on the 
young are exacerbated versions of the arguments against cash benefits in general, 
the youth-based case for basic income may operate on the same level as Van 
Parijs’s famous Malibu surfers’ example (Van Parijs 1991). The logical structure 
of Van Parijs’s argument is to demonstrate that if even the apparently 
individualistic and ‘useless’ Malibu surfers should be entitled to a basic income, 
everyone else should be entitled to unconditional cash. Just like showing that even 
surfers should be fed is a strategic way of showing that everyone should be fed, 
showing that the young - who are perceived as lazy and individualistic - should be 
provided with sufficient means to live a decent life has implications for what we 
owe the more ‘deserving’ remainder of the population.  
 
There is another way to help the young through cash. Instead of delivering a 
continuous income monthly to people, we could give it all in one go, at the 
beginning of their adult lives. Basic Capital (BC), which consists in a substantial 
grant that all citizens receive in one lump-sum in early adulthood “sufficiently 
large that all young adults would be significant wealth holders” (Wright 2006, xii), 
                                                                                                                                         
only existing papers directly on age groups and basic income is Robin Blackburn’s paper 
on a Global pension and Youth Grant in Basic income studies (2011), although he does not 
engage with the intergenerational justice literature. 
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seems like a more specifically youth-oriented solution. Ackerman and Alstott 
introduced the policy in their book The Stakeholder Society (1999) and developed a 
specific proposal: “At age 21, as each liberal citizen steps forward to begin her 
adult life, she should receive a stake of $80,000 from the government (…) The 
money is hers to spend or invest. She may go to college, or not. She may save for a 
house or a rainy day – or blow her money in Las Vegas” (Ackerman and Alstott 
2006b, 45). Julian Le Grand and David Nissan (2003) put forward a similar basic 
capital project that is more sensitive to the UK context than Ackerman and 
Alstott’s proposal (which was largely developed for the US). 18  
 
BI and BC are similar in a number of respects. They share “a common heritage and 
set of objectives” - as Guy Standing (2006, 182) argues. They both provide people 
with financial assets unconditionally: they are delivered without means test and can 
be used to pursue any ends. They are both designed to enhance real freedom and 
foster a more egalitarian society, without directly challenging capitalism as a mode 
of production. Proponents of both policies share egalitarian commitments and see 
in their proposals a way to prevent the production of unequal outcomes by making 
sure those who do not inherit wealth have access to sufficient means to live good 
lives. They can also both be seen as having a strong intergenerational dimension: 
“stakeholding and basic income are universalistic programs, responding to the right 
of each individual citizen to his share in the achievements of past generations” 
(Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 45).  
 
Basic capital is thus an alternative to basic income from within the paradigm of 
unconditional cash and for this reason, it has largely been seen as the “main 
competitor” to basic income (Dowding, Wispelaere, and White 2003). This chapter 
will therefore ask which of the two policies is most relevant if we adopt a temporal 
egalitarian perspective. This debate is especially important for this thesis given that 
basic capital is more explicitly directed at young people and might therefore be 
more directly relevant than basic income. Nissan and Le Grand, for instance, 
                                                      
18 However, Nissan and Le Grand’s BC proposal was of only £10,000, which is much lower 
than Ackerman and Alstott’s proposal. The main reason for this substantial difference is 
that the proposals were designed with the costs of a higher education degree in mind. It is 
important to acknowledge here Robert Van der Veen (2003)’s remark that existing BC 
proposals offer a quantitatively much lower income than a lifetime of basic income 
provision does. This suggests that for BC and BI to be commensurable, BC grants must be 
made more substantive. I will thus evaluate the prospects of the highest BC proposal of the 
two - Ackerman and Alstott’s. The difference between what BC and BI would grant is still 
very substantive. This should give us a presumption in favour of BI as more radical, or in 
favour of BC, if we are considering which policy is most politically feasible. In this 
chapter, I will however disregard this quantitative difference to consider the ethical 
principles that underpin the two proposals. 
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describe the policy as “helping the young to help themselves” (Nissan and Le 
Grand 2003, 29). And yet, if the two policies so extensively relate in justification 
and scope, then it may be a strategic error to address them in opposition to each 
other. One may thus find it more tactical to defend both at the same time, saying 
that “either would do”, instead of weakening the argument for one, whenever we 
praise the other.  
 
In this chapter, I will nonetheless carry on with the tradition of juxtaposing the two 
policies because, beyond the shared common commitments, there are important 
normative grounds for disagreement. For this reason, most of those who engaged in 
the debate strongly felt that there was something to be said in defence of one over 
the other. Ackerman and Alstott (2006a), for instance, argue that BC promotes 
“macro-freedom” while BI only allows “micro forms” of freedom; that is, BI 
enables time-limited opportunities while BC permits long-term planning. In 
response, Standing (2006) argues that while BI promotes the fundamental value of 
basic security, BC would merely equalize “the opportunity to become more 
unequal”. As for Stuart White (2007), he remarks that BI promotes freedom as 
non-domination, while BC promotes freedom as autonomy, i.e. the capacity for 
people to make life plans and live upon them.  
 
My aim in this chapter is to provide a temporal account of the normative 
distinctions that underpin the two policies. Participants in the debate between BC 
and BI have always touched on issues of time, age and prudence, but without 
explicitly engaging with the intergenerational lens. For instance, White (2003) 
mentions that a major issue in this debate has to do with “how we ought to trade off 
the interests of younger and older generations in the transition to a society that 
realizes the civic minimum” (White 2003, 220). I will show that the distinctiveness 
of each policy is better captured by appealing to the diachronic, prudential and 
synchronic language of equality through time.  
 
To this purpose, I assess both policies in light of my comprehensive theoretical 
framework and argue that BI is superior to BC from the point of view of both sets 
of requirements of IG equality (diachronic and synchronic). I first show that, even 
though at first sight BC seems to be a good candidate, closer scrutiny shows that BI 
is preferable on prudential lifespan grounds (Section 5.1). I then consider the 
impact of both policies on social inequalities between people’s lives as a whole and 
on the goal of approximate cohort equality. Here again, I put forward BI as a 
preferable solution (Section 5.2). I then argue that the synchronic relational 
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egalitarian principle provides another strong reason to prefer BI to BC (Section 
5.3).  
 
Before starting, two important preliminary clarifications deserve consideration. 
First, an important distinction can be made between universal basic income (BI), 
on the one hand, and what we may call the youth basic income (YBI), on the other. 
Basic income is a proposal for a monthly cash grant from adulthood to death. 
Youth basic income, on the contrary, can be thought of as a monthly cash granted 
to each individual throughout young adulthood – for instance from 18 to 30 years 
old. Throughout this chapter, I will be discussing BI rather than YBI except for 
Section 5.2.2 where I will consider what can be said in favour of the introduction 
of a basic income exclusively for young adults. However, even then, I will give a 
series of reasons why BI should be preferred. This chapter is thus a defence of BI 
rather than YBI.  
 
The second clarification that must be made concerns the background conditions 
this discussion assumes. It does not seem to make much sense to compare the two 
proposals (BI and BC) in the abstract. As White points out: “In so far as the 
proposals are put forward as parts of packages that also involve specific taxes and 
specific cuts to other existing public expenditures, the task of comparison is made 
all the more difficult” (White 2011, 69). Depending on the background conditions 
one assumes – that is depending on which other welfare services are provided and 
depending on which benefits would be replaced by either scheme, we may change 
our minds on which policy is best. Whenever possible, I will make explicit the 
background conditions my claims and conclusions rely on.  
 
Last, I do not set out to compare either policy, or both policies, to the welfare state. 
Governments owe many things to young people and I do not pretend to exhaust or 
encompass all the things we owe to the young with cash grants. One could 
highlight the benefits of quality training, career advice, affordable education, social 
housing, and universal healthcare in offering the basis for a politics that prevents 
diachronic clustering of disadvantage. Cash does not capture adequately a number 
of things we owe each other in the form of public institutions. Moreover, some 
resources, such as healthcare are more efficiently delivered in kind than in cash.19 
In this chapter, I thus focus my efforts on the question of whether and how BI and 
BC can enable existing welfare states like the UK or France to deliver the demands 
                                                      
19 Discussions on the importance of both in kind and in cash resources can be found in Van 
Parijs (1995, 41-45), Elizabeth Anderson (2000), and Louise Haagh (2007). 
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of equality through time. In other words, I will consider the prospects of BI and BC 
as supplements to the welfare state, rather than as alternatives to it. But I will not 
assume that an extremely generous welfare state is in place either.  
 
5.1 Which!One!Is!Most!Diachronically!Prudent?!
 
What we want to find out, first, is which policy expresses best the ideal of prudent 
planning - that is which one promotes best the double goal of lifespan efficiency, on 
the one hand, and lifespan sufficiency, on the other hand. Both the introduction of 
BI and BC would have a highly significant impact on the reduction of poverty and 
deprivation at a young age. However, as this section will show, the two proposals 
seem to have opposite advantages. BI delivers a lifetime of basic economic 
security, while BC consists of an early investment in young adulthood. It thus 
seems as if, while BI primarily furthers lifespan sufficiency, BC principally 
promotes lifespan efficiency through adopting a youth-centered investment 
strategy. If this were the case, it would be difficult to decide which of the two 
proposals to go for on prudential grounds. I argue that, although at first my 
framework seems to highlight the respective irreducible advantages of the two 
proposals, closer scrutiny shows that while BC can only take a gamble with regards 
to lifespan sufficiency, BI can in fact deliver both lifespan sufficiency and 
efficiency. For this reason, I conclude that BI should be preferred on prudential 
grounds.  
5.1.1 A!dilemma:!efficiency!with!BC!or!sufficiency!with!BI?!
 
Norman Daniels’s veiled planners apply the requirement of equal concern - they 
do not favour one stage of their lives over the other. Being unbiased, they want to 
make sure they have enough at any point to live and act on their conception of the 
good life. They therefore want to make sure that, whatever age they turn out to be, 
they have access to sufficient income to lead a good life. Planners know that their 
conception of what a good life entails might evolve as they age, and for this reason, 
they put forward the prudential principle of income preservation, which states that 
one must have access to sufficient income to live on and to develop one’s time-
sensitive conception of the good life at any point. Planners thus would not find it 
prudent to allocate all resources to their younger self whilst denying basic security 
to their older self. On this basis, a monthly basic cash grant ad vitam æternam 
seems more appropriate than a one-off cash grant at the beginning of one’s life. 
Robert Van der Veen (2003) puts forward a similar argument for BI over BC: 
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“people have a good reason for pre-committing themselves to spreading their fair 
share across time, so that they will be protected from predictable failures to take 
care of their future interests” (Van der Veen 2003, 151). As a matter of definition, 
through delivering a continuous flow of income from upon reaching adulthood to 
one’s death, BI enables a lifetime of basic economic security and freedom from 
deprivation. It thus ensures the preservation of a decent income over a lifetime and 
enforces the prudential requirement of lifespan sufficiency.  
 
In defence of BC, one may argue that if invested properly, the basic capital 
investment may also generate lifespan returns. Such returns may even turn out to 
be higher than a lifetime of basic income. In other words, it is not clear that one’s 
older self will be better served by a basic income entitlement than with the returns 
to investments of one’s basic capital grant. Let us imagine that a young citizen 
invests her capital in a very successful firm or in estate property that greatly gains 
in value over the years. In this case, the lifespan return to capital investments could 
be higher than the basic income guarantee. She may also invest her capital to pay 
for a degree, and as an outcome, land a well-paying and fulfilling job. In these 
cases, the basic capital grant would perhaps not be thought of as objectionable 
from the point of view of age-group justice because lifespan sufficiency would be 
an outcome of the diachronically efficient investment. 
 
It may well be true that BC can deliver a lifetime of basic security for those who 
have invested their capital reasonably, and for those who have been lucky. 
However, it is not the case that BC ensures lifespan sufficiency. Whether the early 
investment will generate sufficient returns to guarantee a life free from poverty is 
largely conditioned by the quality of the investment. Indeed, those who oppose BC 
often highlight the issue of stake blowing, which consists in wasting one’s assets 
through brute or option luck. In either case, the result is that the individual in 
question will not live a life free from basic economic insecurity. BC will thus only 
promote lifespan sufficiency in the absence of stake blowing. Of course, this 
depends on the background conditions. If BC was introduced in a society with a 
generous means-tested minimum income scheme for those who fall below a certain 
level, the risks associated with stake blowing would be importantly limited. The 
advantage of BI over BC in terms of lifespan sufficiency does not hold in all 
contexts. But in the absence of a generous extra means-tested scheme, there is a 
worry with BC that the goal of a lifetime of economic sufficiency is a simple 
possibility, rather than a guarantee on which one may rely throughout one’s life. 
By making such lifetime of basic security a given, BI thus meets the continuous 
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sufficiency requirement better than does BC.  
 
However, there are important advantages to the BC proposal. In fact, the flipside to 
BC’s risky nature in terms of lifespan sufficiency is its fundamental diachronic 
power. By granting a substantial lump sum to young people, basic capital allows 
them to invest in their future, hence enabling the young to shape their lives as a 
whole: it “offers everyone an opportunity to take their life-shaping decisions 
seriously” (Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 51). Ackerman and Alstott refer to the 
power BC would confer to young adults as enabling the realization of their 
fundamental interest in “self-definition”. BC, the argument goes, prevents young 
people from being caught up in basic survival strategies thus protecting their 
fundamentally “imaginative moment” from being wasted. It is responsibility-driven 
and encourages people to make long-term choices (Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 
48). BC promotes the opportunity for ambition formation because it enables 
investments in lifetime projects: every young person is empowered to make plans 
with ambition, shape their conception of the good life, with significant implications 
for their lives as a whole. 
 
Another way to express this advantage of BC is to say that it promotes young 
people’s autonomy over their lives as a whole. An autonomous person is, 
according to Marina Oshana (2006), an agent “who directs or determines the 
course of her own life and who is positioned to assume the costs and the benefits of 
her choices” (Oshana, 2006, vii). Autonomy is therefore partly a diachronic value: 
one is only truly autonomous if he or she has the means to make choices and to 
then assume the costs and consequences of its actions. This view echoes Stuart 
White’s (2007, 2011) conceptualization of the advantages of basic capital. In his 
paper on the difficulties of the republican argument for basic income, he argues 
that BC is better than BI at least insofar as it promotes people’s fundamental 
interest in autonomy: “people have an important interest in having the capacity and 
opportunity to be the authors of their lives, to make their goals and life-plans ones 
they have endorsed following serious reflection on a range of alternatives” (White 
2007, 2). Similarly, in a more recent paper, White argues that Basic Capital has an 
important “horizons effect” because it enables young people to make long-term 
plans (White 2011, 77). 
 
BC thus seems better than BI in promoting autonomy, understood in this 
diachronic sense. Ackerman and Alstott argue that BI, because it cannot be 
withdrawn in a lump sum, treats young people as “presumptive sprendthrifts” 
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which “demeans their standing as autonomous citizens and radically constrains 
their real freedom” (Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 47). Basic income, they argue, 
only provides very small means and will not enable poor individuals to pay for a 
degree or buy a home, both of which may substantially improve their lives as a 
whole. BI, also “runs the risk of underwriting adult irresponsibility: how to justify 
letting the 40-year-old default on her credit-card debts while keeping her basic 
income intact?” (Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 49). Indeed, on most proposals, BI 
is non mortgage-able; that is, you cannot alienate your future basic income for a 
current project. Even if you are due to pay back a loan, your creditor is not legally 
entitled to your monthly BI. At the other end, BC gives young people the power to 
shape their lives; it increase diachronic utility and may thus have a more substantial 
impact on the overall quality of people’s lives than BI.  
 
Ackerman and Alstott have an interesting way of highlighting the comparatively 
low diachronic power of BI in comparison with BC. On their view, BC provides 
macro-freedom to young people – that is the power to make long-term investments 
in their lifespan and to make decisions that will make their life as a whole better. 
For instance, a university degree, they argue, is the kind of investment that grants 
the young macro-freedom. BC shapes people’s lifetime opportunities, and allows 
young people to enjoy “macro-freedom, not only micro” (Ackerman and Alstott 
2006a, 210). Many young people cannot think about macro freedom and their 
overall life, they can only worry about making ends meet (Ackerman and Alstott 
2006a, 210). This seems to provide a strong reason to favour BC over BI. BC 
promotes lifespan efficiency through allowing early investments, with potential 
returns for their life as a whole, thus fostering lifespan efficiency. 
 
Ackerman and Alstott interestingly mention the connection between this debate 
and the topic of age-group justice. Through their BC proposal, they claim to 
engage in a “redefinition” of age groups. They recognize early adulthood as a key 
stage in one’s development, mainly based on the lifetime consequences this crucial 
stage may have on future outcomes. On this basis, they argue for most resources to 
be allocated in young adulthood: “early years of subordination can profoundly 
shape self-understanding – rather than seeing themselves as actively engaged in the 
construction of their lives, they [the young] see themselves almost entirely as 
passive agents of economic necessity” (Ackerman and Alstott 2006a, 210). This 
way, BC can also be seen as preventing diachronic clustering of disadvantage, and 
potentially helping promote its positive contrary. BC thus maximizes lifespan 
efficiency in several ways.  BI may render possible a series of micro-freedoms, but 
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nothing of the sort of a life-shaping, life-changing, macro-freedom. In terms of 
lifespan efficiency, therefore, BC seems better than BI. 
 
It thus seems that we are faced with a prudential dilemma in comparing BI and BC. 
While BI ensures lifespan sufficiency, BC promotes lifespan efficiency. If we are 
only concerned with the young’s best interest, then we may want to go for BC. By 
only providing enough for young people to be above the poverty line, BI does not 
offer to change their destiny in a similarly radical way. Perhaps BI is too focused 
on reducing risks of poverty later in life and misses out on the goal of maximizing 
lifetime opportunities. One may claim that the risks that go with the one time lump 
sum being blown do not justify depriving most young people of the potentially 
radical lifetime returns of the lump sum. In this thesis, however, I am concerned 
with intergenerational equality and therefore, even though I focus on the young, I 
consider that what institutions owe the young is determined by what institutions 
owe the elderly too. We are thus faced with a dilemma given that each proposal 
gets one prudential requirement right, with important implications for age-group 
justice.   
5.1.2 In!defence!of!basic!income!as!lifespanOefficiency!promoting!
 
One way to solve this apparent dilemma is to rescue BI by insisting on the 
importance of the goal of lifespan sufficiency. In previous chapters, I contemplated 
making the requirement of lifespan sufficiency lexically prior to the goal of 
lifespan efficiency. Having enough at any point, one may say, is what primarily 
matters to prudent planning. What would the point of early investments in the life 
course be if it only promised what basic income delivers: a life of basic economic 
security. In other words, if lifespan sufficiency ultimately matters in this way, then 
BI seems preferable to BC. However, I have rejected the lexical ordering of the 
two prudential principles in Chapter 2 on the basis that it unnecessarily restricted 
the scope of what prudent planning may involve. Let us thus consider that the 
lexical ordering does not apply and that the lifespan sufficiency and lifespan 
efficiency principles are equally important, which some may find more plausible in 
this context. The BI versus BC debate is then still unsettled.  
 
There is another way to rescue BI. Basic income can indeed also be said to have a 
positive effect on lifespan efficiency. Think of what impact the prospects of a 
lifetime of security would have for a young person shaping her life plans. Think of 
the many life choices one might be able to make. Arguably, like BC, the allocation 
of BI to young people would spur long-term thinking on what one’s life should be 
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about. Instead of asking, ‘how do I want to invest my capital?’ young people may 
ask ‘what do I want to do with my time?’. Guy Standing even argues that basic 
security throughout a lifetime is in fact a prerequisite for the real freedom to shape 
one’s life:  
 
We should wish to provide basic security for all, since that is essential to 
facilitate the individual freedom to develop. It is a freedom to develop 
ourselves through a creative, multi-sided existence, in which our work and 
our contemplative sides are balanced and balancing.  
(Standing 2006, 177)  
 
Moreover, BI is also likely to contribute to preventing the phenomenon of 
diachronic clustering of disadvantage. As such, being under an adequate 
sufficiency threshold at a young age has a direct impact on the quality of people’s 
lives as a whole. Poverty at a young age is particularly diachronically corrosive and 
BI would eradicate it. It would prevent a wave of clustering of disadvantage 
associated with poverty and would thus minimize a number of lifespan risks. BI 
would also reduce the lifespan scarring effects of bad jobs. As I claimed in Chapter 
4, when work is demeaning, exploitative or unrecognized, the experience can be 
more destructive than rewarding (Chauvel 2010, Standing 2013). Here lies one of 
the key promises of the basic income proposal: it takes the labour market as it is 
and empowers individuals by giving them more options to chose from by 
broadening the range of opportunities available. With £800 a month, one may 
move abroad and learn a language, volunteer, care for others, study, train, found an 
eco-village, work on community building, start an online business, write Wikipedia 
articles, etc. Through eradicating youth poverty and broadening the range of 
opportunities opened to the young, BI contributes to precluding diachronic 
clustering of disadvantage, thus promoting lifespan efficiency. This suggests that 
BC may therefore not be the only route to lifespan freedom and autonomy in 
shaping one’s life. It offers one possible way to meet the lifespan efficiency 
requirement, but BI may be able to do equally well.  
 
We could even go further and argue that BI, through granting a life of basic 
economic security, promotes better diachronic returns than BC. Arnsperger and 
Johnson (2011)’s discussion of the likely impact of BI is interesting in this context. 
They defend basic income “as an equal opportunity tool in the transition toward 
sustainability” (Arnsperger and Johnson 2011, 61). They contend, ambitiously, that 
true equality of opportunity includes the freedom to produce and live outside of 
capitalist markets and call for a basic income to enable non-capitalist experiments:  
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the real freedom—to freely choose not just some intra-capitalist life style 
(…) but to choose between an intra-capitalist way of life and an extra-
capitalist one (e.g., moving to an ecovillage and exchanging goods and 
services within a network of user[s] of mutual-credit currency, instead of 
staying in the hyper-competitive agrochemicals company with whose 
salary one can consume all one’s fill). 
(Arnsperger and Johnson 2011, 63).  
 
Arnsperger and Johnson argue that “marginal people” who explore frugal modes of 
living are currently unfairly stigmatized. On the contrary, they should be 
encouraged as pioneers since they experiment with the humanly and 
environmentally sustainable lifestyles to which societies need to transition. Not 
only young people’s macro freedom could be promoted thanks to BI, but it may 
enable activities that are more personally fulfilling and sustainable.  
 
There is now an extensive literature on the prospects of BI to contribute to the 
dematerialization of culture (Boulanger 2009) and promote more “ecologically 
sustainable paths to wellbeing” (Birnbaum 2009). For Boulanger (2009), the two 
key green ideals of “sufficiency” and “decommodification” can be advanced 
through the basic income guarantee. By providing sufficiency, basic income 
renders possible more frugal and autonomous modes of living and enables non-
consumerist lifestyles. It would also help in promoting the decommodification 
ideal because with basic income, people would be more likely to pool, share, lend, 
and repair instead of buy and waste. Such sustainable practices would be facilitated 
through basic income simply because it would give people much more free time. 
Time is key to the green ideal, the argument goes, because market consumption is 
easier and quicker and will only decline when people have time to coordinate 
alternative avenues for consumption.  
 
Goodin and Van der Veen similarly argue that post-productivism requires both 
“temporal adequacy” and “minimal conditionality” – that is, respectively, greater 
control over one’s use of time, and an income non-dependent on market or state 
compulsion (Goodin and Van der Veen in Fitzpatrick 2009, 2). Basic Income, 
Fitzpatrick argues, would promote temporal adequacy through ensuring minimal 
conditionality (Fitzpatrick 2009, 2). Young people might thus be seen as potential 
experimenters of new modes of living. High levels of unemployment among 
European youth may then be seen as an opportunity to start a paradigm shift to a 
post-productivist society, with potentially positive effects for the opportunity of 
future cohorts to a less environmentally risky future. 
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However, such enthusiasm about the prospects of BI should not be taken too far in 
the argument against BC. First, as Van Parijs (2009) argues, one should not be 
overly optimistic about the prospects of the autonomous sphere that would emerge 
through basic income. We cannot expect that it will be all green and ethical. 
Second, it is not the case that people cannot lead an alternative existence with 
access to an early BC. Early access to assets and to the means of production may 
also enable an opting out of markets. Access to land, space, capital, or farming 
equipment would be immensely facilitated by a substantial BC. BI may also enable 
access to the means of production through sharing, pooling, or crowd funding, but 
BC can accomplish this too. Third, as is now evident, the likely outcomes of BI 
and BC vary a great deal depending on what one does with their stake and with 
their time. This makes the discussion of which make lives go best largely 
conditional.  
 
Last, if our concern is primarily in deciding which policy enables better diachronic 
returns in terms of opportunities, we should perhaps focus on the variety of 
opportunities created rather than on which types of lives we find more fulfilling. If 
we are to be fairly neutral on what counts as leading a good life, as Daniels is, then 
we should not evaluate the respective quality of the opportunities from a post-
productivist standpoint and take this as the deciding factor. For these four reasons, 
concluding that BI promotes lifespan efficiency better than does BC would be 
taking a step too far. I have nonetheless shown that BI can also promote lifespan 
efficiency. The alleged macro power of BC is not as exclusive as its advocates 
make it seem. 
 
We are now in a position to offer an answer to the question of which policy is most 
diachronically prudent. I first highlighted a trade-off between what seemed like the 
key advantage of BI on prudential grounds – its lifespan-sufficiency-promoting 
nature – and the advantage of BC – its lifespan-efficiency-maximising power. I 
briefly hinted at the possibility that BC may, if invested adequately, also produce 
lifespan returns of the same kind than a lifetime of basic security. However, I 
dismissed this possibility on the grounds that BC cannot ensure lifespan 
sufficiency. The lifespan sufficiency requirement then provided us with a strong 
reason to prefer BI.  
 
To solve the dilemma, I then proposed that BI can promote lifespan efficiency too: 
through delivering the scarce resource of time, BI opens up the opportunity for a 
multi-sided or alternative existence, broadens young people’s opportunities and 
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precludes the clustering of disadvantage associated with poverty and bad jobs. I 
argued that BI could also be seen as promoting long-term ambition formation. Just 
not the same kind of ambitions will be formed. Van der Veen (2003) has an 
illuminating way of expressing a similar idea: while BC promotes a “culture of 
property ownership”, basic income promotes a “culture of disposable time”. Both, 
however, generalise "the privilege of being a ‘person of independent means’” (Van 
der Veen 2003, 150). Therefore, if (1) BI is best at promoting lifespan sufficiency 
and (2) BI and BC can both promote lifetime efficiency, then we should favour BI 
on comprehensive diachronic prudential grounds. We do not have to settle which 
types of ambition formation are best here because it is sufficient to show that they 
both promote lifespan efficiency, while BC only promotes one of the two 
prudential requirements.  
 
5.2 Which!Policy!Promotes!Complete!Lives!Equality!Best?!
 
As argued in Chapter 4, the institutionalization of prudent planning can work 
towards the reduction of existing social inequalities between complete lives. We 
should not lose sight of the important intersection of intergenerational issues with 
the transmission of poverty from one generation to another and with the lifespan 
clustering of disadvantage, which reinforces existing inequalities. Having shown 
that BI can meet the prudential requirements better than BC, I now evaluate the 
two proposals’ respective ability to reduce inequalities over complete lives, that is 
both social inequalities between life courses and cohort inequalities. In other 
words, the questions that I aim to ask here are the following: (1) from the point of 
view of the goal of reducing social inequalities between complete lives, which 
policy is most effective, and (2) from the point of view of approximate cohort 
equality, which policy is best? 
5.2.1 Social!inequalities!between!life!courses!
 
At first, one may think of BC as more “egalitarian” in a diachronic sense than BI 
because, as Van Parijs argues, BC delivers most resources to young recipients, 
which decreases the distributive inequality between those who die young and those 
who die old. BI, on the other hand, would unfairly advantage those who live long 
lives, as people would have received more resources over their complete lives than 
those who die young. In their paper “Compensating the Dead”, Fleurbaey, Leroux 
and Ponthiere (2014) make a similar point. They point out that we can in fact 
compensate those who die young simply by giving people cash early in their lives, 
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or by encouraging early consumption. They argue that the earlier resources are 
spent, the lower the risks of people having been treated unequally over their 
complete lives. Since we do not know which unfortunate people will live short 
lives, the best way to be fair to them is thus to give them most resources in one 
lump sum, early on. In this respect at least, BC seems to do a better job than BI.  
 
However, as Van Parijs (2006) argues, this strategy is only superficially 
egalitarian. BC risks exacerbating existing interpersonal inequalities for two 
reasons. The first reason, which Van Parijs puts forward, is that those who will 
blow their stake are more likely to be people who are already disadvantaged. Those 
who have already been socially advantaged will have access to better information, 
support and coaching than those who have a more disadvantaged background. BC, 
instead of disrupting existing social inequalities, might thus reinforce them because 
those already advantaged would use their capital more successfully. A corollary 
worry with the stakeholder society is that those who do not succeed will be more 
likely to then be considered responsible for their own failure. And yet, as I have 
shown drawing on Heckman (2013), social inequalities are heavily determined by 
unequal childhoods, including unequal access to educational opportunities. BC is 
often described as a “starting gate” egalitarian measure (Wright 2006, xii). But it 
does not even provide fair ‘starts’ since it tries to disrupt inequalities, at an early, 
but still late point in the lifespan. Worse, it makes it sound as if it constitutes a fair 
start and may thus contribute to a society that treats harshly those who fail to 
succeed through their capital investments.  
 
One may reply, however, that there are ways around this problem with BC. 
Ackerman and Alstott (2006b) for instance, argue for a series of measures to 
reduce the risk of the least well off youth blowing their stake. Their BC proposal 
includes compulsory high school training on how to best spend ones’ lump sum. 
Moreover, Ackerman and Alstott would deny the lump sum (or hold it for a while) 
to those who have not graduated from high school and to those who have been 
engaged in criminal activities as teenagers. This, however, may not reassure those 
worried that BC may exacerbate existing inequalities. If BC excludes poor 
disengaged and criminalized youth, it may aggravate the existing imbalance in 
privilege, contributing to even more unequal life courses. It may also worsen the 
clustering of disadvantage effect given that early school disengagement would 
become associated with even more costs. It is difficult to feel at ease with such 
denial of BC to some of the most ill placed young members of society. Thus, if BC 
seemed preferable on complete lives egalitarian grounds, at first sight, it would in 
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fact dangerously risk exacerbating existing social inequalities, thus reinforcing 
interpersonal inequalities between life courses. If given the choice, most 
egalitarians would probably find the exacerbation of existing social inequalities to 
be more problematic morally than the randomly produced inequality between those 
who will die young and those who will live a life of normal length, as I already 
argued against Lazenby in Chapter 2.   
 
In defence of BC, however, one may argue that the anticipated risk of BC 
exacerbating existing inequalities is exaggerated and that, if given a chance, most 
disadvantaged young adults would make good use of their lump sum. Moreover, 
BC proponents could make the case that BC can be much more disruptive of 
existing inequalities than BI by giving substantial assets to individuals who would 
never have had access to such capital otherwise. To evaluate this claim, let us 
consider different life plans the least advantaged may follow and whether such 
pathways would be substantially more enabled by a BC than a BI. Let us consider 
would-be: (1) artists, (2) farmers, and (3) high-risk entrepreneurs. Of the three, it 
seems that the high-risk entrepreneur is the one that would need a basic capital 
most. The artist primarily needs time and security. The farmer may equally need 
capital and income. She may use capital to acquire land and equipment. But she 
may be able to get it through a loan or through associating with other farmers by 
pooling resources. Given how precarious small-scale farming is in terms of the 
chances of poverty at any given time in her life course, she may benefit from the 
lifetime of basic security.  
 
The high-risk entrepreneur however - who has a risky but potentially life changing 
idea - primarily needs capital. If she cannot find an investor, she may never be able 
to realize her potential. Of course, the project may not work, but the potential 
returns to investments could be really high. There is little the high-risk investor can 
do with a non-mortgage-able BI for life. In this sense BC, could be disruptive of 
existing social inequalities. By affording the means to high-risk entrepreneurs to 
realize their projects, it has the potential to accelerate social mobility. BC could be 
really disruptive in a way that BI cannot be. One could reply that, even though BI 
is non-mortgage-able, the attitude of lenders could positively change in a basic 
income society. BI could increase the bargaining power of the high-risk 
entrepreneur trying to get a loan. Lenders would know that whatever people will 
earn can be used to pay back a loan, given that the borrower’s basic needs would 
already be covered by the basic income. This way, one could possibly speculate 
that, in a basic income society, people could fairly easily borrow the capital they 
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need to invest in their high risk/high return projects.  
 
However, even if we grant that BC may be more disruptive of social inequalities 
than BI, in some cases, through promoting social mobility, there is another problem 
with BC from the point of view of social inequalities over life courses. I have 
already mentioned the fact that it may render some already disadvantaged people 
even more relatively disadvantaged. But the other problem is that it will inevitably 
create important inequalities between complete lives. BC, some argue, will create a 
society structured by a drift between winners and losers. Standing, for instance, 
worries that BC will contribute to a winners-take-all versus losers-take-all society: 
“it would be equalizing the opportunity to become more unequal” (Standing 2006, 
188). Instead of creating a society in which people can all live secure lives, BC 
would enable a two-speed society to emerge:  
 
One could imagine TV chat shows and tabloids having endless items on 
“how Jane splurged her $80,000, and another patting Jim on his 
broadening shoulders for having been an exemplary young adult (…) If 
anything, it would help legitimize the unequal society by encouraging 
people to adopt a casino-type set of attitudes.  
(Standing 2006, 192) 
 
If some will blow their stake through genuine imprudence or irresponsible 
behaviours, others will simply be unfortunate and have to pay for it for the rest of 
their lives.  
 
BC thus seems to be quite a risky policy from the point of view of inequalities 
between life courses. At best, BC would generate and tolerate very substantial 
inequalities between winners and losers, but further some social mobility in the 
process. At worse, it will reinforce existing social inequalities between life courses 
and harden attitudes to those who do badly. BI, on the other hand, does not leave 
the lifespan distribution of cash to luck and promotes instead a lifetime of security 
for all. Through freeing up time, it equalizes the opportunity for all to do what they 
may want to do with their time. Depending on whether the basic income is just 
above or well above the poverty line, it may free up more or less time. In the UK, a 
£800 basic income per adult individual would ensure a life free from abject 
poverty. As such, the income may be sufficient to open up a set of opportunities: 
caring for one’s own family, volunteering, travelling, working part-time instead of 
full time, taking a year off work. BI ensures that these opportunities are open to all. 
The monthly grant may be insufficient on its own to lead a more expansive 
lifestyle, but it generalises the opportunity to have more time to do the things we 
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may want to do, without losing our basic economic security. 
 
5.2.2 The!goal!of!approximate!cohort!equality! !
 
As far as birth cohorts are concerned, it seems that BI and BC would both offer a 
‘compensation’ for current disproportionally high rates of unemployment and 
poverty that fall on younger cohorts. Both would increase young people’s chances 
of living a better life. Both would also compensate the young for the loss of income 
resulting from higher rates of unemployment and would enable the young to take 
the time to gain skills. The question to know which policy would reduce scarring 
effects most however depends on our previous discussion of the likely impact of 
both policies for lifespan efficiency. It may be the case that particularly scarred 
generations would be best served by a basic income, which would top-up their 
comparatively lower incomes. It would make coping with stages of unemployment 
easier. At the other end, basic capital could allow scarred cohorts to create their 
own opportunities, by starting a business for instance, and would thus also count as 
a relevant compensation. One could think of both proposals as opening up a 
broader range of opportunities for particularly impaired generations.  
 
Perhaps there is one way to distinguish the policies from the point of view of 
approximate cohort equality. Let us first assume that, at least as far as job-related 
opportunities are concerned: (1) there is such a thing as a ‘jilted generation’ in the 
UK and in France, where more than 1 in 5 young people in the labor force between 
15 and 24 years old are unemployed, and even more so in Spain or Greece where 
rates of youth unemployment are higher than 1 in 2; and (2) the generation will be 
scarred in the long run. Given (1) and (2), there may be a case to be made for 
proposals that target the young generation exclusively. In terms of approximate 
cohort equality, we could argue that, in order to compensate the young generations 
for the long-term impact of their joblessness, we ought to give cash only to their 
generations. Indeed, what is the point of a compensation that targets both 
advantaged and disadvantaged generations? Basic capital may thus be thought as a 
better cohort compensatory measure than basic income, which is aimed at 
everyone.20 
                                                      
20 Stuart White (2011) interestingly sees this exclusionary aspect of Basic Capital as a 
drawback: “When we introduce a basic capital scheme, there will be one generation that is 
the first to get the capital grant. All following cohorts will get it too. But earlier generations 
will apparently get nothing. By contrast, when we introduce a basic income, members of all 
living generations will get something. Again, it looks as if intergenerational inequality 
might be sharper under basic capital than basic income. Consequently, if we care about 
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However, basic income could also be made to compensate younger generations if it 
was introduced exclusively for young cohorts. Consider the following proposal for 
a Youth Basic Income (YBI). The basic income proposal as such emphasizes the 
importance of delivering cash continuously from adulthood to death. But we could 
institutionalize basic income only for the current younger generation. We would 
exclude, say, anyone over 35 years old from the scheme. This way, BI could be 
made to work to compensate the ‘jilted generation’. The resulting inequality 
between birth cohorts in basic income provision would come to compensate the 
inequality in job opportunities. Here, we can make a further distinction between 
age-specific YBI and cohort-specific YBI. To compensate the ‘jilted generation’, 
we could introduce a cohort specific YBI to which they would be entitled until 
their death. This scheme would be for the jilted generation exclusively. Age-
specific YBI, on the other hand, would be for the current young and the future 
young exclusively. To clarify, on cohort-specific YBI, the jilted generation gets a 
basic income monthly ad vitam æternam; on age-specific YBI, the jilted generation 
gets a basic income for a few years, until they reach 35 years old.  
 
However, there are a number of problems with YBI - in both its cohort and age 
specific forms - and in general with the view that our unconditional cash scheme 
should exclusively target the young. First, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, it is 
difficult to consider that there is such a thing as an all-things-considered jilted 
generation. In terms of job prospects, a particular generation may be doing worse 
through no fault of its own. But there are other benefits that they may be enjoying 
such as better access to healthcare and better technologies and knowledge. The 
basic phenomenon of intergenerational growth of knowledge and technology 
means that it is unlikely that we will be able to say that younger generations are 
worse off all things considered.  
 
In Chapter 4, I argued that one way around this incommensurability problem was 
to focus only on job prospects, for instance, and to aim at restoring job-related 
inequalities between cohorts. For this reason, while it may be justifiable to help the 
young preferentially in other ways, for instance through a job guarantee, making 
them the only recipients of either cash proposal seems objectionable from the point 
of view of approximate cohort equality principle itself. One could still argue for the 
possibility to introduce cash grants just for the young on the grounds of them being 
                                                                                                                                         
intergenerational inequality, we have another egalitarian reason for preferring basic income 
to basic capital” (2011, 72). If we accept my claims that (1) there is a jilted generation and 
(2) that it will be scarred in the long run, then the exclusionary nature of BC becomes an 
advantage. 
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worse off in terms of their current and future job prospects. But then the cash grant 
would have to be justified purely as compensation for unequal generational job 
prospects. 
However, there is a second problem with the exclusive focus on the young. If we 
allocated basic income only to younger cohorts, then we would not include the 
least advantaged member of earlier cohorts in the scheme. If it is the case that a 
generation may be thought of as worse off in job prospects in average, the social 
class one belongs to is one of the most fundamental determinants of people’s life 
courses. If we are concerned with reducing such inequalities, then granting basic 
income only to younger cohorts may be unsatisfactory. Gosseries and Gaspart 
(2007), for instance, put forward the basic principle that one generation owes the 
next as much as it has received from the previous one and only as much (with some 
exceptions). Once the accumulation phase is over, savings are prohibited. We 
should instead focus on reducing existing social inequalities. Moreover, given that 
transfers between generations largely occur within families, one may hope that a 
basic income for all, by making young adults, but also their parents and grand 
parents better off, will benefit the worse off in whichever generations they are, with 
direct and indirect benefits for children and young people.   
 
Furthermore, as was argued in previous section, both the sufficiency and efficiency 
advantages of BI are reliant on its capacity to ensure a lifetime of basic security. 
By introducing YBI, we would compromise the positive prudential impact of BI. In 
other words, if we introduced age-specific YBI, then the previous mentioned 
benefits of BI would vanish. Note that this is only true of age-specific YBI.  
Indeed, cohort-specific YBI is a lifelong BI, but for some cohorts only. However, 
the previous argument that cohort-specific YBI misses out on the least well-off 
individuals in other generations and compromises their access to basic security 
seems to push against the policy. 
 
In sum, knowing whether we should deliver basic income only to younger 
generations would require knowing whether current middle aged and older 
generations have passed on enough to the young generation or not. The transfer 
that would be required for a BC or YBI to be transferred to the next generation 
would be so high that it seems difficult to make the argument that it is a required 
rate of saving. It seems equally difficult to argue that the least well off in other 
generations should not benefit from radical cash grants. As argued in Chapter 4, in 
face of uncertainty, what we can do is reduce risks, including risks of scarring 
effects across the lifespan, and introduce the grant universally. Given the prudential 
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benefits of BI highlighted in Section 5.1, implementing a BI just for the young (at 
least as an age group) is a poor option on prudential grounds.  
 
To conclude, in Section 5.2, I have shown that, on complete lives egalitarian 
grounds, BC is too risky. The upside of this risk is that it may disrupt existing 
inequalities quite efficiently by promoting social mobility. However, BC’s 
downside is that it risks exacerbating existing inequalities over life courses if those 
who are better equipped end up making better investments, and if those who are 
disengaged and have a criminal past are excluded from the scheme. Regardless, it 
also risks contributing to a winner-take-all society that is in tension with the 
complete lives egalitarian goal, at least if the losers blow their stakes through no 
fault of their own (through brute luck or as a result of previous lack of training, 
education or information).  
 
As for the goal of approximate cohort equity, both YBI and BC may help in 
compensating the jilted generation for the disproportionate risks of unemployment 
and poverty they suffer and may thus both reduce the scarring effect phenomenon. 
However, I have suggested that compensating younger cohorts exclusively may not 
be desirable, especially if we favour the next generation and leave behind the least 
advantaged in older generations. On the approximate cohort equality principle, 
there did not seem to be a conclusive case to be made for one policy over another. 
This seems to reinforce my suggestion in Chapter 4 that, as a principle of justice, 
approximate cohort equality does not seem to be as action-guiding as the 
requirements of lifespan prudence, or as I will now show, as the synchronic 
relational egalitarian requirement. If we are primarily concerned in reducing the 
scarring effects phenomenon to make sure the young are not too scarred over their 
complete lives, on approximate cohort equality, then we ought to simply do what 
prudent planning instructs. Rough equality between cohorts may then be partly 
captured as an outcome of adequate prudent planning. 
 
5.3 Which!Is!Best!for!Synchronic!Relational!Equality?!
 
Philip Pettit and Stuart White both suggest that a fundamental advantage of BI is 
that, by providing an income continuously, from young adulthood to death, it 
promotes freedom as non-domination, understood as the absence of “dominating 
control” (Pettit 2007, 4). BI provides the material conditions for relational equality 
because it makes sure that no one needs to enter relationships of submission in 
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order to survive. It provides the basis for Rousseau’s requirement that no one 
should be so poor as to be obliged to sell oneself (Rousseau [1762] 1998, 52). BI 
would strengthen the position of flexi workers, increasing their bargaining leverage 
(Standing 2006). It would empower individuals to refuse entering wrongful 
relationships (for example, in the labour market), and would enable them to quit 
abusive relationships (for example, in cases of dependence on an abusive partner). 
Therefore, if one is primarily concerned by freedom as non-domination, then one 
will have a strong presumption for basic income over basic capital (White 2011, 
75-76). Through reducing the risks of dependency under duress, BI thus seems to 
ensure relational synchronic equality. 
 
An important distinction here can be made between exit and voice, as 
conceptualized by Albert Hirschman:  
 
There are two main types of activist reactions to discontent with 
organizations to which one belongs or with which one does business: either 
to voice one’s complaints, while continuing as a member or customer, in 
the hope of improving matters; or to exit from the organization, to take 
one’s business elsewhere.  
(Hirschman 1978, 90) 
 
Voice – that is the ability for people to express their views, interests and concerns - 
is constitutive of a community of equals. BI provides citizens with the right of exit, 
but at the same time increases people’s ability to voice their complains. If workers 
need their jobs to a lesser extent, they will be able to set their conditions more 
easily. The added value of basic income from a synchronic relational perspective is 
that it offers individuals a right to exit that is very likely to have a positive impact 
on their bargaining power. In turn, workers with a BI are thus likely to have a more 
powerful voice. This double benefit of BI seems to be in line with what Karl 
Widerquist sees as the key advantage of basic income: it empowers people with 
freedom as the “power to say no” (Widerquist 2013). 
 
Young people are more likely than any other age group to be unemployed or poor, 
so the argument for basic income from a synchronic relational standpoint seems 
particularly appealing. In the example of LGBT homeless youth highlighted in 
Chapter 4, for instance, it is clear that BI would have a positive impact on the 
young not becoming homeless in the first place. BI would protect young people 
from either having to stay in abusive households or having to become homeless 
and suffer further risks of abuse and domination.  
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By contrast, with its resolutely individualistic fundamental principle - “One person, 
one life, one stake” (Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 49) - BC primarily focuses on 
distributive equality over complete lives, and does not address the kind of wrongful 
relationships that can be generated in the synchronic temporality. BC is primarily 
luck egalitarian: “Each person is her own person. Each is entitled to real freedom to 
shape her own life. This precious freedom should not be compromised merely to 
save others from the consequences of their own choices” (Ackerman and Alstott 
2006b, 51). BC aims to reduce brute luck through giving the means to almost all 
young adults to shape their destinies, but accepts inequalities in outcome that result 
from different choices individuals may make. BC is thus susceptible to the 
harshness objection often raised against luck egalitarianism (Fleurbaey 1995, 
Anderson 1999, Lippert-Rasmussen 2012). It does not offer significant forms of 
protection to those who make bad investments and blow their stake. This is 
unsatisfying from the comprehensive egalitarian approach I endorse in this thesis.  
 
The winners-take-all society is particularly problematic from the point of view of 
synchronic relational equality, both between age groups and within a cohort. Those 
who have blown their stake will lose both their prospects for ambition formation, 
as I argued earlier, but they will also lose the basic security that would be needed to 
stand free from the risk of domination. As a result, with BC, people would be free 
as non-dominated only if they had invested their stake in the right way. This is a 
first reason why synchronic relational egalitarianism demands a BI rather than a 
BC. Once again, however, this argument for BI over BC only applies against 
specific background conditions. If BC was introduced in a society that also 
proposes a means-tested minimum income to ensure that no-one fell below the 
poverty line, the synchronic relational egalitarian presumption against BC would 
not be as strong. Let us assume here again that the generous minimum income 
background condition is not met. Then there is an important worry about the equal 
standing of those who blow their stake.   
 
In response, BC proponents may reply that relational equality and freedom as non-
domination is compatible with an early investment in the lifespan. Institutions may 
give you the opportunity to be free from poverty, through a capital investment for 
instance, and this precisely treats you as an equal. Why would we interpret 
Rousseau’s claim that no one should be too poor to be dominated synchronically 
and not diachronically? Perhaps we could take it to mean that people should not be 
too poor at the start of their life to avoid that their life course be one where they 
risk having to sell themselves into slavery. I have argued in Chapter 3 that the 
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relational egalitarian ideal, however, provides strong reasons to ensure that people 
are able to stand as equals at every point in their lives. The egalitarian goal of 
ending relationships of domination cannot be satisfied simply by providing a fair 
chance to young people. If in the middle of their lives, winners hold a higher status 
and more political power than those who blew their stake, the mere fact that they 
all had been given the same stake in the past does not make up for the fact that the 
community they now live in cannot be considered as a community of relational 
equals.   
 
Furthermore, BC only privileges one stage of people’s lives: young adulthood. 
Ackerman and Alstott realize that this is a problem, which they identify as the 
“time slice problem”, in the traditional vein initiated by the equality through time 
debate. They ask: “What is the appropriate relationship between stakes to the 
young and government pensions to the elderly?” (Ackerman and Alstott 2006b, 
53). I have argued that egalitarianism demands more than just equality between 
complete lives and also more than prudential lifespan planning in Chapter 3. 
Egalitarianism properly understood also demands that people be able to stand as 
equals regardless of their age and without risk of marginalisation, stigmatisation 
and exclusion. BC would prevent the young homeless case mentioned previously, 
but similar cases would be possible at an older age, or as soon as one has used 
one’s stake.  
 
Moreover, as Standing argues, by targeting young entrants, BC will give them an 
advantage over older workers because it would allow young people to accept lower 
wages (Standing 2006). This would risk excluding older workers from the 
productive sphere, which would not be unproblematic for older workers’ standing 
as equals. And paradoxically, that would not even radically enhance young 
people’s freedom to say no, in Widerquist’s sense. Their basic security not being 
secured in the long run, the young would still have to do what ensures that they 
will be able to make ends meet in the future. BC would thus give the young more 
weight in their power struggle against older people in the labour market, but 
without even increasing the young’s freedom ‘to say no’ more than basic income. 
BI, by contrast, would give young people the “freedom to say no” (Widerquist 
2013) to various relationships of inequality, without giving “one group an inbuilt 
advantage” (Standing 2006, 189). 
 
There is a third synchronic relational reason why BI may be preferable than BC. It 
has to do with the multisided existence that a lifetime of basic security may enable. 
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People would be more likely to participate in their local communities if they had 
more time. They would be able to develop the political side of their existence, 
simply because they would regain control over their time. This, arguably, is 
important if we are worried about the young’s political disengagement. Indirectly, 
therefore, BI could thus be the means the young require coordinating and 
expressing their political interests. BI would thus shoot two birds with one stone: it 
would directly contribute to meeting the interests of the young in a non-risky 
present and future, and it would give them more time to participate in the political 
struggles that they feel they should take part in.  
 
My comprehensive account of intergenerational equality does not say that 
synchronic relational equality is more important than diachronic prudence or 
equality. Therefore, this presumption for BI on relational egalitarian grounds is not 
sufficient to make a conclusive case in support of BI over BC on grounds of 
intergenerational equality. However, given my previous argument in support of BI 
on diachronic grounds, it seems fair to conclude that BI expresses the requirements 
of equality through time in an intergenerational perspective better than does BC. 
 
5.4 Conclusions!
 
In conclusion, I have shown in this chapter that there are several reasons to prefer 
BI to BC on intergenerational egalitarian grounds – as summarized in the table 
below.
   Table 4 - BI versus BC: a summary
 Basic Capital Basic Income Which is 
best? 
Lifespan 
sufficiency 
- BC, if invested properly, may generate returns commensurable to a lifetime 
income 
- However, if the stake is blown, lifespan sufficiency will not be ensured 
- BC does not ensure lifespan sufficiency 
- BI ensures lifespan sufficiency through delivering a lifetime of basic 
economic security 
 
BC<BI 
 
Lifespan 
efficiency 
- BC encourages long-term thinking and promotes ambition formation 
- BC promotes macro-freedom through investing in the youth ‘self-
imaginative’ moment  
- BC thus promotes lifespan efficiency  
- BI does not permit early investments in lifelong projects (because it is non-
mortgageable) 
- But, through freeing up time, BI allows the formation of other kinds of 
ambitions 
- BI promotes lifespan efficiency too. 
BC = BI 
Inequalities 
between life 
courses 
- BC seems more egalitarian, at first, because it reduces inequalities between 
longevity groups and may promote social mobility 
- However, BC risks exacerbating existing inequalities between social 
classes, and even if it does not, it risks creating a winners-take all society 
- BC is not likely to effectively reduce inequalities between life courses 
- BI enhances everyone’s long-term real freedom 
- It does not risk to exacerbate existing inequalities because lifetime returns 
are pre-defined 
- BI contributes to limiting inequalities between life courses 
BC<BI 
Approx. 
cohort 
equality 
- BC can contribute in compensating the jilted generation 
- however, excluding other cohorts or age groups seems problematic 
- BI may also contribute in compensating the jilted generation, if we 
introduce YBI (age or cohort specific) 
- however, excluding other cohorts or age groups seems problematic 
BC = BI 
Synchronic 
relational 
equality 
 
- BC misses out on the risks of synchronic relational equality between 
winners and losers 
- BC misses out on the risks of synchronic relational inequalities between 
young and old 
- BC does not ensure synchronic relational equality 
- BI promotes freedom as non-domination 
- BI gives people a right to exit and strengthens their voice and power to say 
‘no’ 
- BI, may enable more active political engagement 
- BI thus promotes synchronic relational equality well 
BC< BI 
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In her paper on the debate between BC and BI, Cecile Fabre interestingly argues 
that BC is not an egalitarian proposal because it pays little attention to misfortunes 
that may befall people over the course of their lives. A proposal that “allows for 
large brute-luck based inequalities between individuals in the course of their lives” 
she argues, “is not an egalitarian proposal” (Fabre 2003, 118). However, after all, 
as this thesis argues, on the dominant complete lives view, it may well be fine from 
the point of view of equality if individuals are afforded the same benefits over their 
complete lives, even if they are unequal in some portions of their lives.  
 
Cecile Fabre (2003)’s claim that BC is not an egalitarian proposal has found three 
concrete elaborations in this chapter. First, BC is not prudent in at least one 
important respect - it does not ensure lifespan sufficiency. For this reason, it does 
not fulfil one important requirement of equality through time. Second, BC would 
insufficiently reduce existing inequalities between life courses. It may have some 
positive impact on social mobility, but would also risk exacerbating existing 
inequalities developed earlier in the lifespan (for instance between those who 
graduated from high school and those who disengaged). Moreover, BC would 
certainly create new life course inequalities between those who succeed through 
investment and those who do not. Third, BC would not ensure synchronic 
relational equality at specific points in the lifespan and would also risk entrenching 
some inequalities in standing in the productive sphere between young and older 
workers. This chapter has shown that the temporal theoretical tools I developed in 
previous chapters informs an important policy-oriented debate, and possibly, in 
settling the debate in favour of basic income. If we must chose, I argued, we should 
therefore prefer the basic income proposal. 
 
However, there are also some advantages to BC such as its important diachronic 
macro-freedom promoting power and its potential positive impact on social 
mobility. These advantages of BC are likely to be even more important in contexts 
where higher education is costly or unaffordable. By enabling more young people 
to get a higher education degree, BC may increase the chances of disadvantaged 
young people leading more equal lives. Similarly, in a capitalist economy, 
ownership of the means of production is an important variable in predicting how 
one’s life course will unfold. For these reasons, we may not want entirely to 
abandon BC, even if we contend that BI is superior. What we may be able to 
conclude, therefore, is that basic income should be the baseline, but that we may 
also integrate other unconditional cash proposals. Here are two hybrid proposals 
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that accommodate the lifespan efficiency and disruptive power of BC with the 
diachronic and synchronic advantages of BI.  
 
Consider first the following addition to BI that can be referred to as the Baby Bond 
proposal.21 This BI proposal could be designed as a right from birth, saved for the 
first 18 years of one’s life and given as a cash grant at 18. Part of the basic income 
from birth to 18 years old could go to the parents as family allowance. Indeed, as 
we have seen from James Heckman’s account of pre-distribution, lifespan 
efficiency requires that children be made key recipients of any serious investment 
scheme. The other part of the child basic income would be saved monthly and 
would be available in the form of a Basic Capital at 18 years old. At age 18, 
individuals would receive their BC and in addition, from 18 on, the monthly 
allowance. In a generous welfare state economy where education is affordable or 
even free, such as in France, such scheme may not be needed. If education is 
difficult to afford for the least well off, as in the US (or increasingly in the UK), 
such BC may enable the young to make life plans and stimulate social mobility 
more effectively. The Baby Bond proposal may thus allow us to accommodate this 
concern without undermining BI as baseline. 
 
An alternative to the Baby Bond Proposal, but still with basic income as the 
underlying baseline, can be referred to as the Mortgage-able Income proposal. We 
could introduce a basic income but allow individuals to alienate part of their future 
basic income guarantee to fund costly projects they may have at any point. At 20 
years old, Mary could decide to ask for a certain portion of her future monthly 
basic income to be given to her in one lump sum so as to pursue a higher education 
degree. For instance, she could agree to receive only half of her monthly basic 
income for ten years and to withdraw the other half in one lump sum. For the next 
ten years, instead of receiving, say £800 a month she would receive £400 a month, 
and she would get a lump sum of £48,000. This proposal gives leverage to 
individuals to decide how and when they want to make life-changing plans.  
 
Both proposals have important advantages. However, I find the Mortgage-able 
Income proposal less satisfactory than the Baby Bond proposal for two main 
reasons. First, unless the basic income guarantee is so large that it goes well 
beyond the poverty line, alienating part of one’s future income threatens the 
fundamental principle of lifetime basic security. In implementing the proposal, one 
                                                      
21 The phrase is taken from New Labour’s policy proposal of investing £250 to £500 for 
each new-born child. For a discussion of the proposal see White (2012). 
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would have to ensure that there are still enough safety nets in place for lifespan 
sufficiency to be ensured and for people to be able to stand as relational equals at 
any point in their lifespan. My second reason for preferring the Baby Bond over the 
mortgage solution is practical and pragmatic. The Baby Bond idea is simpler 
because it can essentially be reduced to the ‘disarmingly simple idea’ of basic 
income as a right to existence. From birth to death, we would be entitled to this 
monthly cash grant, but as children, part of it would be saved for our adult lives. In 
some sense, the Baby Bond proposal reinforces and strengthens the simple 
message of basic income. The Mortgage-able Income proposal, on the contrary, 
risks threatening the basic foundations and moral significance of basic income by 
undermining the ideal of continuous guaranteed economic security. 
 
These concluding remarks have left us with a presumption for Basic Income over 
Basic Capital as the baseline for a radical egalitarian proposal for unconditional 
cash. But we have also acknowledged the need to consider hybrids of BI that also 
deliver some capital to the young. I have suggested that a Baby Bond/Basic Income 
proposal could help us meet the increasing need of the young for capital, especially 
in the US and in the UK, without undermining the basic income proposal. In fact, if 
anything, the Baby Bond strengthens the value of basic income by asserting it as a 
right to existence, from birth to death.  
 
In the coming chapter, I will now examine the intergenerational fairness of the 
democratic processes in which policy decisions are taken. Chapter 6 is devoted to 
discussing the problem of the political marginalisation of the young. I focus on 
whether the absence of young people in parliaments is problematic, intrinsically 
and instrumentally, for intergenerational equality. I discuss the introduction of 
youth quotas in parliament as a potential answer. 
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CHAPTER(6(* (YOUTH*ING(POLITICS:(THE(HOPES(OF(YOUTH(
QUOTAS((
 
 
When, before the 2005 general election, the Electoral 
Commission launched a campaign to persuade young people to 
vote with the shout-line: ‘If you don’t do politics… there’s not 
much you do do’, they missed the point entirely. It’s not that 
young people don’t do politics, it’s that modern politics doesn’t 
do young people 
(Howker and Malik 2010, 154) 
 
 
In 2005, Ipsos MORI calculated that the voting power of those over 55 in the UK 
was worth over 4 times that of 18-34 year-olds (Howker and Malik 2010, 157). 
The low political power of the young can be explained both by their low voting 
turnout and by the ageing of the electorate. When populations age, the median age 
of the electorate ages too. In the UK, the median voter’s age in 1991 was 44, and it 
is projected to be 51 years old in 2050 (Berry 2012, 21). Young voters are also 
much less likely to be registered for the elections: in 2011, only 56% of young 
people between the age of 19 and 24 were registered, whereas 90% of people 
between 55 and 64 years old and 94% of people aged above 65 years old were 
registered (The Electoral Commission 2011, 5). Voters’ turnouts are strongly 
correlated with age as well. In the 2009 local elections, only 10 per cent of 18-24 
year-olds said that they had voted compared to 85% of people of 65 years old and 
over (The Electoral Commission 2009, 27). The quantitative difference between 
potential voters, registered voters, and actual voters is directly correlated with age: 
the younger the voters, the higher the difference between potential and actual 
voting turnouts will be (Berry 2012, 34).  
 
In a report on young people’s political participation, Berry argues that there is an 
emerging “intergenerational democratic deficit” whereby young people are 
becoming marginalised within the democratic process (Berry 2012, 5). “While it 
may be premature or sensationalist to proclaim the rise of a ‘gerontocracy’”, Berry 
argues, “it is clear that today’s young people have become relatively 
disenfranchised” (Berry 2012, 5). There is a rising sense that the political 
marginalisation of the young is a growing problem for democratic legitimacy and 
that young people’s interests may get sidelined (Griffith 2011, Howker and Malik 
2010, Willetts 2010, Sloam 2012) This concern is not new. As Philippe Van Parijs 
(1998) claimed 15 years ago, the concern is that “they [the elderly] may use it 
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[their vote] in excessive manner to benefit their unavoidably short-term self-
interest” (Van Parijs 1998, 293). Similarly, Longman argued that "in an aging 
population, the great danger is that the electorate will become more and more 
focused on the short term, for there will eventually be fewer and fewer voters who 
are parents of young children and more who are concerned with having the state 
provide either for their own aged parents or for themselves in retirement" 
(Longman 1987, 143).  
 
One may find this intergenerational democratic deficit concerning from the point of 
view of intergenerational justice. First, the political marginalisation of the young 
may put in jeopardy the goal of achieving a community of relational equals 
professed by the synchronic relational egalitarian principle. If the young do not feel 
included in their political communities and disengage, we may worry that their 
status as equal citizens may be affected. Second, the democratic deficit may matter 
for instrumental reasons. If the young are politically marginalised, then there will 
be little incentive for politicians to take their interests seriously. There are a 
number of challenges the young face, such as higher rates of unemployment, which 
may not be given adequate weight, even though they can be expected to have a 
central impact on the life courses of those who are young. If, as Van Parijs (1998) 
claims, there is some evidence for thinking that voting behaviour is affected by 
“age-related self-interest”, then the goal of implementing intergenerationally fair 
policies may be undermined.  For these two reasons at least, it seems that there are 
some prima facie intergenerational reasons to examine ways to enhance youth 
participation. 
 
There are a number of possible ways to improve youth involvement in formal 
politics. We may enfranchise the young more through lowering the voting age, for 
instance, or through making voting compulsory. We may facilitate youth 
participation through implementing easier voting systems or making registration 
simpler. We may also increase funding for youth political initiatives and provide 
political training to more young people. In a recent report aimed at identifying 
ways to enhance youth participation, the UNDP (2013) also suggests encouraging 
parties to recruit more young people, supporting the development of youth wings in 
political parties, and developing civic education in schools and universities. The 
following diagram by Craig Berry categorises and lists a series of such possible 
changes to the democratic system to challenge the intergenerational democratic 
deficit.  
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Figure 9 - Range of possible changes to democratic systems (Berry 2012, 45) 
 
The categories illustrated include changes to the demography of the electorate 
(such as lowering the voting age to 16 years old), to the voting process (such as 
mandatory voting to make sure the young vote), and to the institutions (such as the 
introduction of youth quotas in legislatures). As I highlighted in red in the figure 
above, youth quotas (YQs) are the most radical institutional solution to the 
democratic deficit. Drawing on existing examples of youth quotas in the form of 
reserved seats for young people in parliament in Uganda, Kenya and Morocco, the 
UNDP (2013) also puts forward the introduction of youth quotas in electoral laws 
as a way to enhance youth representation and participation. The average age of the 
members of the European Parliament is 55 years old and the average age of the 
members of the UK parliament is 50. In France, there is currently only one MP 
under the age of 30 years old, 37 MPs under the age of 40 and 386 MPs between 
the age of 50 and 70 years old. Young people between the age of 18 and 35 years 
old are thus quantitatively under-represented in these three parliaments, but also as 
a general rule in most parliaments.22 
 
                                                      
22 The global average age of a parliamentarian is 53 years old when the median age of the 
global population is about 26 years old (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2012). 
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There is very little research available on the topic of age quotas23 and European 
politicians have not yet acknowledged it as a relevant policy to consider. How 
should we explain this lack of critical engagement with the invisibility of youth in 
parliament? Whether we believe in representation as the ideal of democracy or as 
the second best option after participatory democracy, it seems that the possibility of 
implementing quotas in order to prevent some social groups from becoming 
politically marginalised is now broadly acknowledged. Gender and ethnic quotas 
are studied, deliberated, tested or implemented. Why aren’t age quotas, in general, 
and youth quotas, in particular, discussed too? 
 
One response to this question is: ‘because age is special’. If women and ethnic 
minorities are not represented in parliaments, they will have been treated unequally 
in comparison with other citizens. On the contrary, if you adopt a diachronic 
perspective, if young people are not represented, they will not have been treated 
unequally over their complete lives when compared with other age groups, who 
were young themselves at some point. This specificity of age partly explains why 
the absence of young people in parliaments is not seen as an injustice as are 
inequalities in representation between other social groups. As Philips argues in a 
brief paragraph on the underrepresentation of young people in politics: “The 
situation of women looks more obviously unfair [than young people’s] in that 
women will be under-represented throughout their entire lives” (Philips 1995, 63).  
 
There is another relevant distinction to be made between the justification of gender 
or ethnic quotas and the discussion of youth quotas. If women are not represented 
in parliament, then it is likely to mean that they do not stand a fair chance in the 
competition for these social positions. The history of gender domination and 
exclusion substantiates the suspicion (Philips 1995, Mansbridge 1999, Williams 
1998). Gender and ethnicity are not relevant grounds for exclusion from such 
positions. On grounds of fair equality of opportunity therefore, and against unfair 
discriminations, one may support the introduction of quotas in parliament for these 
groups to restore equality of opportunity. However, this argument is unlikely to 
work for young people. Indeed, the main explanation and justification for the 
absence of young people in parliament is likely to be their lack of experience. 
Experience, unlike gender or ethnicity, is a relevant feature of the position of being 
                                                      
23 Both Philips (1995, 63) and Van Parijs (1998) noted the absence of engagement with age 
quotas two decades ago. More recently, in 2012, the German Foundation for the Rights of 
Future Generations and the London based Intergenerational Foundation launched a call for 
paper on Youth Quotas and intergenerational justice (2012). 
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a MP. In other words, it is not the case that the exclusionary criterion in the case of 
young people is irrelevant to the position of being a MP.  
 
For these two reasons at least, it is likely that the best defences of youth quotas will 
rely on an instrumental justification. Rather than arguing, as for gender, that the 
inequality in representation is prima facie unfair, one may want to insist on both 
the negative consequences that the absence of young people in parliaments causes 
and the positive outcomes that introducing youth quotas could bring about. This 
chapter provides this instrumental justification and claims that youth quotas, 
insofar as they can indeed help in bringing about intergenerationally fairer 
outcomes, deserve to be seriously considered.  
 
In the literature on quotas, two kinds of grounds for quotas are often emphasized: 
on the one hand, the policy level or substantive representation and, on the other 
hand, the symbolic level or symbolic representation (Philips 1995, Mansbridge 
1999). The first is about the impact that quotas can have for the policies that will be 
discussed and implemented. The second is about the impact that the 
implementation of quotas could have, beyond the parliamentary room, for social 
cohesion. In this chapter, along those two lines, I put forward two instrumental 
arguments for the introduction of youth quotas and argue that they jointly provide a 
good basis for a politics of youth presence in parliaments. In Section 6.1, I evaluate 
the impact that youth quotas can have on enhancing the chances of 
intergenerationally fair policies being implemented. In Section 6.2, I show that 
youth quotas can play an important symbolic role in the promotion of a community 
of political equals, with potential implications for youth political participation.  I 
argue that YQs can be expected to have an impact on IG equality for both policy 
and symbolic reasons. In Section 6.3, I introduce an original distinction between 
two kinds of quotas: cohort and age quotas.  
 
6.1 Substantive( Representation:( What( can( YQs( Do( for(
Deliberations(
 
Jane Mansbridge (1999) argues that one key ground for supporting the introduction 
of descriptive representatives – that is representatives from selected marginalised 
groups – is that it enhances “the substantive representation of the group's interests 
by improving the quality of deliberation” (Mansbridge 1999, 628). In this section, I 
evaluate the kind of impact the introduction of youth quotas can have on 
parliamentary deliberations - that is on the ideas discussed and ultimately on the 
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policies implemented. I argue that a correlation between a youth presence in 
parliament and fairer intergenerational outcomes is likely, and that this gives us a 
first reason to support the introduction of youth quotas in parliaments on grounds 
of justice between generations.  
 
In The Politics of Presence, Anne Philips (1995) puts forward a justification for 
gender and ethnic quotas based on: “the need to tackle those exclusions inherent in 
the party packaging of political ideas, the need for more vigorous advocacy on 
behalf of disadvantaged groups, and the importance of a politics of transformation 
in opening up a fuller range of policy options” (Philips 1995, 37). My defense of 
youth quotas formulates similar arguments. Mitigating the underrepresentation of 
young people, I argue, is desirable: to prevent the exclusion of some age-related 
concerns from the party packaging of political ideas – for instance, concerns 
related to affordable housing, education, and unemployment (Section 6.1.2); to 
increase the chance of more vigorous advocacy on behalf of the young – for 
instance, through speaking out against misrepresentations of the young as lazy and 
self-serving (Section 6.1.3); and to open up a fuller range of policy options – for 
instance, because intergenerational diversity promotes more innovative and 
competent deliberations, and for epistemic reasons (Section 6.1.4). I conclude by 
explicitly articulating these three hopes of youth quotas with the goals of 
intergenerational justice (Section 6.1.5.). But I will briefly start with two important 
limitations of the substantive argument for quotas (Section 6.1.1). 
6.1.1 Narrowing(the(scope(of(the(substantive(representation(argument((
 
The idea of substantive representation presupposes that there are such things as 
‘group interests’ such as ‘women’s interests’. In my case, assessing the potential 
impact of youth quotas on the substantive representation of ‘youth interests’ 
presupposes such group-based conception of interests. However, this approach 
risks unduly essentialising groups: “Essentialism involves assuming a single or 
essential trait, or nature, that binds every member of a descriptive group together, 
giving them common interests that, in the most extreme versions of the idea, 
transcend the interests that divide them” (Mansbridge 1999, 637). In the case of 
young people, we may too quickly assume that they have common substantive 
interests. We may also presuppose that older MPs cannot represent any such 
interests adequately. We may also disregard more important differences, such as 
those stemming from class membership.  
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Appealing to such an overly essentialist understanding of the category of young 
people to justify quotas is likely to be farfetched. The impact of age on political 
ideas is not prevalent. In the UK, in the 2010 General Election, for instance, young 
people voted equally for the three dominant parties: 30% of young people between 
18 and 24 years old voted Conservatives, 31% Labour and 30% Lib-Dem 
(Cracknell, McGuinness, and Rhodes 2011, 36)24. The support for pensions among 
the young is often high, as attested for instance by the solidarity demonstrations in 
France in support for pensions in 2010. Promoting an essentialist conception of age 
groups is also potentially counterproductive because, given that society is ageing 
anyway, the last thing we want is for institutions to reinforce the view that one 
should only vote for what is best for one’s own age group. This would in fact 
ensure that institutions would be age biased because the majority age group would 
be encouraged to shape institutions in a way that meets its own temporal interests 
as they age.  
 
However, one does not have to be in the grips of an overly essentialist view of age 
to make a successful argument for youth quotas. One merely has to assume that 
there are some age or cohort-related interests, concerns or goals that have some 
impact on people’s voting behaviours. Age seems to have at least some impact on 
people’s views on which policies should be implemented: “voting at referenda on 
long-term ecological issues such as whether or not a country should abandon 
nuclear energy has been shown to be strongly related to age” (Van Parijs 1995, 
298). For instance, Van Parijs uses the example of a 1990 referundum in 
Switzerland organised for a phase-out on nuclear energy: 64% of the 18-29 age 
range and 57% of the 30-39 supported the proposal, but it was rejected since only 
47% of the overall population supported it – the favourable votes of the youngest 
were outweigted by the negative votes of older voters.  
 
More recently, Berry also showed that age has some impact on how people vote. 
For instance, drawing on Furlong and Cartmel’s research based on the British 
Election Survey 2009/10 he showed that ‘unemployment’ was an issue that 
concerned the members of Generation Y (15-30 years old) significantly more than 
members of the baby-boomers generation. The topic of ‘health care’ was seen as a 
priority over unemployment by both the baby-boomers and the generation before 
them (the ‘silent generation’) (Berry 2012, 13). In short, one simply needs to 
recognize that age groups, because of their position in the lifespan and their cohort 
                                                      
24 Note that, although young people were equally likely to vote for the three parties, voters 
aged over 65 years old were 44% likely to vote for conservatives and only 16% likely to 
vote for Lib-Dem. They were however 31% likely to vote for Labour (just like the 18-24). 
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membership, share a series of common concerns, goals and experiences. I will only 
appeal to this weak understanding of youth interests in the rest of this section.  
 
Another important limitation of descriptive representation as substantive 
representation must be raised here. There is a fundamental distinction to be made 
between the underrepresentation of young people on the electors’ side, on the one 
hand, and on the representatives’ side, on the other. The possible correlation 
between age, cohort and voting power, does not seem to provide evident reasons to 
consider modifying the composition of representative bodies. All Van Parijs, 
Longman and Berry seem to claim is that there is a correlation between voting and 
age. The problem would then be the ageing of the electorate, not the age of 
parliamentarians per se. Young MPs may find themselves victim of the problem of 
having to meet the short-term interests of their electorates too, just like older MPs. 
If anything, population ageing may give us reasons to consider a number of voting 
reforms, but not directly to bring in more young people in parliaments. This is an 
important limitation on what quotas can do alone if the young remain relatively 
disenfranchised. The aim of this section is precisely to establish the special 
significance and hopes of descriptive representation itself, independently from 
what voting can do. 
6.1.2 Preventing(the(exclusion(of(youth(interests(from(the(party(packaging(of(
political(ideas(
 
Regardless of the party membership of young MPs, they may contribute in 
expanding the available party policy package through pushing for a better inclusion 
of youth concerns in political agendas. Anne Philips (1995, 27-57) identifies such 
party packaging as a fundamental argument for quotas. It does not rely on a too 
substantive conception of youth interests. Some groups may have common 
concerns but its members may interpret them in different ways based on their 
goals, values, party lines or social class. Quotas can help in making sure that 
political parties include those concerns, whatever their responses may be. It may 
therefore promote more deliberations in parliaments on these issues. This seems 
particularly relevant when studies show that the young do not feel that politicians 
take their concerns seriously. In a survey on young people’s attitudes towards 
political parties, for instance, Hen and Foard showed that only 7% of 18 year-olds 
thought that political parties were interested in the same issues that concern young 
people (Hen and Foard in Berry 2012, 40).  
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Older MPs have been young too and can thus relate to some such concerns.  
However, they are not young now and may thus miss out on some cohort-related 
concerns. Indeed, there is an important difference between period effects, on the 
one hand, and age effects, on the other hand (Chauvel 1998, 286-289). The period 
effect designates the impact of an event at a given time: for instance, the effects of 
a financial crisis can be described as period effects. Arguably, many people suffer 
its consequences, regardless of their age. However, there are also age effects, 
which designate the impact of age and membership in a generation on given 
outcomes. Poverty or unemployment as a result of the same financial crisis will be 
experienced very differently if lived at a young age or towards the end of one’s 
career, for instance. For young people, youth unemployment and poverty can lead 
to dependency on one’s parents, including for accommodation and income. Youth 
unemployment may also lead to the postponement of projects young people might 
value, such as founding a family or buying a home (Wolff and De-Shalit’s (2007)’s 
planning-blight phenomenon referred to in Chapter 4).  
 
In parliaments, younger MPs may thus pick on specific problems relating to 
housing, education and unemployment in a different way than older MPs would. 
The 28-year-old MP Jo Swinson, in 2009, complained about the lack of age 
diversity within the UK parliament:  
 
There are a huge number of Oxbridge-educated lawyers elected as MPs 
when they are middle-aged. There is not a single MP who has paid tuition 
fees. We have a large part of the population with debts from these or who 
face working well into old age because of pension changes, but there is no 
person in Parliament who shares, or will share, their experience. 
 
 (Swinson in Parkinson 2009) 
 
The absence of age diversity, Swinson suggests, has an impact on the kinds of 
social experiences represented. One may thus hope that a more age-diverse 
parliament can better account for the age and cohort related plurality of 
experiences. The virtue of shared experience thus offers an important ground for 
descriptive representation, as Manbridge argues. One first argument for youth 
quotas, therefore, is that more age-diverse parliaments will be better able to 
represent the range of concerns that constituents may have. YQs would introduce 
more experiential diversity into deliberations. 
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6.1.3 Increasing(the(chance(of(more(vigorous(advocacy(on(behalf(of(the(young(
 
We may also defend the introduction of youth quotas on the ground that there is an 
important risk that policies and debates will be driven by misrepresentations, if 
conducted solely within some age groups and in exclusion of others. If an age 
group is absent from the debates, its aspirations and problems may become 
distorted. French and British youth policies, for instance, can be said to have been 
driven to a large extent on false representations and often unfair prejudices 
(Buckingham 2012, Howker and Malik 2010, Intergenerational Foundation 2012). 
Malik and Howker complain: “More than anything we’re vulnerable and yet the 
attitude of much of the society towards us is that we’re lazy and undeserving” 
(Howker and Malik 2010, 69).  
 
The Intergenerational Foundation recently published a report on the perception of 
young people in European countries. The results are quite compelling and account 
for the poor perception of younger people in the UK: “British people in their 20s 
achieved the lowest scores of any country in relation to being viewed with respect. 
(…) In terms of contempt, British people in their 20s came first” (Leach 2011).  
Because of these misrepresentations, as Furlong and Cartmel argue, “when issues 
emerge that have a core relevance for young people, they are often tackled from a 
paternalistic and condescending ‘we know what’s best for you’ perspective” 
(Furlong and Cartmel in Berry 2012, 16). An example they put forward is 
unemployment policy: politicians “tend to focus not so much on creating 
opportunities, but on (…) motivating young people who are presented as feckless 
and even as ‘inadequate citizens’” (Furlong and Cartmel in Berry 2012, 16).  
 
An example of the impact such misrepresentations may have is the denial of a 
means-tested minimum income guarantee to French Citizens under 25 years old. 
Since its introduction in 1988, the access to a minimum income guarantee in 
France has been restricted to citizens over the age of 25 years old. In 2009, the 
scheme was finally reformed to include young people under 25 years old, but with 
much more restrictive requirements: to be entitled to benefits, they must have 
already worked for at least two full time years in the past three. As a result, only a 
few thousand young persons have access to a basic minimum income when they 
need it, while over 20% of French youth live in poverty. In fact, most arguments 
that were provided were either infantilizing or paternalistic: young people do not 
deserve it, they will be idle and lazy if they receive it, they do not really need it and 
they should not be given something for nothing (Bidadanure 2012). If young 
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persons had had a stronger voice, including stronger representatives, when this age-
based discrimination pertained 25 , it would possibly have encountered more 
resistance. We may hope that bringing in more young persons in parliaments can 
have the modest impact of not leaving the misrepresentations unchallenged.  
 
Youth quotas can thus have the second important benefit of increasing the chance 
of ‘more vigorous advocacy’ on behalf of the young for instance through speaking 
out against misrepresentations of the young as lazy and self-serving. We can hope 
that the young will be fiercer challengers of some misrepresentations and can act as 
watchdogs for age-based discriminations. 
6.1.4 Opening(up(a(fuller(range(of(policy(options(and(instigating(change(
 
For the two reasons previously mentioned - that quotas increase experiential 
diversity and that young people may be fiercer advocates on behalf of the young -
descriptive representation may also contribute to opening up a fuller range of 
policy options. In the UK, the Labour and Conservative parties both emphasize 
personal desert and an obligation-to-work rhetoric in relation to youth 
unemployment (Cooke 2013b, 11). Including more young people in deliberations 
may contribute to diversifying further the range of possible options. Of course, 
there is no guarantee that it will in fact diversify policies substantively, but it is 
another potential outcome of YQs. As Anne Philips argues, one of the key 
potentials of descriptive representation is precisely this opening of possibilities. It 
is about “what would emerge under more favorable conditions”, that is if 
parliaments were more diverse (Philips 1995, 52). Mansbridge and Philips also 
suggest that the descriptive representation of some groups is likely to further 
innovation and change. I want to take this case for diversity in parliaments a bit 
further and argue that intergenerational diversity may increase innovation in 
problem solving and promote change. 
 
Hélène Landemore makes an interesting argument about cognitive diversity in 
representative bodies. She argues that diversity in fact trumps individual expertise 
and she vouches for a collective understanding of competence. Drawing on Page 
and Hong, she argues that cognitive diversity is what matters most to the quality of 
collective problem-solving (Landemore 2012, 251-289). She defines cognitive 
diversity as the range of perspectives through which people approach a problem or 
                                                      
25 The first version of the scheme, which completely excluded young people under 25 years 
old, was considered an illegitimate discrimination by the French Equal Opportunities and 
Anti-Discrimination Commission (HALDE 2008, 8-10). 
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a question. In a footnote, Landemore suggests that, if there is a connection between 
cognitive diversity and other forms of diversity, like gender, then the argument of 
cognitive diversity may also be an argument for descriptive representation: “the 
argument suggests that positive discrimination is not just a good thing on fairness 
grounds but also for epistemic reasons. I will not enter that complicated debate 
here but it is clearly one of the potential implications of an argument advocating 
the epistemic properties of cognitive diversity” (Landemore 2012, 261). One may 
want to take this intriguing thought of Landemore’s further in the context of the 
descriptive representation of the young. 
 
If it were the case that both age diversity and cohort diversity increased cognitive 
diversity, which is very likely to be the case, then this would support the claim that 
more intergenerationally diverse parliaments may be more competent than less 
intergenerational ones. There is in fact an extensive literature26 on the benefits of 
intergenerational practices and collaborations for the transmission of knowledge 
and the development of original and innovating problem-solving mechanisms. The 
French President François Hollande, for instance, introduced the “contrats de 
générations” (generational contracts) in firms to encourage the recruitment of 
young people and to facilitate their training processes, while protecting the job 
positions of senior workers. The launch of this programme was defended on the 
basis that intergenerational environments foster a better understanding and 
resolution of problems and spur more innovation and originality (Ministère du 
Travail).  
 
Another example is a study conducted on intergenerational partnerships by the 
Institute of National Economy in Bucharest, which tested the hypothesis that there 
could be a positive correlation between research performance and intergenerational 
practices (Zaman, Sandu, and Anghel 2009, 607). Their study drew on research 
that shows that diversity, in general, constitutes an advantage for innovation and 
showed that it is also the case for age-diversity:  
 
Older researchers bring greater abilities in doing research projects 
proposals, higher level of accumulated integrated knowledge in a certain 
scientific field, a wide relationship network and greater propensity and 
desire to cooperate. On the other hand, young researchers contribute to the 
teamwork with their enthusiasm, higher documentation and data electronic 
processing capacity, experienced gained along postgraduate or 
postdoctoral education programs they have attended abroad, greater 
                                                      
26 The Beth Johnson Foundation’s Centre for Intergenerational Practices, for instance, 
provides much research on the benefits of intergenerational practices (Beth Johnson 
Foundation 2013).  
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mobility, greater ability to adapt to electronic systems and procedures for 
accessing national and international funds and the determination to build a 
career in research.  
(Zaman, Sandu, and Anghel 2009, 611) 
 
One may then ask, if intergenerational collaboration fosters innovation and 
efficiency in firms and academic spheres, then why would it not do so in 
parliaments? This shift to a more holistic conception of expertise provides an 
indirect reason to introduce youth quotas in parliaments: if it can be shown that 
collaboration between young and old promotes innovation and efficiency, then the 
absence of young people in parliaments risks undermining the quality of 
parliamentary discussions (compared to what they could be). The burden of proof 
then lies on those opposing the introduction of quotas to show why we are not 
missing out, or why the costs of youth quotas would be higher than the benefits of 
IG cooperation.  
 
There is an important risk with this epistemic argument for the significance of 
diversity for deliberation. It seems to glorify ‘competence’ as the right sort of 
consideration for reforming legislatures. However, I only want to suggest that 
intergenerational diversity may be one advantage of the introduction of youth 
quotas. So far, I have put forward two other arguments for youth quotas: they may 
help in preventing the exclusion of some youth concerns from the party packaging 
of political ideas; they can also be seen as increasing the chances of more vigorous 
advocacy on behalf of the young. I see the epistemic value of diversity as an extra 
argument rather than as the deciding consideration. Let me now articulate these 
potential benefits of YQs in parliaments more directly with the demands of 
intergenerational justice.  
6.1.5 Youth(quotas,(policies(and(intergenerational(justice(
 
As I have argued in Chapter 4, young people may be said to share a number of 
justice-based interests. Such interests include their diachronic interests, as a cohort, 
in having access to at least roughly the same opportunities as the generation before 
them, and their correlated interest in prudent institutions that show sufficient 
concern for lifespan efficiency, and prevent the phenomenon of diachronic 
clustering of disadvantage. The young also have a synchronic interest in being 
treated as equals, as defined through the synchronic relational egalitarian principle. 
It is a requirement of intergenerational equality that such justice-based interests be 
advanced as much as other age groups’ justice-based interests. Do the three 
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previous arguments highlighted for youth quotas contribute to the promotion of 
such goals?  
 
First, if representatives underestimate, at best, and misrepresent as laziness, at 
worst, the challenges that young people are facing, then policies are likely to be 
inadequate. As Daniels suggested, the best way to establish the requirements of 
lifespan prudence would be to appeal to a veiled representative body - as this 
would preserve impartiality and prevent age bias. In practice, it is of course 
impossible to reproduce the age-neutrality of the prudent planners. However, in 
non-ideal circumstances, it seems that the least we can do is to make sure that 
deliberative bodies do include representatives from all age groups to limit the risk 
of age bias. Drawing on previous discussions, we may therefore argue that, in non-
ideal circumstances, the politics of prudence requires a politics of presence, defined 
by Philips’s as the enhancement of the political representation of disadvantaged 
groups through quotas.  
 
Second, as far as equality between cohorts and synchronic relational equality are 
concerned, it also seems that quotas can help. Unless we assume that there is 
absolutely no impact of age and cohort-related self-interest, the total absence of a 
given cohort from deliberations is unsatisfactory. Even if older age groups are able 
to represent young people’s concerns, to a certain extent, they may miss out on 
important concerns they may have. Take the example of internships. To a recent 
online survey conducted by Arte on young people (16-35), 84% of young 
respondents expressed the view that unpaid internships were exploitative and 
should be abolished (Europe Arte TV 2014). And yet, just over half of young 
people in the EU who work as interns received compensation for their last 
internship (European Commission 2013, 11). If the young feel this way and their 
representatives tolerate unpaid internships nonetheless, then we can see how the 
synchronic relational egalitarian principle may be both directly and indirectly 
undermined. The young may also need to take part in deliberations to define what 
should count as ‘normal’ in terms of their opportunity range. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the age-relative normal opportunity range requirement is limited if it is 
defined through what the empirical norm actually is at the present time. Inclusive 
deliberations may be particularly instrumental in defining what counts as a 
‘reasonable’ set of opportunities for the young to have access to.  
 
I have also identified innovation in problem solving as a potential benefit of youth 
quotas. However, it is not clear that this helps improve intergenerational fairness. It 
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may just be a side advantage of quotas. Innovation and efficiency may be 
beneficial, but they may not lead us closer to justice. The only way to articulate this 
more directly with IG justice is if we endorse a substantive epistemic 
understanding of deliberation. A procedure is referred to as epistemic when it 
brings us closer to the ‘true’ understanding of justice. We could argue that 
intergenerationally diverse parliaments have epistemic value in that they bring us 
closer to justice, properly understood. However, I do not share this substantive 
epistemic understanding of deliberations. For this reason, I cannot conclude that 
the third argument for quotas for the young brings use closer to the requirements of 
intergenerational justice.  
 
In Section 6.1, my argument revolved around the view that there is a possible 
substantive impact of a certain kind of presence in parliaments on the ideas that 
will be expressed, and ultimately on the policies that will be adopted. As Anne 
Philips puts it, “part of what sustained the development of an autonomous women's 
movement was the arrogance of those who thought that ideas could be separated 
from presence” (Philips 1995, 7). By this, she challenges the view that there is no 
correlation between gender and ideas. I have tried to show, like defenders of 
gender or ethnic quotas, that there is a potential negative correlation between the 
total absence of young people in parliaments and the adequate representation of 
their concerns. I have also argued that there is a potential epistemic advantage of 
intergenerational diversity in parliaments and that the absence of young people is 
also problematic on such grounds. These claims provide the first basis for a politics 
of youth presence: the absence of young people is detrimental for the quality of 
deliberative bodies and for the adequate representation of some youth interests. 
Ultimately, I have articulated these arguments for quotas with my intergenerational 
framework, and concluded that youth quotas can increase our chances of meeting 
the demands of intergenerational justice.  
 
However, I have also suggested that a certain kind of presence is no ‘guarantee’ as 
such of certain kinds of ideas being expressed and of certain policies being 
implemented. I have started this discussion with two limitations of descriptive 
representation: we cannot over-essentialise the young and assume that young MPs 
will be better at promoting youth concerns; and even if they are, it will not directly 
affect imbalances in power at the voting level. The impact of quotas on substantive 
representation is thus potentially not as radical as one may hope.27 This does not 
                                                      
27 Note that we may also consider that the burden of proof lies on those who oppose the 
introduction of quotas to show that the absence of descriptive representatives from 
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mean that youth quotas will have no impact on intergenerational fairness. As I have 
shown, there are several reasons to believe that the introduction of quotas will have 
a positive impact on deliberations. However, this limitation shows that the 
substantive case for quotas may not provide on its own a sufficient basis for youth 
quotas in parliaments. This leads us to another important argument in favour of 
YQs. I will now show that regardless of the impact that descriptive representation 
can have on the quality of deliberations, YQs can also be defended on symbolic 
grounds.  
 
6.2 Symbolic(Representation:(Promoting(a(Community(of(Equals(
 
The symbolic value of representation is, in Philips’s account, one in four legitimate 
grounds for a politics of presence. I already have highlighted the other three earlier 
in this chapter - the need to tackle exclusion in the party packaging of ideas, the 
need for more vigorous advocacy on behalf of disadvantaged groups, and the 
importance of a politics of change open to a fuller range of policy options. I have 
categorized the three first arguments as being about the substantive value of 
descriptive representation and will now focus on the symbolic value of descriptive 
representation. “If subsequent scrutiny established that an under‐participation of 
women (…) had no observable consequences (an unlikely outcome, but still in 
principle possible)” Philips argues, “this would not significantly alter the 
judgement that such inequality is undesirable” (Philips 1995, 33). The symbolic 
value of descriptive representation is such that, even if there was only little 
evidence that quotas affect the substantive representation of the marginalised 
group’s interests, there would still be independent reasons to advocate for a politics 
of presence. Jointly the substantive and symbolic arguments provide a good basis 
for the introduction of youth quotas in parliament. 
 
In this section, I distinguish two interrelated sides of the symbolic significance of 
descriptive representation. First, drawing on Tim Scanlon’s work on the value of 
choice, I argue that descriptive representation can be said to have demonstrative 
symbolic value – it publically attests the equal political value of marginalised 
groups and creates a social meaning of ability to rule (Section 6.2.1). Second, I 
argue that descriptive representation also has instrumental symbolic value – that is, 
it may have a positive impact on the social inclusion of marginalised groups and on 
                                                                                                                                         
marginalized groups would have no impact on deliberations from the three substantive 
point of views I have highlighted (party-packaging of political ideas; vigorous advocacy of 
group’s interest and innovation through enhanced diversity). 
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their political participation (Section 6.2.2). These two sides of symbolic 
representation are causally interrelated: the demonstrative value underpins and 
explains the instrumental effects descriptive representation may have. For this 
reason, Philips and Mansbridge, for instance, do not separate these two kinds of 
symbolic values. However, the analytical separation is the best way to account for 
the fact that, while the symbolic instrumental value of quotas may potentially be 
empirically verified or disproved, the demonstrative symbolic value may not (or at 
least not as easily). The demonstrative value of quotas touches on something more 
fundamental: the fact that a certain kind of presence matters for political equality.  
6.2.1 The(demonstrative(symbolic(value(of(YQs(
 
In his Tanner Lectures on the significance of choice, Tim Scanlon (1986) 
distinguishes three reasons we have to value individual choice: choice has 
predictive value, demonstrative value, and symbolic value (Scanlon 1986, 177-
185). If I order my own food at the restaurant, instead of letting someone else 
choose for me, then the order is likely to match my preferences better than it would 
otherwise (Scanlon 1986, 177-179). This way, choice has predictive value – in 
many circumstances, the fact that I choose for myself predicts that the results of my 
choices will accurately match my preferences. However, Scanlon argues, the 
predictive value of choice is relative and conditional: I may not know much about 
the cuisine in this given restaurant or I may be drunk. In which case, someone else 
may be better than I am at ordering the right thing for me. This often justifies 
paternalistic policies. The predictive value of choice, however, is not the only value 
of choice. In other words, it may be valuable for me as a person to choose for 
myself even if I am not the best judge of what my own interest is. Indeed, Scanlon 
argues, choice also has demonstrative and symbolic value.  
 
Scanlon illustrates the demonstrative value of choice by appealing to the following 
example (Scanlon 1986, 179): when you buy a gift for someone, the best way to 
make sure that they get what they prefer is often to let them decide what they want 
or to give them money. However, getting them exactly what they prefer is partly 
beside the point. Gift giving is an opportunity to demonstrate care, affection and 
knowledge. Likewise, the symbolic value of choice is unrelated to the predictive 
value. In a situation where people are normally allowed to make their own choices, 
Scanlon argues, “I may value having a choice because my not having it would 
reflect a judgement on my own or someone else’s part that I fall below the 
expected standard of competence” (Scanlon 1986, 180). In some circumstances, if I 
am not allowed to make a choice, it may mean that I am considered as ‘inferior’. 
 
190 
This matters all the more, Scanlon argues, if the members of my group are 
systematically questioned in their capacity to choose for themselves. The 
demonstrative and symbolic values of choice are both unrelated to the predictive 
value of choice precisely because they are non-instrumental. Regardless of whether 
I may get the results wrong, my choice may have demonstrative and symbolic 
value.  
 
How do these distinctions relate to the symbolic value of descriptive 
representation? Scanlon is primarily concerned with individual choices, not with 
the representation of these choices by suitable people. There is a big stretch 
between saying that my individual choice matters for demonstrative and symbolic 
reasons, on the one hand, and saying that my being politically represented by 
people who ‘look like me’ has demonstrative and symbolic value, on the other 
hand. In fact, Scanlon’s discussion of the symbolic value of choice already makes 
some claims about groups, categories and norms. Scanlon is partly concerned that 
paternalistic policies respect the multiple ways in which choice matters: even when 
people are not able to decide what is best for themselves, part of what must be 
taken into consideration is whether some particular groups are “being held inferior 
in the argument for legal regulation” (Scanlon 1986, 181).  
 
In many circumstances, group identity has a meaning for whether given individuals 
are acknowledged as equals or not. In this way, descriptive representation may be 
considered as contributing to the self-image of marginalised groups. If there are no 
women in parliaments, this has negative value for women’s self-image as political 
equals. If there are women in parliaments, this has positive demonstrative value for 
women’s self-image. Scanlon’s two non-instrumental concepts thus seem to work 
together in the case of descriptive representation. I will thus keep the distinction 
between predictive value, on the one hand, and symbolic and demonstrative values, 
on the other hand, but collapse the two latter non-instrumental values into one. 
Descriptive quotas may thus be said to have what I henceforth refer to as 
demonstrative symbolic value – they attest that the relevant groups are political 
equals, entirely regardless of their potential substantive contributions to 
parliamentary deliberations.  
 
Robert Goodin (1977) draws a parallel distinction between self-interest and self-
image. Regardless of the substantive impact quotas can have for the representation 
of the interests of marginalised groups, political representation matters for self-
image as well: “people's self-images are, at least in places and in part, tied up with 
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politics” (Goodin 1977, 259). Goodin highlights this distinction between self-
interest and self-image to contradict social scientists who object to quotas on the 
ground that they have little impact on the substantive representation of the group’s 
interests. Goodin argues that demonstrating the inapplicability of one argument 
(self-interest) does not dismiss the other (self-image) (Goodin 1977, 260). 
 
Similarly, Philips (1995, 27-57) emphasizes the importance of the composition of 
parliaments for attesting to the political equality of women. Some men may be 
better at advancing the cause of women than some women will (for example, for 
ideological reasons). But this is unlikely to exhaust our reasons for thinking that 
the absence of women in parliaments is a problem for political equality. We need 
women in parliaments regardless of whether they will advance the cause of 
women. We need ethnic minorities regardless of whether they will in fact have a 
concrete positive impact on antiracism. We hope that it will be the case and this 
gives us extra reasons for implementing quotas in general, but the potential 
substantive impact on deliberations and policies is not the only justification. 
Diversity of geographical origins, ethnic backgrounds, genders, sexual orientations, 
and occupation has an important symbolic value. As Mansbridge argues, 
descriptive representation is likely to play a key role in creating “a social meaning 
of ability to rule” for groups that are not considered as fit for politics (Mansbridge 
1999, 648-650).  
 
Drawing on this demonstrative symbolic value of quotas, one may argue that youth 
quotas would consist in a “public acknowledgment of equal value”, to borrow 
Charles Taylor’s expression (Taylor in Philips 1995, 40). It would signal to society 
and young people that their contribution is valued and that they are considered with 
equal respect. Their status of equal citizens would be attested, recognised and 
emphasized. The absence of young people in parliaments on the contrary, may 
signal the opposite and create a social meaning of inability to rule. It may 
contribute to an apolitical self-image of young adults, generate a sense that the 
young are of lower social, or at least political, status, and reinforce the sense that 
older people are more fit to rule.  
 
If we care about the goal of a community of equals where people relate to each 
other as equals throughout their adult life, as I have discussed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4, then the existence of such social meaning of political inferiority is 
problematic and must be undermined. Youth quotas could thus participate in a 
redefinition of young adulthood. They could contribute to the construction of a 
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social understanding of the young as able to rule and reinforce their image of equal 
citizens. Gender and ethnic quotas contribute to undermining the view that only 
white men are able to be in parliaments.28 Youth quotas have the potential to 
undermine the age norm that young citizens under 30 years old are not fit to rule, 
thus contributing to the political equalisation of young people.  
 
Like Philips, Mansbridge does not consider the case of young people. She only 
mentions young people as needing “role models” as diverse as possible in positions 
of authority, including parliaments (Mansbridge 1999, 651). Goodin (1977), 
however, elaborates his argument about the importance of self-image in the context 
of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, where quotas had been introduced 
for women, black people and also for young people in each state legislature. 
Quotas were introduced to remediate the critical underrepresentation of all three 
groups in previous Conventions. In the context of the Vietnam War, the absence of 
young people was considered all the more concerning given that their age group 
was disproportionately affected by the war. The idea that the young would not be 
included in political deliberations and did not enjoy an equal status of authority 
exacerbated the perceived generational tension. The value of quotas could thus be 
expressed partly in this symbolic vein of asserting the political equality of 
marginalised groups. Legislative bodies, as figures of political authority and power, 
are particularly suitable contexts for the symbolic demonstration of political 
equality.  
 
In this section, I claimed that descriptive representation in general, and youth 
quotas in particular, can be said to hold demonstrative symbolic value. The 
introduction of youth quotas would explicitly attest to young people’s political 
equality, thus contributing to a social meaning of ability to rule. It is tempting to 
consider the symbolic argument as merely non-instrumental. After all, I introduced 
the symbolic argument by stating that we want young people in parliaments 
‘regardless’ of the impact it may or may not have on procedures. However, it 
would be a mistake to consider the symbolic value of youth quotas as merely non-
                                                      
28 There is a possible counterargument that quotas for underrepresented groups in fact have 
the opposite outcome of reinforcing, rather than undermining, the view that only white men 
are able to be in parliament on merit. If this were true, then it would weaken the claim that 
quotas help creating a social meaning of ability to rule for marginalised groups. One 
possible way to answer this objection is that, far from abandoning quotas, we should find a 
way to improve the political communication of quotas. In an interesting paper, Rainbow 
Murray (2014) argues that we should emphasize the ‘over-representation of men’ rather 
than the ‘underrepresentation of women’ and should introduce ‘quotas’ for men to reframe 
the debate. The burden of proof would then be on men to justify that they “deserve” to be 
overrepresented. 
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instrumental. I will now introduce the instrumental symbolic value of YQs. This 
instrumental value of quotas fundamentally differs from what I have referred to as 
‘substantive representation’ in the first section of this chapter. As Mansbridge 
claims, symbols are instrumental too, but they differ in that they promote goods 
unrelated to substantive representation. I was first concerned with the impact of 
youth quotas on the substantive representation of youth interests in parliaments. 
With the instrumental symbolic value of quotas, however, I will now examine the 
society-wide effects that the public acknowledgement of equal value can be 
expected to have.  
6.2.2 The(symbolic(instrumental(value(of(YQs((
 
The presence of descriptive representatives, as Mansbridge argues, is likely to have 
some positive effects on the feelings of inclusion of politically marginalised 
groups: “From this perspective, if the costs are not too great, we should promote 
diversity in positions of authority and excellence” (Mansbridge 1999, 651). Age 
diversity may be an important kind of diversity, especially if some age groups, like 
the young, but also maybe the very old, are politically marginalised. More age 
diversity in parliament may be particularly instrumental in bringing about a more 
cohesive society.  
 
Youth quotas could indirectly play a role in encouraging young people to vote, for 
instance. As Malik and Howker argues, it would be too simplistic to believe that 
young people simply do not want to engage to explain the fact that their voting 
turnout is so low:  
 
When, before the 2005 general election, the Electoral Commission 
launched a campaign to persuade young people to vote with the shout-line: 
‘If you don’t do politics… there’s not much you do do’, they missed the 
point entirely. It’s not that young people don’t do politics, it’s that modern 
politics doesn’t do young people.  
(Howker and Malik 2010, 154) 
 
We may hope that quotas would contribute to increasing young voters’ turnout. To 
reply to Shiv Malik’s quote, one may hope that youth quotas may send the explicit 
message: “Politics does young people now”. The presence of some young people in 
parliaments may thus act as a strong symbolic gesture to reengage young people in 
political communities, potentially increasing their voting turnouts. 
 
Youth quotas also have the potential to increase the vertical communication 
between constituents and their MPs. Increased diversity amongst MPs, Mansbridge 
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(1999, 641-643) argues, can have an impact on people’s likeliness to visit their 
MPs. She draws on studies that suggested that Black people in the US were more 
likely to go see their Congressperson if they were Black. Age membership is very 
different from other identities, but one could speculate that older people may feel 
more confident in sharing their concerns with a MP from their generation. 
Similarly, we can imagine cases where young people may feel more confortable 
communicating their concerns to representatives roughly their age instead of 
people the age of their parents or grand parents. They may fear, for instance, 
paternalistic or contemptuous responses to their problems. 
 
There only needs to be a few young MPs for this to work. Mansbridge (1999, 642) 
argues that one of the advantages of descriptive representation is that it can allow 
communication beyond formal constituencies. Women representatives may act as 
surrogate representatives for women who share their views across various 
constituencies. So the vertical communication may be improved, through an 
increased communication between populations and surrogate descriptive 
representatives. This way, age diversity could contribute to enhancing the vertical 
communication between constituents and MPs. The absence of young 
representatives, on the contrary, prevents such opportunities for vertical 
communication between young people throughout constituencies and young 
surrogate representatives. 29  
 
Notice that the introduction of youth quotas may also have effects on youth 
participation in politics that do not result from the symbolic effects of quotas. Quite 
straightforwardly, the introduction of youth quotas would have to be followed and 
supported by the introduction of other measures. Upstream, the young will have to 
be trained earlier and this may involve better civic education in schools. Parties 
will have to actively engage in recruiting young people and in developing their 
youth wings so as to meet the quota requirements. Governments may have to fund 
campaigns, education programs and design training. De facto, the introduction of 
youth quotas would thus have to be followed by a series of other measures to 
enhance youth participation. Youth quotas must therefore be understood in light of 
this institutional ripple effect. As such, this is an argument for focusing on the 
introduction of quotas since it presupposes a series of other measures to be put in 
                                                      
29 Note that this is potentially also a point that falls into the substantive representation 
argument. If there is a better vertical communication as a result of youth quotas, this is also 
likely to improve the substantive representation of youth concerns in parliaments. 
Mansbridge classifies enhanced vertical communication under the category of substantive 
representation (Mansbridge 1999, 641-643). 
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place. It is properly radical in this sense because its implementation necessitates an 
entire rethink of how to train and integrate more young people into politics. 
 
To conclude, in Section 6.2, I introduced the demonstrative symbolic value of 
descriptive representation and argued that youth quotas could be seen as an 
attestation of the equal political status of the young, and that it could contribute to 
the creation of a social meaning of equal ability to rule. I then showed that youth 
quotas also had a more directly instrumental symbolic value: youth quotas could 
contribute to enhancing young people’s feelings of inclusion and can help in 
reengaging young people in their political communities. One potential impact of 
youth quotas could be an increase in voting turnouts from the young. Another 
potential impact of youth quotas could be an enhanced vertical communication 
between young people and MPs. For these two kinds of symbolic reasons, youth 
quotas could thus bring us closer to the ideal of a community of relational equals. 
If, somewhere down the line, quotas can contribute to increasing the political 
participation of young people, then we will not have to be concerned about the 
interests of the young being sidelined as much. In this way, quotas can be said to 
increase legitimacy and to enhance our chances of meeting the demands of 
intergenerational justice.   
 
The two kinds of symbolic values I have highlighted – demonstrative and 
instrumental – are extensively connected. The symbolic effects of youth quotas 
arise from the demonstrative potential they have. However, separating them adds 
one level of argumentation for quotas. While the impact of youth quotas on 
‘feelings of inclusion’ and on youth political participation can be measured, the 
properly demonstrative political value is not quantifiable. It is valuable because of 
what it means and attests. It is difficult not to have in mind potential symbolic 
effects when considering their value, but analytically at least, they can be 
separated. And, while the symbolic effects can be proved or disproved, the 
demonstrative value may be thought as more intrinsically valuable.  
 
6.3 Age(or(Cohort(Quotas?(
 
Let me now discuss what I take to be an important distinction that has been running 
through my argument for youth quotas in this chapter. A fundamental distinction 
can in fact be made between two types of youth quotas: age quotas and cohort 
 
196 
quotas30. We can either introduce age quotas to make sure that there are always a 
certain number of young people in parliaments, or we can introduce cohort quotas 
to make sure that minority cohorts like the ‘jilted generation’ get fairly represented 
throughout their lives. Implementing age quotas for young people would consist in 
having, at any time a certain number of MPs under the age of 30 (or 35) years old. 
We could for instance say that at any time there always needs to be over 50 young 
people in national parliaments. Implementing cohort quotas, on the other hand, 
would consist in having a certain number of seats reserved for each cohort. The 
idea here would be to protect some minority cohort from being underrepresented. If 
we consider that at any given time there are about four voting birth cohorts (for 
instance currently the baby boomers generation, their parents, generation X and 
generation Y) then we should consider that none of these generations may have 
fewer representatives than 50 (for instance). Consider the following age 
composition of the French Parliament.  
 
Figure 10 - French MPs by age (Assemblée Nationale 2012) 
 
This diagram represents the number of MPs per age group. Even though it 
represents age groups, it gives us information on how different birth cohorts are 
being represented: the baby boomers, born in approximately 1946/64 are between 
50 and 68 now. They clearly constitute the most represented cohort.  
 
We must now separate age effect from cohort effect. It is likely to be the case that 
most MPs will always be between 40 and 70 years old. Older MPs will perhaps 
consider that they cannot keep up with the position’s workload and younger MPs 
will perhaps feel like they want to gain more experience first, including studies, 
training, and jobs. If this trend remains over time, then different cohorts will be 
represented fairly over their whole lives. In this case, we would not need cohort 
quotas. However, if it turned out that minority cohorts were underrepresented over 
                                                      
30 I am indebted to Axel Gosseries for very insightful discussions on the implications of the 
distinction. 
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time, introducing cohort quotas could be an important option. It could guarantee 
that representations do not become too disproportionate by securing a minimum 
number of seats to avoid the risk of majority generations getting a better 
representation of their interests over their complete lives. In light of the distinction 
between age and cohort quotas I just introduced, let me briefly go back to previous 
discussions to examine which quotas have been under discussion in the arguments 
of substantive and symbolic representation. 
 
It seems that age quotas would help in accounting better for the experiences and 
interests of the young, because, as I have argued, a diversity of age-related 
experiences is likely to improve the understanding of challenges faced by different 
age groups and reduce the risk of misrepresentation. If we are concerned about 
youth unemployment and poverty and are dissatisfied about imprudent and short-
term institutional planning, then it seems that it is the absence of young people in 
parliament, as an age group, that we are primarily concerned with. The hopes that 
youth quotas may prevent the exclusion of some age-related interests, increase the 
vigor of advocacy on behalf of the young, and instigate change through a 
broadening of policy options would be primarily served (if at all) by the 
introduction of age quotas for the young. The need for age quotas is reinforced by 
the current trend of the aging of most European countries. If the young constitute a 
decreasing minority, then the relevance of age quotas will persist over time.  
 
As we saw earlier, however, the various problems that we have identified also have 
a cohortal dimension. There are in fact a few reasons why we may call for the 
introduction of cohort quotas for the young. First, as I have already mentioned, 
while older MPs have been younger, they have been younger at an earlier time. For 
this reason, if we are concerned with accounting for a larger variety of experiences, 
what we really need is to introduce some cohortal diversity in parliament. In fact, 
making it all about age would be misleading, since it would give more strength to 
the complete life intuition that all MPs have been young once and can therefore 
voice youth experiences and concerns. The conjunction of age effect with period 
effect, however, gives rise to a series of cohortal experiences that need to be 
accounted for in parliament.  
 
Second, imprudent planning often leads to diachronic disadvantage and can scar a 
whole generation. For this reason, the members of the ‘jilted generation’ are 
expected to fare relatively worse than the previous generation over their complete 
lives, at least in terms of job opportunities and economic security (Chauvel 2010). I 
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have already discussed how high rates of poverty and unemployment are likely to 
be correlated with further experiences of unemployment, poverty and exclusion 
throughout the lifespan, but youth disengagement from politics is also likely to lead 
to further disengagement from politics in the long run. In his paper on young 
citizens and voting turnout, Edward Phelps (2004) for instance analyses data that 
suggests that lower voting turnout among the young today may not result from an 
age effect but from a cohort effect. Comparing different cohorts as they age, he 
worries that turnouts among younger cohorts will not increase as they age. To 
address this double cohortal challenge, institutions should give a voice to 
particularly impaired and disengaged cohorts throughout their lives, and not only 
when they are young.  
 
The introduction of cohort quotas could be needed to mitigate the risk of a skewing 
away of policies towards the interests of majority cohorts. The problem is not only 
the political absence of young people, as an age group, it is their exclusion, as a 
birth cohort. Both problems currently overlap, but over time, two different 
problems could develop. The baby boomers, as a majority generation, will still 
have disproportionate power over the next generation when they will not be 
‘young’ anymore. To gain and keep power, politicians are likely to shift their 
policies towards the interests of the growing majority of pensioners and to neglect 
the interests of younger members of society. It is not that there is a conscious plot 
by the baby-boomers to disregard the interests of their children. As Malik and 
Howker claim, there is a “skewing of policy away from the interests of the jilted 
generation and towards those of their parents – not by any conscious effort by 
voters, but simply because of the numbers” (Howker and Malik 2010, 157).  
 
The result is a risk that institutions that meet the needs of different age groups will 
be framed according to this concern for pleasing the majority cohort rather than 
based on what is prudent, urgent, fair or sustainable. Implementing cohort quotas 
by making sure that there are at least a certain number of members of the minority 
cohort in parliament at any given time may thus lower the risk of the political 
exclusion of smaller or relatively more disenfranchised cohorts – at least at the 
representation level. Of course, such impact, as I have mentioned throughout this 
chapter, would be limited since it would only undermine the representation 
problem downstream and not directly the upstream voting problem. However, 
while the underrepresentation of such cohorts in parliaments would risk reinforcing 
the problem, more equal representation can reduce it. 
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Last, the epistemic value of diversity may provide reasons for both age and cohort 
quotas. If it is likely that age-diversity is correlated with cognitive diversity, then 
this is likely to be both due to the fact that we change when we age, and that we are 
educated differently based on when we were born. Indeed, over time, educational 
systems significantly modify the knowledge they deliver, the methods they 
employ, the relationship to knowledge they transmit and the technologies they use. 
For this reason, different generations are likely to have a different kind of input 
into deliberations. Intergenerational diversity is thus likely to be both valuable for 
age-based reasons and for cohortal reasons. 
 
In practice, cohort quotas could take the form of age quotas for the jilted 
generation’s members, as they age. If it turned out that there was a very low 
number of 40 years old MPs in 20 years and then a very low number of 60 years 
old MPs in 40 years, then the political inclusion of the jilted generation would have 
been threatened for their entire lives. Since age is an indicator of the birth cohort 
one belongs to, cohort quotas might turn out to be implemented through age: the 
best way to implement these cohort quotas may perhaps be to set a minimum 
number of 40 year-olds and then a minimum number of 60-years-old MPs (if a 
problem arises in terms of their representation). The distinction is nonetheless 
important to identify better what kind of problems we are dealing with. Imagine the 
following two hypothetical examples, which I name age-unjust parliament and 
cohort-unjust parliament.  
 
In age-unjust parliament, on the one hand, policies are always biased against the 
young. There are no representatives under the age of 35 years old and decisions are 
always based on misrepresentations. Decisions violate the lifespan efficiency 
principle – the age-unjust parliament is dominated by a middle-aged-centric 
perspective on what a good life requires. Their motto is: ‘frugal young age and 
opulent old age’. Now imagine that, in such society, the motto ‘frugal young age 
opulent old age’ applies to everyone as they age. This society can be described as 
unjust for prudential reasons: lifespan sufficiency may be violated if the frugal 
youth involves insufficient resources for the young to live a minimally decent life, 
and the lifespan efficiency principle is infringed on. This society may also be 
unjust from the point of view of synchronic relational equality: the young may be 
at higher risk of being dominated, controlled or exploited by older age groups. The 
approximate cohort equality principle, however, is fulfilled if it is the case that 
every cohort is treated the same over time. Here it seems clear that mitigating the 
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risk of such age-unjust parliament requires the introduction of age quotas for young 
people.  
 
In cohort-unjust parliament, on the other hand, deliberations are also biased against 
the young, and the ‘frugal youth opulent old age’ lifestyle is preferred too. 
However, there is no continuity: as they age, the young have to endure a frugal 
middle age, and then a frugal old age. Cohort-unjust parliament shapes policies in a 
way that always serves the majority cohort as they age. Such planning thus 
threatens approximate cohort equality: it is cohort quotas, rather than age quotas, 
that are needed to mitigate the bias in deliberations. Members of younger cohorts 
in parliaments may act as watchdogs for the sustainability of policies. The age 
unjust and cohort unjust parliaments illustrate the two distinct problems that give 
rise to the need to conceptualize cohort representation as well as age 
representation.  
 
Let me now consider a real example. Pieter Vanhuysse (2013) designed an index to 
calculate intergenerational fairness. One of the measures he uses is the Elderly Bias 
in Social Spending’ (EBiSS). He compares the per capita spending per elderly 
person (65 years old or over) to the per capita spending on 20-64 year-olds in 
OECD countries. The following spending was included in the measurements: 
 
On the elderly-oriented spending side, the EBiSS numerator includes old-
age-related benefits in cash and in kind, survivors benefits in cash and in 
kind, disability pensions, occupational injury and disease-related pensions, 
and early retirement for labor market reasons. On the nonelderly-spending 
side, the EBiSS denominator includes family benefits in cash and in kind, 
active labor market programs, income maintenance cash benefits, 
unemployment compensation and severance pay cash benefits, and all 
education spending.  
(Vanhuysse 2014, 6) 
 
Healthcare is not included in the calculations, so the EBiSS is very likely to 
significantly underestimate the ratio. The EBiSS is only one measure among many 
others (including levels of child poverty, ecological footprint, debt per child, etc.), 
but it is interesting to illustrate our discussion of age and cohort unjust parliaments. 
The results Vanhuysse found are illustrated in the graph below: 
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Figure 11 - Elderly bias in social spending (Vanhuysse 2013, 27) 
 
The OECD countries surveyed operate very different levels of EBiSS, from over 
eight times as much per elderly person than non-elderly person in Poland, to 
slightly over four times as much in Germany, to under three times as much in 
South Korea. There is nothing intrinsically unfair about these ratios as such. Such 
imbalances in ratios may just be required to meet the demands of the lifespan 
sufficiency principle: only it takes much more to bring the elderly above this 
threshold than it does younger people.  
 
However, it could be the case that some of these imbalances are unjustified. Take 
the case of Greece: the state spends seven times more for every elderly Greek as 
for every non-elderly Greek (2007-2008). Such imbalances may be morally 
unproblematic if (a) the ratio is in fact the best expression of prudent planning and 
synchronic relational quality, and (b) if such spending are sustainable over time. 
However, if it is the case that no young persons have taken part in the 
deliberations, then this increases the suspicion that decision may be taken by age or 
cohort unjust parliament. If (a) is not met, we may be in an age-unjust parliament. 
If (b) is not met, then we may be in a cohort-unjust parliament. One could perhaps 
argue that, the lower a country scores in terms of intergenerational fairness as 
measured by Vanhuysse (when examining EBiSS ratios, ecological footprints, 
child poverty, youth unemployment, etc.), the more problematic the absence of 
young people in parliaments may be. 
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This case further exemplifies the implications of the distinction between age and 
cohort quotas for the question of the substantive representation of youth interests in 
parliaments. When the EBiSS is abnormally high, or when young people’s poverty 
and unemployment is very high, the burden of proof lies on those who are in the 
cohort or age group that seems to be privileged by social spending to explain why 
this is not problematic. If the political system that legitimises those imbalances is 
itself in the grip of an intergenerational democratic deficit, then the least we can do 
is to make sure some representatives of the relevant age group or cohorts take part 
in the deliberation, on substantive representative grounds. 
 
Would age or cohort quotas be better placed to help achieve the aims of symbolic 
representation? It is young people as an age group that are not included in the 
community of political equals, because they have only recently become adults. 
People are more likely to find the silence and invisibility of the young acceptable 
in comparison with other age groups because they are seen as inexperienced. For 
this reason the young are always likely to be politically marginalised. And yet, for 
the symbolic reasons we have highlighted in the preceding section, the political 
exclusion of young adults is in tension with the goal of synchronic relational 
equality. Of course, other age groups may be marginalized and invisible in 
parliaments. If it turned out that there were no elderly in parliaments, this would be 
a problem for the goal of a community of equals too. If Phelps (2004) is right that 
the disengagement in voting turnout could be sign of a cohortal disengagement 
from formal politics, then it is possible that what we may need, on symbolic 
grounds, is both age and cohort quotas. 
 
6.4 Conclusions(
 
In this chapter, I have considered the introduction of youth quotas in parliament as 
a radical policy reform to address the low political participation of young people. I 
have highlighted two sets of arguments for the descriptive representation of the 
young in parliament: some relating to the substantive representation of their 
interests and some to do with its symbolic value. I argued that jointly these two sets 
of arguments provided a good basic for a politics of youth presence. I then pointed 
to an original distinction between cohort quotas and age quotas and examined 
which kinds of quotas specifically had been under discussion as youth quotas. I 
suggested that cohort quotas could be implemented through age quotas, and that 
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the distinction could vanish in practice, but showed why the justifications behind 
the implementation of youth quotas are both age-based and cohortal.  
 
This final chapter has been concerned with highlighting some important potential 
benefits of quotas for the young in parliaments from the point of view of 
intergenerational equality, and has suggested that the introduction of youth quotas 
in legislatures should be seriously considered. The philosophical discussions have 
drawn on empirical evidence and the arguments have been concerned with 
informing practice. However, the question of how youth quotas can be enforced 
effectively remains largely beyond the scope of this enquiry.  I have focused on 
directly elected bodies of representation and their non-descriptive 
representativeness. For this reason, I only focused on lower chambers. However, it 
is important to note that, in practice, it would be much easier to introduce youth 
quotas in the House of Lords than in the House of Commons since members of the 
upper house are appointed. The House of Lords is fundamentally problematic from 
the point of view of legitimacy, but if we are concerned with outcomes and 
symbols, as we were in this chapter, then we could also consider the nomination of 
young people in upper chambers where only 4% of members are under 50 years 
old and only 17% under 60. The House of Lords is a strong symbol of the 
veneration of the elders in the UK. For this reason, symbolically, the appointment 
of 50 people under the age of 35 years old, for instance, could have some symbolic 
power. The same could be said of the French Senate, which also has only 4% of 
members under the age of 50 years old.  
 
As far as lower chambers are concerned, youth quotas would be easier to introduce 
in proportional elections than in first-past-the post systems. In proportional systems 
with party lists, it is relatively easy for parties to meet quota regulations in general, 
because there is a larger pool of candidates to pick from. In fact, the Moroccan 
parliament, which has both women and youth quotas (30 reserved seats for under 
40 years old) in place, operates with a list system, which facilitates the operation of 
these quotas. In non-proportional systems, parties would need to put forward young 
people in safe seats and it would be more difficult to meet their targets. It would 
thus be easier to introduce youth quotas for the European parliamentary elections 
than for the UK or French general elections. There is very little data on the few 
experiments with youth quotas in Africa. A more in depth engagement with the 
practicalities of its implementations could help in seeing which implementation 
strategies work best and in establishing a feasible strategy for first-past-the-post 
electoral systems too.  
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CONCLUSION(
 
 
This thesis has explored the normative significance of time and age for egalitarian 
justice and provided an egalitarian account of justice between overlapping 
generations. When we apply egalitarian comparison to people born at different 
times, I asked whether we should do so synchronically (at this specific point in 
time) or diachronically (over the course of their lives). My answer to this question 
was ‘both’. Contrary to what the default distributive view claims, complete lives 
are not the only relevant time unit of egalitarian concern. I have claimed that, to be 
justified, inequalities between overlapping generations must meet the three 
following principles: (1) approximate cohort equality; (2) prudent planning 
(lifespan sufficiency and efficiency); and (3) synchronic relational equality 
between age groups. Based on this principled theory of intergenerational equality, I 
proposed an account of what treating young people as equals means, in theory and 
practice. This general conclusion summarizes the thesis’ main arguments, 
highlights directions for future research and emphasizes the thesis’ core 
contributions. 
 
Summary(of(the(Thesis((
 
Part I was structured in four chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the concepts of 
intergenerational justice (including the distinction between age groups and birth 
cohorts) and the dominant answer to the equality through time debate – complete 
lives egalitarianism. I explained why CLE became established as the default view: 
it corresponds to the (itself dominant) metaphysical view of persons as unified 
selves from birth to death; it is the other side of the coin of the anti-utilitarian 
separateness of persons argument, which views interpersonal inequalities as 
fundamentally distinct from intrapersonal inequalities; and it naturally follows 
from the (luck) egalitarian ideals of responsibility and compensation, which fits 
well the diachronic approach. While CLE finds inequalities between birth cohorts 
to be prima facie objectionable, I showed, it does not register inequalities between 
age groups as objects of egalitarian concern.  
 
I accepted the first cohortal implications of CLE by showing that there is some 
moral significance to younger and future cohorts having access to an at least equal 
set of opportunities as they ‘begin the world’; and I put forward approximate 
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cohort equality as an important intergenerational egalitarian principle. However, I 
ended Chapter 1 by taking issue with the implications of CLE for age-group 
justice. Pure CLE does not offer any resources on its own to oppose some 
inequalities between age groups, beyond their derivative impact on inequalities 
between birth cohorts. As a result, both the question of what institutions must do 
for different age groups and of which limits should be set to age-based 
discrimination are left unexplored. Although the idea that age is ‘special’ compared 
to gender or race has some intuitive strength, it does not follow that all inequalities 
between age groups should be considered acceptable. For this purpose, Chapters 2 
and 3 offered two important complements to CLE: the first says that inequalities 
between age groups are fair only when they are prudent and the second adds that 
age-based inequalities in treatment must not create relationships of domination.   
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced Norman Daniels’s diachronic prudential theory of age-
group justice. I provided a principled interpretation of the outcomes of the 
prudential lifespan account around the lifespan sufficiency and lifespan efficiency 
principles. The first prudential principle demands that institutions ensure that 
people have enough at any point to be above an absolute threshold defined by 
appeal to basic human needs, and a relative threshold set at the level of an age-
relative normal opportunity range. After rejecting a series of objections to the 
prudential account coming from within the diachronic paradigm, I concluded that 
the account stands on firm ground as an adequate diachronic complement to CLE.  
 
However, I introduced the important concern with intrapersonal prudence that it 
inherited from previous theories an understanding of age-group issues as residual, 
thus conceptualizing age-group issues in isolation from other questions of social 
justice, including social class. I showed that: at best, Daniels misses out on the 
potential of institutions that meet age groups’ needs to reduce many other 
inequalities; at worst, the PLA risks working against the goal of the Rawlsian 
egalitarian theory that frames Daniels’s account. I thus argued for the critical need 
to reconnect the requirements of age-group justice to broader discussions of social 
justice.  
 
In Chapter 3, drawing on McKerlie’s simultaneous segments approach, I offered an 
account of the moral significance of synchronic inequalities in general, and in 
particular between age groups. I contended that synchronic inequalities have 
normative value beyond their derivative impact on both complete lives equality and 
lifespan prudence. However, I argued that McKerlie’s synchronic alternative, while 
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it expresses important intuitions about the limitations of CLE and the prudential 
lifespan account, is inadequate. The main problem with simultaneous segments 
egalitarianism is that the least arbitrary segment to apply the value of distributive 
equality is the whole life segment. CLE would thus be, I claimed, the par 
excellence segment of distributive justice. 
 
I then argued that there was an alternative way to explain our reluctance to accept 
instances of synchronic inequalities, such as the Unequal City and Swapping 
Castes examples. I appealed to the relational egalitarian conception of equality to 
account for the moral significance of synchronic inequalities that occur at any one 
time. I put forward the synchronic relational egalitarian principle as a 
supplementary egalitarian way to think about what can be wrong about inequalities 
between age groups: phases of domination do not cancel out diachronically and are 
problematic even if they create positive overall lifespan utility. When assessing 
forms of synchronic inequalities, we need to examine the imbalances in status, 
respect, power and voice that they contain or generate. 
 
In Chapter 4, I argued that the three principles offered the outline of a 
comprehensive theory of justice between overlapping generations. I claimed that 
the principles were individually insufficient, but jointly complementary. I also 
argued that we should aim to accommodate all dimensions through institutional 
planning, and that no principle takes lexical priority over others. From the 
theoretical framework, I then derived four implications for what counts as treating 
the young as equals, in a way that displayed significant sensitivity to other social 
inequalities. Young people are treated as equals when their communities 
acknowledge them as relational equals and when they are able to stand free from 
domination (synchronic relational equality); when institutions ensure their access 
to sufficient resources to enjoy a normal opportunities range (lifespan sufficiency); 
when institutions pre-distribute resources so as to promote a life of good quality, 
prevent the diachronic clustering of disadvantage and minimize the formation of 
unequal life courses (lifespan efficiency); and when institutions mitigate the 
scarring effects that undermine their long-term prospects as a cohort (approximate 
cohort equality).  
 
In Part II, I made explicit the implications of this account of intergenerational 
justice for concrete public policies. Chapter 5 discussed the important debate about 
unconditional cash between basic income and basic capital proponents. I argued 
that, even though at first sight basic capital seems to be a better diachronic 
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candidate, closer scrutiny shows that basic income is preferable. I then argued that 
the synchronic relational egalitarian principle provides another strong reason to 
prefer basic income to basic capital.  I concluded that basic income should be the 
baseline for egalitarian universal cash policies. In light of the important diachronic 
power of basic capital and its potential in fostering social mobility, I nonetheless 
considered the possibility to complement the basic income baseline with an early 
lump sum (Baby Bond proposal), but without undermining what makes basic 
income normatively superior from the point of view of equality through time – the 
fact that it ensures a lifelong of basic economic security and promotes synchronic 
relational equality.  
  
In Chapter 6, I looked at the problem of the underrepresentation of young people in 
parliaments and put forward arguments for the introduction of youth quotas. I 
highlighted two sets of arguments for the descriptive representation of the young in 
parliament: some relating to the substantive representation of young people’s 
interests and some to do with the symbolic value of quotas in fostering the goal of 
a community of equals. I argued that jointly these two sets of arguments provide a 
good basis for a politics of youth presence in parliaments. I then discussed an 
original distinction between cohort quotas and age quotas. I suggested that cohort 
quotas could be implemented through age quotas, and that the distinction could 
vanish in practice, but I showed that the justifications behind the implementation of 
youth quotas are both age-based and cohortal. From the point of view of young 
people’s diachronic and synchronic interests, and for the goal of a community of 
relationally equal citizens, I concluded, the introduction of youth quotas should be 
seriously considered.  
 
Avenues(for(Future(Research(
 
There are at least three related topics that deserve to be researched in the future. 
First, the theme of personal responsibility has largely been left in the background 
of this thesis. I have only discussed individual responsibility in Chapter 1, when I 
explained the intuitive pull of the diachronic view for responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarians, in Chapter 2, to show that Daniels’s account leaves some space for 
ambition-sensitivity, and in Chapters 3 and 5, when mentioning the harshness of 
luck egalitarianism for those who do not succeed. I did not focus on individual 
responsibility more than this because there was a great deal of work to be done 
investigating intergenerational equality per se before turning to personal 
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responsibility. Moreover, I wanted to go against the trend of anti-youth rhetoric 
and policies that overwhelmingly focus on the young’s behaviour. However, in the 
future, it would be worthwhile to look at how the discussed principles of 
intergenerational equality might be articulated more closely to individual 
responsibility. My suspicion, however, is that the synchronic relational equality 
principle, which state that people must be free from wrongful relational 
inequalities, will stand in the way of most attempts to justify too significant 
synchronic inequalities, even if they are the result of individual choices made in the 
past. Rather than personal responsibility, a more promising angle to approach this 
question would perhaps be to discuss the space that egalitarian ideals of solidarity, 
contribution and reciprocity should take in a theory of intergenerational equality. 
 
Investigating what treating the elderly as equals requires could be a second avenue 
worth exploring. I have already mentioned some of the implications of my 
framework for what we owe the elderly, especially in Chapter 3, when I put 
forward the synchronic relational principle as an objection to the Unequal City 
example. However, this thesis has primarily focused on young people, as it had set 
out to do. It would be worth thinking more about the implications of my views for 
pension policies - although my argument for a basic income from birth to death has 
already pointed to the importance of unconditional cash for all age groups. I also 
expect that the synchronic relational equality principle would be a relevant 
perspective from which to examine the treatment of disadvantaged elderly in care-
homes, for instance. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 4, I think that although the 
principles I have put forward do not importantly conflict in the case of young 
people, they may be in greater conflict when focusing on what we owe the elderly. 
Lifespan efficiency, for instance, which encourages pre-distributive policies, may 
conflict with lifespan sufficiency, which encourages compensatory policies 
whenever needed, to bring people up to a certain level.  
 
Last, I have focused on basic income and the challenge posed by the basic capital 
grant. But it would also be important to address the labourist challenge to basic 
income. Indeed, policy proposals aimed a youth unemployment are often labourist 
in that they propose solutions that are conditional on the young working. 
Conditional benefits, workfare programmes or youth guarantee proposals are 
varied, but they have in common that they foresee work-based solutions as 
preferable to unconditional benefits, and they see the obligation to work as going 
hand-in-hand with the right to an income. My framework would serve an 
interesting purpose if it could help in differentiating and assessing the various 
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proposals’ relative diachronic and synchronic advantages; and ultimately rank them 
accordingly.  
 
It is interesting that the European commission’s proposal (2012) for a youth job 
guarantee draws on the scarring effects of youth unemployment and on the fact 
that early experiences of employment improve one’s chances of having a job in the 
future. An argument for a youth job guarantee as promoting lifespan efficiency 
better than does BI (and for a smaller cost to the taxpayer) could be made. There is 
a sense that giving unconditional cash to the young settles for less in this way. If 
young people want jobs and are unemployed in large numbers and we give them 
cash instead, it may feel like we are merely compensating them for an important 
opportunity that they should have access to (Harvey 2013, Tcherneva 2013).  
 
In the future, I could respond to this challenge to basic income and argue that, far 
from settling for less, BI settles for more, for some of the reasons highlighted in 
Chapter 5 and beyond. It seems to me that the synchronic relational egalitarian 
principle is likely to give us strong reasons to oppose programmes that coerce 
young individuals into jobs they do not want. Moreover, although unemployment 
scars people’s lives as a whole, bad jobs do too. In defence of BI, one argument 
could be made, along the lines of Guy Standing (2013), that an unconditional basic 
income is required for a meaningful right to work. Or at least, my framework 
would help in isolating job-based solutions that are satisfactory diachronically and 
synchronically from those that are not. This discussion also intersects with some of 
the research questions on contribution and reciprocity that I have already 
mentioned. 
 
Research(contributions(
 
This thesis has addressed a series of important questions that have been 
insufficiently explored by contemporary egalitarian thinkers. By taking time and 
age seriously, I offered a number of original theoretical and practical arguments at 
the intersection of the political philosophy of egalitarianism, intergenerational 
justice and public policy. Three significant aspects of my contribution are worth 
emphasizing.  
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Intergenerational equality 
 
I have contributed to the theory of intergenerational justice through highlighting 
the generational implications of the abstract ‘equality through time’ debate. I have 
shown that questions of justice between overlapping generations raise important 
normative questions, thus challenging the view that intergenerational justice 
primarily concerns relations between non-contemporaries. My focus on 
overlapping generations has been both on age groups and birth cohorts. I clarified 
what was at stake behind this demographic distinction and particularly contributed 
to the under researched field of age-group justice through: (1) identifying three 
principles of age-group justice – lifespan sufficiency, lifespan efficiency and 
synchronic relational equality; (2) showing how these principles could guide the 
design of just institutions in a non-residual manner; (3) looking at concrete 
examples of policies that further these goals.  
 
Moreover, I have shown that questions of age-group justice are in fact of primary 
importance when discussing what we owe to the young and the elderly, and that the 
overlooking of age-group issues in the literature is not justified. It is one thing to 
know that institutions ought to be sustainable and that we ought to correct and 
compensate for important inequalities between cohorts when they arise - as the 
approximate equality between cohorts principle enjoins. It is another to know how 
institutions should be designed to meet people’s needs throughout their lives. I did 
not go as far as kicking away the cohortal ladder with which this thesis’ 
investigation began – that is, I did not abandon the cohortal principle or consider it 
insignificant. However, I did suggest that the prudential and synchronic relational 
requirements of age-group justice are more informative than the cohortal principle, 
when it comes to overlapping generations.  
 
Egalitarianism 
 
I have aimed to contribute to egalitarian thinking by showing that questions of time 
and age cannot be considered as residual when theorizing equality. I have 
explained why these questions have been overlooked by egalitarian theories, and I 
showed how Daniels’s account of age-group justice inherits the conceptualization 
of these matters as residual. I advocated an intersectional approach to equality that 
integrates questions of age and time at its core. One suggestion was to focus on the 
diachronic clustering of disadvantage model to elucidate the lifespan efficiency 
requirement in a way that articulates prudential lifespan concerns, on the one hand, 
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with the development of inequalities in advantage over the life course and the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty, on the other hand.  
 
In addition to this, I have argued that the purely distributive approach to equality, 
which I have shown explains the focus on complete lives well, is insufficient and 
must be complemented by a relational egalitarian approach to explain adequately 
our strong intuitive reluctance to accept some synchronic inequalities as 
unproblematic. Therefore, I have contributed to an important current egalitarian 
debate (between distributive and relational conceptions) and hope to have made a 
strong case for why, even if we care about distributive inequalities, we must 
endorse the relational conception of inequality to make proper sense of some 
important inequalities between age groups.  
 
Philosophy of Public Policy 
 
I believe that this thesis is an illustration of what political philosophy, including in 
its ideal forms, can do for politics. The diachronic/synchronic and 
distributive/relational distinctions I have discussed help unpack the normative 
disagreements underpinning public policies as different as the basic income 
proposal and the introduction of youth quotas in parliament. For instance, I 
challenged the view that the underrepresentation of young people in parliament is 
largely unproblematic, because the young will get an equal representation over 
their complete lives. Similarly, the intergenerational framework I put forward 
revealed some important conflicts in value between basic income and basic capital 
and showed that if we embrace a time-sensitive comprehensive egalitarian 
approach, we should prefer basic income as a baseline. Moreover, I have offered an 
account of what we owe to young people, both as an age group and as a birth 
cohort, which can inform youth policies. For instance, the original distinction 
between age and cohort quotas for the young revealed the different reasons we may 
have for supporting the policy. The normative conclusions that I have reached in 
this thesis can be used to shed some lights on other policy debates. And the thesis 
can serve as an example of what political philosophy can do for public policy. 
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List(of(Abbreviations((
 
PPP Philosophy of Public Policy 
IG Justice Intergenerational Justice 
CLE Complete Lives Egalitarianism 
SSE Simultaneous Segments Egalitarianism 
PLA Prudential Lifespan Account 
JSA Jobseeker Allowance 
BI Basic Income 
YBI Youth Basic Income 
BC Basic Capital 
YQs Youth Quotas 
( (
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